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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to generate a
sociological conception of academic freedom from an
examination of the social context in which it operates.
Three variables are analyzed:

academic freedom, the

American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
as an advocate of academic freedom, and academic organi
zation.

Academic freedom is treated historically and

analytically in reference to its practice in the United
States.

The AAUP is analyzed in terms of the Associ

ation's impact on the practice of academic freedom.
Two types of academic organization are distinguished:
formal or official organization and informal, reference
organization.

Post-World War Two cases of AAUP censure

of administrative officers and trustees of colleges and
universities are analyzed to demonstrate the interplay
of the three variables.
The idea of academic freedom in the United
States was not a domestic creation but was transplanted
from Germany b y American scholars in the nineteenth
century upon their return from study abroad.

The

largely paternalistic and proprietary character of
xi

American collegiate education, particularly in religious
colleges, was inimical to the development of academic
freedom,

only with the rise of research and graduate

education after 1850, styled largely on German models,
did academic freedom emerge as a forceful ideal in
American higher education*

Collective promotion of

principles of academic freedom culminated in the
formation of the AAUP in 1915.
The AAUP, a voluntary association of faculty
members in accredited U. S. colleges and universities,
promotes academic freedom through codification and
implementation of principles.

As an agency of codifi

cation, the Association has sponsored statements of
principles in 1915, 1925, and 1940.

These principles

(1940) have been endorsed by numerous other educational
associations.

The Association seeks to implement its

principles of academic freedom through several means,
chief among which is censure of institutional officers
found upon investigation to have violated these princi
ples.

Censure is removed upon reform of organizational

policy by the offending institution.
The formal or official organization of an aca
demic institution is comprised of role definitions and
norms governing role interaction.
xii

The roles are

differentiated according to function and hierarchy.
Academic freedom is dependent on the nature and extent
of authority vested in the faculty.

Prescribed patterns

of faculty autonomy are considered to promote academic
freedom.

The composition of the academic community,

according to the reference groups with which the members
identify themselves, also affects the practice of aca
demic freedom.

Following Robert Merton a distinction

between "cosmopolitans" and "locals" is applied hypo
thetically to academic organization.

Cosmopolitans,

who subscribe primarily to external values, are con
sidered to lend more support to norms of academic freedom
than do locals, who adhere to the particularistic values
of their institution.

Locals are hypothesized to be

overrepresented among administrators and trustees, cosmo
politans among the faculty.
From the perspective of academic organization,
academic freedom, conceived as a set of norms governing
the action of academic citizens, includes the following:
(1)

freedom of the faculty member in his role

as an academic specialist to criticize and to challenge
accepted theories, beliefs, and practices related to
his field of competence;
(2)

freedom of the faculty member in his role
xiii

as a citizen of the institution in which he serves to
criticize official policies and practices of his insti
tution, including actions of administrative officers
and trustees? and
(3)

freedom of the faculty member in his role

as a member of the academic profession to defend his
colleagues against perceived threats to, or violations
of, their academic freedom.
AAUP censure cases from 1945 to 1965 are
analyzed.

The findings with respect to patterns of

conflict, AAUP intervention, and censure resolution
support the viability of the conceptual analysis outlined
above.

xiv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom is not one freedom, but many.
To the sociologist, academic freedom is not one norm, but
a complex of norms attached to the role of faculty member
in institutions of higher learning.

The norms which com

prise academic freedom may be viewed as role prerogatives
of the faculty member in the performance of his role.
These norms reside in the relationship between the
faculty and the administrative officers of an insti
tution.

If norms of academic freedom are "rights" of

faculty roles, they are also, conversely, obligations of
administrative roles,

institutional administrative

officers are the guarantors of faculty role prerogatives
of freedom.
For the purpose of a preliminary definition
academic freedom may be considered to include the
following normative components for faculty roles:

(1)

freedom to criticize and challenge accepted theories,
beliefs, and practices related to one's field of compe
tence (in teaching, research, and publication);1 (2)
freedom to criticize the policies, programs, administration,

2
and governing board of one's institution; and (3) freedom
to defend one's colleagues against perceived threats to,
or violations of, their academic freedom.*
I.

STATEMENT

The overall purpose

OP PURPOSE
of this dissertation isto

generate a sociological conception of academic freedom.
The essential tasks in this endeavor are;

(1) to isolate

a set of norms which comprise "academic freedom" in con
ventional usage:

(2) to determine which elements of the

social organization of colleges and universities have a
bearing on the practice of academic freedom (that is,
which seem to have some causal relationship to academic
freedom); and (3) to outline the interrelations between
norms of

academic freedom and patterns of academic organ

ization.

After surveying the published literature on the

subject of academic freedom, the author is not aware of
any previous attempt to analyze the subject in this
manner.
II.

PLAN AND APPROACH OP THE STUDY

Academic freedom is by no means a precise
concept.

Historical analysis indicates the lack of

clarity that has surrounded the idea and its application.
Chapter two, "The Idea of Academic Freedom;

its Develop

ment in the united States,"is concerned with clarifying

3
various usages of the concept.

An attempt is made to

summarize the history of the idea in American experience.

3

Zn the latter part of that chapter the concept is analyzed
in some detail and is distinguished from some related
ideas with Which academic freedom is often confused.
The organization which has been the primary
advocate of norms of academic freedom in the united
States is the American Association of university Pro
fessors .4

The AAUP is a national voluntary association

of college and university faculty members, founded in
5
1915.
On the national level the AAUP promotes academic
freedom through several means, the chief of Which are:
(1) published policy statements pertaining to "standards”
of academic freedom;

(2) gaining the endorsement of other

professional and educational associations for its standards;
(3)

investigation of selected cases of alleged violations

of its standards; and (4) published lists of institutional
administrations "censured" for violations of its standards.6
Academic freedom has been the major concern of
the AAUP since its inception.

Because of the importance

of its role in the development of norms of academic freedom,
Chapter Three,
Professors:

"The American Association of university

Advocate of Academic Freedom," is devoted

exclusively to the policies, programs, and procedures of
the AAUP as a national organization

(as opposed to the

4
activities of the Association's local chapters).

In that

chapter attention is focused also on the evolution and
implementation of the Association's policies and procedures.
As stated at the outset, the norms which comprise
academic freedom may be looked upon as prerogatives of
certain professional roles in colleges and universities.
In this fact lies the relationship between academic freedom
and the social organization of the university.

Whether,

and to what extent, academic freedom exists in practice
depends upon the nature of the academic organization,
particularly the definition of faculty roles,

if, at a

given college, faculty roles are defined as analagous to
occupational roles of employees in the business world,
then it is not likely that academic freedom with respect
to criticism of the administration and its policies, for
instance, will exist in practice,

if, on the other hand,

faculty roles are imbued with professional status, such
that the faculty is considered the primary decision
making unit of the university, then the probability of
academic freedom in practice is greatly enhanced.

How

1

faculty roles are defined will depend on how the goals
and purposes of the college or university are conceived
and on the general role of the administration with respect
to those goals.

Chapter Four,

"Academic Organization and

5
Academic Freedom,11 includes a detailed examination of
the social organization of the academy and its bearing
on the conditions of academic freedom.
Academic freedom is not entirely a function of
the social organization of academic life.

Personalities

of individual administrators, trustees, and faculty
members will have, quite obviously, a bearing on the
extent of academic freedom in given situations,

one

college president may be quite "tyrannical” or authori
tarian, whereas another may be rather "democratic."

It is

not the purpose of this study, however, to delve into
individual personality inventories or biographies, nor
to seek out evidence of individual influences on academic
freedom in particular situations.

Such individual factors

are assumed to exist; they are taken as given.

This study

employs a sociological frame of reference, which neces
sarily limits the range of factors to be considered and
rules out the possibility of any "total" explanation of
academic freedom.

The purview of this study is limited

to patterns of academic life, its structure or organi
zation, and the relevance of these patterns to the norms
of academic freedom.
Chapter Five, "Academic Freedom Challenged:
Some Post-War Cases,” contains an analysis of some actual

6
cases of violation of principles of academic freedom.
The cases are all those of censure and subsequent^removal
from censure by the AAUP, from 1945 to 1965, of college
and university administrations for infractions of princi
ples of academic freedom and tenure as set forth in the
Association'8 1940 statement.

7

These cases represent a

wide variety of types of colleges and universities and
a diversity of infringements.

There are some cases of

censure imposed during this twenty year period which are
still in effect; that is, censure has not been removed,
as of 1966.8
There are two important reasons for limiting the
analysis to those cases which have been removed from
censure.

First, those cases still on the censure list

are "open" cases, yet to be resolved, and are "sensitive"
in the eyes of the AAUP.

Second, and more importantly,

the "closed" or resolved cases exemplify the maximum
influence of the AAUP (as compared to the "open" cases)
on the academic organization of given colleges and
universities.

In the closed cases, one may examine the

"successful" procedures of the AAUP and the response
(i.e., the change or adjustment) of the internal organi
zation and policy of an institution.

For in order to be

removed from censure an institution must satisfy the AAUP
that specific changes have been made in organization and

7
policy to conform to the principles of the Association's
1940 statement.
In the preface to their historical work on aca
demic freedom in the united States, Hofstadter and Metzger
state:
One of our earliest decisions in
planning this work was to make it
more than a running account of
"cases." To write only about the
outstanding violations of freedom
would be to treat the story of
academic freedom as though it were
nothing but the story of academic
suppression. The cases are, in a
sense, the pathology of the problem.
The distortions that would arise
from dealing with them alone are
comparable to those that would be
found in a history of the labor
movement telling only of strikes,
a history of science telling only
of the encroachments of theology,
or a history of political democracy
devoted only to its defeats.^
The same objection might be raised against the approach
used in Chapter Five of this study.

That is, is it merely

a pathology of academic freedom, a distorted view, to
analyze cases of violations of principles?

The objection

is met, the author believes, in that the cases treated in
Chapter Five had "successful" outcomes; the violations
were in some sense "rectified" and censure removed.
Furthermore, in examining such cases, one is enabled to
see better the conditions which promote, as well as retard,
academic freedom in practice.

Therefore, the pathological

8
element, per a e , is nonessential to the analysis.

The

cases simply offer a convenient framework in which view
the interplay of academic freedom and academic organi
zation .
Chapter Five, then, is concerned with the actual
interplay among the three variables discussed separately
in the three preceding chapters:

the concept of academic

freedom, the AAUP as advocate of academic freedom, and
academic organization, the framework within which the
practice of academic freedom must be imbedded, if it is
to exist as anything other than a fiction or an abstraction.
XII.

THE STUDY VARIABLES

At this point it is possible to conceptualize the
relationship among the three variables which comprise the
subject of this study.

The following discussion will

serve as a guideline for the analysis carried out in
detail in later chapters.
Figure 1 represents the elementary relationships
among the three variables.

In general terms academic

freedom is conceived to be a dependent variable, subject
to influence by both academic organization

(the structure

of the college or university) and the American Association
of University Professors.

The main independent variable

is the AAUP which "operates upon" academic freedom both

ACADEMIC
FREEDOM

ACADEMIC
ORGANIZATION

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

Figure 1. Relationships of three variables, Academic
Freedom, Academic organization, and the American
Association of university Professors. Arrowed line
indicates direction of relationships.

9

10
directly and through academic organization.

The Associ

ation exerts direct influence, for instance, through
promulgation of ideal standards or principles of academic
freedom.

The AAUP also promotes academic freedom in

directly (through academic organization) by encouraging
changes in academic structure

(e.g., institution of a

faculty senate) which are intended to enhance .academic
freedom.

In either type of case, of the three variables,

the prime mover is the AAUP.1-®
If a distinction is made between the practice of
academic freedom and the ideals or principles of academic
freedom, which are imperfectly represented in practice,
it is possible to refine the representation of the
variables of Figure 1 (see Figure 2).

in Figure 2, the

basic relationships among the three variables are retained.
The AAUP still represents the primary independent variable
and academic freedom, whether ideal or practice,
dependent variable.

is a

It is to be noted here, however, that

the AAUP exerts no direct influence on the practice of
academic freedom.

The influence of the Association is

always mitigated, or at least channeled through, the
structure of the university.

Again, as in Figure 1,

this influence may consist in, for instance,

(1) es

tablishing "principles" of academic freedom, which it
then seeks to have adopted or "put into practice" by

ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (IDEAL)

ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (PRACTICE)

ACADEMIC
ORGANIZATION

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

Figure 2. Relationship of four variables. Broken line
indicates absence of direct relation. Arrowed line
indicates direction of influence.

11

12
colleges and universities, or (2) promoting changes in
academic organization, such as greater faculty partici
pation in academic policy making, designed to promote
academic freedom in practice.
If the representation in Figure 2 has any merit
there are some interesting implications.

First, for the

understanding of academic freedom the internal organi
zation of academic life is of vital importance as an
intermediate variable because the practice of academic
freedom is dependent upon its structure.

Second, there

is no direct relation between academic freedom as an
ideal or set of standards, on the one hand, and the
practice of freedom in the organizational and behavioral
nexus of academic life on the other.

The link between

ideal and practice in this case is academic organization.
Therefore, to be viable, the principles of freedom must
be supported by, or rooted in, the organization of the
college or university.

Third, as noted earlier, the

AAUP does not exert any direct Influence on the practice
of academic freedom; rather all its influence is mediated
by academic organization.

Therefore, an association

such as the AAUP has to take into account, in its
promotion of academic freedom, the nature of academic
organization, both in general and in its many particular
varieties.

Finally, the foregoing would seem to imply

13
that a sociological approach, which by definition focuses
on organizational patterns and relationships, is especially
appropriate to the study of academic freedom.
Figure 3 is Identical to the previous one except
for the broken vertical line which bisects the figure,

on

the left is the "actual" college or university situation,
including the internal academic organization and the system
of practices related to academic freedom.

To the right of

the vertical line are the "abstract" set of norms and ideals
of academic freedom and their sponsor, the AAUP.

Together

these may be taken to represent the "academic profession."
The relationship among the variables is unchanged from
Figure 2.

It is to be noted that the AAUP, as a unit in

the academic profession is "external" to the actual
college or university situation and seeks to promote the
practice of academic freedom through college and uni
versity organization.
THE TIME SETTING
The two decades following the end of World war
Two have been selected as the time span in which to
examine a variety of problems of academic freedom in
their contemporary forms.

Chapter Five, as noted

earlier, is an analysis of post-war cases of AAUP-imposed
censure for violations of academic freedom.

The most

THE ACADEMIC
PROFESSION

COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (PRACTICE)

ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (IDEAL)

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

ACADEMIC
ORGANIZATION

IDEAL

ACTUAL

Figure 3. Relationship of variables within context of
colleges and universities and the academic profession.
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15
important reason for selecting this-period as opposed to
others is the establishment by the AAUP of a relatively
clearly defined set of principles of academic freedom and
tenure in 1940, which it has sought to promote since then
throughout the academic world.

Allowing for the disruptions

of the war and some early AAUP efforts to have its princi
ples of academic freedom made known and approved, it seems
well to use the year of the war's conclusion as the
starting point for the analysis of current problem of
academic freedom in the united States, viz-a-viz the
1940 AAUP standards.
The post-war period has been characterized by
several general trends of some relevance to higher edu
cation in general and to academic freedom in particular.
Some of these trends had their origin long before the
war, to be sure.

First, a substantial increase in the

total U.S. population, especially in the younger age
categories.1,1

Second, general economic prosperity,

interrupted by occasional downswings in business cycles.
Third, increased public demand for education, including
higher education.

Fourth, various manifestations of

anti-intellectualism, the most dramatic of which was the
McCarthy era of Comidunist "witch-hunts."

Fifth, con

tinuing concern, intensified by the "Cold War," with
national security, as exemplified by loyalty oaths in

16
higher education.

Sixth/ the relatively greater growth

in facilities of public, as opposed to private, higher
education as the result of local, state, and federal
financial support.

Seventh, increased public sensitivity

to social issues such as civil rights for minority groups.
Eighth, closer ties between colleges and the economic
needs of community and nation, such that universities
have become valued increasingly as training centers for
occupational roles.

Ninth, more emphasis on applied

knowledge and research in the universities to serve
specific needs of industry, commerce, agriculture, and
government.

Tenth, the burgeoning bureaucratization of

the universities.
Each of these trends has left its impact on the
character of academic life in higher education.

Several

of these elenfents are related and usually have acted in
conjunction, rather than singly, upon the structure of
the academic world.

For instance, the growth in the

size of the universities is closely tied to the trend of
bureaucratic organization.

The impact of some of these

trends on problems of academic freedom is made evident
in the analysis of censure cases in chapter Five.

More

over, these trends have served as the backdrop for the
recent development of academic freedom in the united
States.

17
In summary, the main concern of this study is
to examine the concept and practice of academic freedom
from a sociological viewpoints

Academic freedom is con

ceived as a complex of norms in relation to academic
organization*

Attention is focused on the extent and

manner in Which academic freedom is a dependent variable
of academic organization as well as on the policies and
programs of the American Association of university Pro
fessors in regard to academic freedom.

Chapter Two deals

with the historical development and contemporary usages
of the concept of academic freedom in the united States.
Chapter Three contains an analysis of the functions of
the AAUP as advocate of academic freedom.

Chapter Four

is concerned with the variables of the internal academic
organization of colleges and universities and their
bearing on conditions of academic freedom.

Chapter Five

is devoted to an analysis of resolved post World War
Two cases of AAUP censure of institutional administrations
for violations of principles of academic freedom.

The

analysis of the cases provides the framework for elabo
ration of the ideas and hypotheses developed in the
previous chapters.

A statement of summary and con

clusions completes the study.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
^For the social sciences and the humanities this
norm entails freedom to criticize prevalent beliefs and
practices of one's community and society insofar as these
are the subject of one's competence.
2The list of academic freedom norms could be
extended and specified in detail. See Chapter Two for a
discussion of the concept of academic freedom.
^For an extensive historical analysis of the
problem of academic freedom in America, see Richard
Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The Development of
Academic Freedom in the United States (New York:
Columbia
university Press, 1955).
4Because of the unwieldy length of the organi
zation 's name, abbreviations such as "AAUP" or the
"Association" will be used often throughout the disser
tation .
^Association membership as of January 1, 1966,
was approximately 77,000. The Association has organized
chapter affiliates on some 900 college and university
campuses. Cf. the AAUP Bulletin, vol. 52, no. 1 (March
1966), pp. 64, 72.
^The medium of publication is the Association's
official Bulletin, issued four times a year, and circulated
to all dues-paying members of the organization.
7This statement of principles, because it is so
germane to this study, is reproduced in full in Appendix C.
9Some descriptive and tabular data on these cases
as compared to those removed from censure are found in
Chapter Five.
9Hofstadter and Metzger, o£. cit., v.
l^The author does not intend to imply that the
AAUP is the only positive force for academic freedom in
the world of higher education.
There are other organi
zations, such as the American Civil Liberties union, which
exhibit some concern for academic freedom, as well as more
subtle, "non-organizational" elements, such as the force
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of academic traditions in particular instances (e.g.,
the concept of the faculty as a "guild" in the old
English sense). The AAUP is considered by the author,
however, to be the greatest "visible" force for academic
freedom in the United States,
•^The trends cited are widely known matters
of fact; therefore, no footnote citations are given.
The relation of certain of these trends to conditions
of academic freedom is clarified in the analysis of
censure cases in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER II
THE IDEA OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM:
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Unlike civil liberties, academic freedom in this
country has never enjoyed a specific meaning established
by law.

Having no legal status, its scope and appli

cation have been repeatedly in doubt.

Nor has tradition

been of much assistance.

As an idea academic freedom was

not a domestic creation.

When it was implanted finally

into the American pattern of higher education from abroad,
the notion of academic freedom struggled with largely
inimical traditions of academic practice.

With little

support from tradition and no footing in law, the concept
of academic freedom has been the subject of incessant
controversy, among its champions no less than among its
detractors.
Because of lack of consensus on the meaning and
applicability of academic freedom, particularly in the
earlier stages of its American experience, the evolution
of the concept is difficult to trace.

The purposes of

the present study, however, do not seem to require a
comprehensive accounting of the origin and history of
academic freedom.

Only three facets of the historical
20
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development of the concept of academic freedom have been
selected for brief analysis In this chapter:

(1) the

bearing of structural features of early American higher
education on the development of the Idea of academic
freedom;

(2) the Introduction of the German conception

of academic freedom Into American education after 1850;
and (3) the subsequent development of the concept in
conjunction with intellectual-scientific and academic
trends beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth
century and continuing into the twentieth.

The concluding

section of the chapter draws analytical distinctions b e 
tween academic freedom and some related ideas in an attempt
to clarify contemporary usage of the concept.
I.
FREEDOM IN EARLY
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
The twentieth century concept of academic freedom
is hardly applicable to higher education in the united
States prior to 1860.

The prevailing contemporary con

ception of academic freedom is intimately tied to the type
of university structure and function that came into being
mainly after the civil War.

There are, however, elements

of early American academic history that fostered and re
tarded the emergence of academic freedom in more recent
times.
In his Academic Freedom in the Age of the College,1
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Richard Ho£stadter divides the educational history of the
pre-Civil War era roughly into three periods:

the period

of the colonial college, beginning with the founding of
Harvard in 1636; the Revolutionary and early national
period, comprising the latter decades of the eighteenth
centure; and the period of the old-time (denominational)
2
college, 1800-60.
Each of these periods had distinctive
characteristics in relation to the subject of freedom
within the academy.
in the entire colonial period there were only
nine colleges, from the founding of Harvard to the es
tablishment of Dartmouth in 1769.3

The colonial colleges

had virtually no permanent professional faculty.

Instead

they relied primarily on a small staff of amateurish,
young tutors (often future ministers) for such instruction
as they were able to offer.

The college president was

typically regarded as a "professional," perhaps because
of his clerical identity.

In the absence of any sub

stantial body of professional faculty it is difficult to
speak of the problem of academic freedom in its modern
sense.

Assuredly, there were related issues of insti

tutional autonomy and administrative power of the presi
dent.

These issues, tied to patterns of denominational

sponsorship and lay government of higher education, are
discussed below.
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'The latter decades of the eighteenth century*
designated as the Revolutionary and early national period,
were distinctive in some ways.

There was moderate expansion

of colleges to 1799, Including the establishment of sixteen
new institutions.*

Three related developments during the

period have a bearing on the subject of academic freedom.
First, there was a growing trend of religious toleration
in the society at large.

Second, in connection with the

founding of the Republic there was a substantial concern
with civil liberties of the individual citizen.

Each of

these trends made itself felt in academic circles, although
neither had its origin in the college.

The third major

trend was more specifically, perhaps generically, academic:
the secularization of knowledge and learning,

of this

trend HOfstadter says:
The most significant trend in
collegiate education during the
eighteenth century was the secu
larization of the colleges. By
opening up new fields for college
study, both scientific and practi
cal, by rarefying the devotional
atmosphere of the colleges, and
by introducing a note of skepticism
and inquiry, the trend toward
secular learning inevitably did
much to liberate college work.5
Between 1800 and 1860, an astoundingly large
number of new Institutions,about five hundred,6 were
founded across the expanding nation, only a small minority
7
of which survived until the Civil War.
Hofstadter
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8
characterized this period as "the great retrogression."
9
This was the period of the "old-time college."
The limited
capacity of the society to support higher education became
fragmented to the detriment even of well-established insti
tutions.

The majority of the new institutions, being

sponsored by religious denominations and sects, were
regarded, perhaps, as a type of status symbol by church
men and townspeople.

Hofstadter elaborates on the causes

and consequences of the new trend:
The two factors that were far more
important than geography in de
termining that American education
should be fragmented were denomi
national sponsorship of colleges
and local pride. The multiplicity
of colleges was a product of the
multiplicity of Protestant sects
compounded by the desire of local
bodies, religious or civil, to
promote all kinds of enterprises
that gratified local pride or
boosted local real-estate values.10
*

*

*

. . . This fragmentation of higher
education was devastating in its
consequences both for the quality
of academic work and the position
of the professor. . .i;L
*

*

*

. . . From the outset the severely
denominational institutions neither
aspired to nor pretended to foster
academic freedom. . .12
In spite of the differences among these ante
bellum periods in the development of academic freedom, and
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the rather encouraging trends of the latter eighteenth
century, the entire era exhibited two prevalent charac
teristics which were uniquely American and ultimately
worked, on the whole, to the detriment of academic
freedom.

The first was the role of religion in education,

and the second was the system of lay control.

Although

these were related trends, they may be examined separately.
Religion and Education.
The basic pattern of the relation between church
and college was set during the colonial period.

Most of

the early colleges developed under religious sponsorship
and control, and served important religious functions,
including the training of clergy.

In spite of their

liberal arts curricula, the colleges commonly were
handmaids of orthodox religious institutions and values.
It should be noted that while many eighteenth
century colleges were founded and supported by a single
denomination, they often assumed something of an inter
denominational character in the composition of boards of
control and student bodies.

There was apparently enough

competition among the various colleges for student enroIlment and support to justify, if not require, this
type of "open door" policy as a matter of expediency.
This type of policy soon became formulated as religious
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freedom for students, constituting the first evidence of
freedom of thought as a conscious goal in academic life.

13

The denominational identity of the college, however, was
almost always reflected in the religious affiliation of
the president.14
Whatever the trend toward genuine religious
toleration and secularism in the latter part of the century,
this course was soon reversed in the early nineteenth
century when roost of the new colleges were rigidly sectarian
in control, policy, and appeal.
The critical question in regard to academic
freedom is the extent to which the religious and sectarian
character of the colleges operated to stifle free inquiry
and expression.
not possible.

A clear and specific answer probably is
There were not many "academic freedom cases"

in the colonial era because apparently, as Hofstadter
states, most teachers

". . . lived and worked placidly

within this f r a m e w o r k O r t h o d o x religious values and
beliefs were challenged rarely in the colleges perhaps
because of the orthodoxy of the college personnel them
selves.

This orthodoxy seems to have been virtually

guaranteed by the recruitment process, as explained by
HOfstadter:
The candid examinations of pro
spective appointees suggest that
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the consideration of doctrinal
acceptability was all but uni
versal; and where a president,
professor, or tutor was installed
without prior examination, the
omission is more plausibly
explained by the presumption
that his principles were already
well known than by the assumption
that the board of governors was
liberal or indifferent to such
matters.
In interdenominational
colleges more latitude existed
for variety of belief, but no
one seems to have contested the
principle that a college officer's
beliefs could properly be scanned
before his appointment.
Fundamentally, the colleges, as wards of the church, were
not "free" with respect to religious matters; they lived
in an atmosphere of orthodoxy, though with little, if any,
feeling of external constraint on academic inquiry,

in

any case, the colleges, having no corporate autonomy from
religion, were not anxious "to bite the hand that fed them."
Lay Government of Education.
The nature and extent of religious control of
collegiate education was complicated by, as well as mani
fested in, the system of lay government.

This pattern

also originated in the colonial colleges and has persisted
as a basic trait of American higher education.
The pattern that emerged in the eighteenth century
usually consisted in designating a number of persons to

28
serve as "trustees" of the college.

Trustees, in the

legal sense, were the college, and possessed total au
thority over the affairs of the college, including the
legal power to hire and fire faculty and administrative
personnel.

The trustees were "lay" in the sense that

they were external to the college, being legal guardians
rather than employees, and in the further sense that
they were not professional educators.

Early trustees

were usually men of established status in the eyes of
church and community, often being clergy.
As with the issue of religion, the crucial
question concerning academic freedom in the pattern of
lay control is the extent to which such control actually
worked to the detriment of free work and expression in
the colleges,

of the long run effect of lay government,

Hofstadter notes that it has " . . .

hampered the develop

ment of organization, initiative, and self-confidence
among American college professors, and it has contributed
. . . to lowering their status in the community."

17

Faculty personnel (as well as administrators) tend to be
regarded as employees, who serve at the pleasure of the
trustees, to whom the faculty is thereby beholden.

Insofar

as this is actually the case, teachers are not likely to
question or challenge values and beliefs associated with
the interests, religious, economic, or political, of the
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trustees.
In point of fact, however, trustees have seldom
chosen to augment, on a continuous basis, the full measure
of their legal powers over the minute affairs of the
colleges.

Even as early as the colonial period con

siderable authority was delegated to the administrator,
sometimes at the demand of the president.

The first

issues of academic freedom and institutional autonomy
probably resided in conflicts between president and
18
trustees over questions of policy-making for the college.
Only after the formation of substantial professional
faculties did academic freedom, in the guise of faculty
authority, become an issue of any magnitude or signifi
cance.
It is important to note, with Hofstadter, that
American Protestants did not
consider that they were destroying
Intellectual freedom by extending
the policy of lay government from
churches to colleges,
indeed they
considered it one of their con
tributions to civilization that
they had broken up the priestly
autonomy of advanced education
and had brought it under the
control of the community.19
Nevertheless, the net effect of the system of lay govern
ment of higher education has tended to obstruct academic
freedom by restraining faculty authority.

From colonial

times to the present, the division of authority among
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trustees, administrators, and faculty has been a problem
that has evaded permanent resolution and has preoccupied
those involved in any of the three roles.
The Limits of Freedom.
in the entire pre-Civil War era the dominant
pattern consisted of a linkage between religion and
education, church and college, that resembled a parentchild relationship.

The child enjoyed little autonomy

from the often heavy hand of parental authority.

The

relationship drew very close, perhaps bordering on incest,
in the denominational old-time college of the early
nineteenth century.

To be a "church-related" college

was to be a church-controlled one.

The parental church

took great pride in giving birth to institutions of
learning, and in the accomplishments of its fledgling
offspring, but seldom would permit its children to be
weaned.

As a result, the mortality rate was high; many

colleges died from the suffocation of paternal-sectarian
possessiveness.
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Others hobbled along to a delayed

maturity.
On the whole, then, the college was subservient
to church and community as represented by the board of
trustees.

The degree of religious control was never

absolute, being mitigated, in part, by sectarian rivalries
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that occasionally resulted in religious toleration.

lay

government was not as stifling as it might have been,
considering the extensiveness of its legal powers.
Nevertheless, it is tenuous to speak of "free inquiry"
under these ante helium circumstances in view of the lack
of "inquiry," on the one hand, and the rarity of open
challenges of religious and community authority, on the
other,

in short, the limits of academic freedom were

never tested in an overt and comprehensive fashion.

Aca

demic freedom was never a consciously formulated ideal of
academic

life, Thus, the "age of the college" in the

United States represents the pre-history of academic
freedom.
II.
A

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN GERMANY:
MODEL FOR THE UNITED STATES

The German System of Higher Educations

Modern Trends.

The seminal forces in the development of con
ceptions of academic freedom in the united States were
derived from patterns of practice in German higher education
in the nineteenth century.

The general structure and

functions of German universities provided the framework
and the rationale for the German ideal of academic freedom,
later Imparted to American education.
The modern era of German higher education, which
culminated in the nineteenth century, is usually considered
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to have been ushered in by the foundation of the university
•I

of Halle in 1694 and the university of Gottingen in 1737.
Two features of Halle gave substance to its claim to dis
tinction as the original modern university:

(1) its

assimilation of modern science and philosophy and (2) its
advocacy of freedom of thought and teaching.
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From its

foundation Halle became known for its rejection o f of
ficially established systems of doctrine in theology,
philosophy, medicine, and law.

Its espousal of free

teaching usually meant in practice a stout antagonism
toward the traditional dogmas still prevalent in other
universities.

Some of its faculty were leading pioneers

of the German Enlightenment, and Halle became a strong
hold of rationalism.
Founded in 1737 by the state of Hanover, the
University of Gottingen was an offshoot of Halle and
became a formidable rival, eventually surpassing its
model in prestige and originality.

Freedom of thought

and teaching were taken for granted and the ideal of
research in all fields of knowledge was fostered to a
greater extent than at Halle,

older teaching methods

gave way to the modern lecture and the seminar in con
junction with the new emphasis on research.
By the end of the eighteenth century, according
to Paulsen,23 virtually all German universities had
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instituted new patterns of university structure and
function fashioned on the models of Halle and Gottingen.
It should be noted, however, that in spite of the fact
that these changes represented a rather radical departure
from prior traditional conceptions of knowledge and proper
university function, the most decisive changes were yet
to come.

That is, even though original research, particu

larly in the humanities, was incorporated into the role
expectations of the academic scholar in the eighteenth
century, it was not until the next century that the
research function of the university became dominant.
Three major universities were founded in the
early decades of the nineteenth century:
Breslau (1811), and Bonn (1817).

Berlin

(1810),

At these universities,

from the beginning, scientific research was the dominant
university function,

whereas Halle and Gottingen had

introduced research as a proper function of the university
teacher, the research function remained for them a sub
sidiary requirement until much later,

in the nineteenth

century original research in Increasingly specialized
fields of science and scholarship became the foremost
expectation of a university professor.

Thus, Berlin,

founded under the guidance of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and
the other universities mentioned became the prototypes
of the modern university and served as International
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models.
The remolding of the German universities into
workshops of scientific research constituted nothing less
than a revolution in patterns of university organization.
Just as radical changes were wrought in the functions of
the university and the role of the professor, so also was
there a new conception of the role of the student.

Paulsen

explains:
For the new idea was also formed
of the ultimate purpose of academical
studies, the object in view being no
longer the acquisition of encyclo
pedic learning or of dogmatic
propositions, but the gaining of an
independent grasp of scientific
principles, the lifting of the
student into the region of ideas,
and his initiation at the same
time into original scientific
research.^4
These complex and radical developments in the
structure and function of German universities, sketched
here in only barest outline, were the framework for the
formation of the ideals of Lernfreiheit and Lehrfreiheit.
These ideals, which were later to influence American
notions of academic freedom, have been singled out for
brief attention.
The ideals of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit.
During the course of the nineteenth century
German universities became noted, for, among other
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features, the ideals of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit.

Each of these ideals eventually was grafted into American
academic structure in modified form.

The notion of

Lernfreiheit pertained to the student and the learning
situation.

Under this conception university students

were free to choose a university and to "transfer" from
one to another at will.

With few exceptions, they could

choose their curriculum and take courses in any preferred
sequence,

class attendance was optional.

The only

examination for which they were responsible was the
final examination which culminated the regular period
of university study.

Their private lives were subject

to a minimum of university regulation.
The ideal Lehrfreiheit was considered to be the
professional prerogative of university professors.

In

cluded in the concept of Lehrfreiheit were freedom of
inquiry and the right to report findings both in the
classroom and through publication.

The rationale for

both Lern- and Lehrfreiheit was tied to the purpose of
the university.

If the universities were to perform the

vaunted research function, then, so the argument went,
the professors needed freedom to investigate all evidence
and to report all findings.

Similarly, students, being

potential research workers, deserved freedom to choose
their training.

These ideals were definitional requirements
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of the true university, equally as much as the research
function itself.
German influence on American Scholars.
The vessels of the transfer of the German ideals
of freedom to the United States were, on the one hand,
German expatriates, and on the other, native Americans
studying in German universities.

The greatest influx of

German-trained scholars and scientists occurred in the
latter decades of the nineteenth century and continued to
a lesser extent into the twentieth.

Some eight to nine

thousand Americans studied in German universities during
the nineteenth century.

26

Those who became the leading

champions of academic freedom in this country were often
German-trained.

As Metzger points out, eight of the

thirteen signers of the 1915 "Report on Academic Freedci "
of the American Association of University Professors had
studied in German universities.
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Whether American students received an accurate
or representative impression of the nature and extent of
academic freedom in German universities is not an issue
here.

What is important to note is that American students

in Germany were almost universally awed by the ideals
of Lehr- and Lernfreiheit and became enthusiastic
promoters of these ideals upon their return to the united
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States.

American students in Germany were also impressed

lay the rationale of academic freedom.

The functional

necessity of freedom for research, teaching, and learning
in a true university was an appealing idea to the American
visitors.
III. LATER DEVELOPMENT OP THE
CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES
The second half of the nineteenth century in the
united States witnessed a twin revolution in the academic
world that enhanced the prospects of academic freedom.
The first revolution was an intellectual one, centering
on the controversy related to the Darwinian theory of
evolution.

The second, based partly on the first, was

more specifically an academic revolution, the rise of
the university as a new (to the united states) form of
academic organization.

Although the two can be separated

analytically, it is well to remember that they acted upon,
and supplemented, one another.
The Contributions of the Darwinian Debate.
Intellectual historians have dealt comprehensively
and minutely with the Darwinian controversy and its impact
on American thought.
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in his Academic Freedom in the

Age of the University, Walter Metzger discusses the
t

consequences of this controversy for the rise of the concept
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of academic freedom.

2Q

Metzger contends that two patterns

of events held particular significance for the development
of academic freedom.

The first of these were "inflamma

tory events," the dismissals and harassments of evo
lutionists among college faculties.

The second was the

attack, led partly b y the evolutionists, on religious
authority in science and education.

Out of these two

patterns emerged a new rationale, though not entirely
overtly expressed, for academic freedom.
Metzger views the new rationale for academic
freedom contributed b y the Darwinian revolution as three
fold, consisting of (1) a formula for tolerating error,
(2) limitations upon administrative power, and (3) a set
of positive values or morality.

The formula for toler

ating error evolved from the evolutionist notion that
all beliefs are tentatively, rather than categorically,
true or false, and only verifiable through disciplined
inquiry.

Since truth can never be fully known, a man

should not be penalized for holding nonconformist ideas,
as long as he has followed systematic rules of science
in reaching his conclusions.
As a result of the Darwinian controversy
limitations upon administrative power in judging the
professional standing of professors could not be
justified on the grounds of the judicial incompetence
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of the board of trustees or administrators.

Only experts

among professional peers are capable of evaluating, with
any wisdom, the professional standing of a faculty member.
Says Metzger,

"...

the argument for scientific compe

tence, used in the Darwinian debate as an answer to
clerical presumptuousness, has been turned to useful
account as reply to trustee presumption."
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Finally, of all the values associated with
scientific activity, universalism and neutrality, emerged
from the Darwinian era to form the basis for a scientific
morality,

universalism means that particularistic criteria,

such as race, creed, nationality, are irrevelant in judging
the value of a scholarly or scientific work.

Neutrality

implies a positive attitude of disinterestedness in the
pursuit of knowledge.

On the relation of these values

to academic freedom, Metzger states:
By assimilating the value of universaliam, academic freedom has come
to signify the brotherhood of man in
science that is akin in aspiration to
the brotherhood of man in God. . . .
By acquiring the value of neutrality,
academic freedom has come to stand for
the belief that science must transcend
ideology . . .
As the symbol and the
guardian of these two values, academic
freedom has come to be equated not
only with free intellectual activity,
but with an ethic of human relations 3
and an ideal of personal fulfillment.
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The Rise of the University.
Although It is apparent that the Darwinian
controversy made an impact on the structure of the aca
demic world and fostered the underpinnings for a new
concept of academic freedom, it was essentially an intel
lectual revolution, a revolution of ideas and world-views.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, in partner
ship with this intellectual revolution, and concomitant
with the German influence on American students, occurred
the academic revolution, the rise of the university
structure with its new academic functions.
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In the present context perhaps it is unnecessary
to explore the complex "causes" of the rise of the uni
versity; instead, attention is called to the structural
and functional features of the new mode of academic
organization as these are relevant to academic freedom.
As with the concept of academic freedom, Germany provided
a model of the university for selective adaptation by
American educational reformers.

Upon their return to the

United States from Germany, some Americans became en
thusiastic promulgators, not only of the ideal of Lehr
freiheit , but also of the idea of the university as a
center of research and original contribution to knowledge.
Indeed, it was primarily the latter idea that had
attracted them to Germany in the first place.

On the
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whole, they simply looked upon academic freedom as a
functional requisite for the performance of the research
function, broadly defined, in the university setting.
JohnsHopkins University, founded in 1876, was
deliberately patterned on the essential features of the
German model.

The key structural element was the

graduate school, the rough equivalent of the German
faculty of Philosophy,

" . . .

broad in its range of

specialties, non-utilitarian in its objectives, devoted
to the tasks of research."*^

The primary functions were

research and graduate training.

The original faculty of

Johns Hopkins, the Gottingen of Baltimore, had received
German training, almost to a man.

The lecture, the

seminar, and the laboratory were the German-inspired
modes of instruction.
Following the lead of Johns Hopkins, fifteen
major graduate schools were founded over the next two
decades and graduate enrollment soared.
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With each new

graduate program the original model became blurred and
compromised.

Often graduate schools were tacked onto

existing undergraduate colleges with no sharp lines
demarcating them.

Metzger points out that

In answering the question:
'What
should the new university be?' every
need clamored for satisfaction,
every craft hoped for inclusion.
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Our post-war institutions of higher
learning were therefore not merely
motley, but mongrel; not only
different from each other in size,
quality, independence, and so
phistication, but eclectic in_fi
their character and purposes. 16
in spite of the variability and hodge-podge
character of the new university movement, which included
the establishment of land-grant colleges under the
Morrill Act of 1862, the quintessence of the new uni
versity was its dedication to the German-inspired functions
of academic research and graduate training.

Associated

with the rise of the university in the latter decades of
the nineteenth century and passing over into the twentieth
were three elements of special significance for the longrun development of the concept of academic freedom.
were:

These

(1) new attitudes toward the pursuit of knowledge

through scholarly and scientific research;

(2) the pro

fessionalization and specialization of academic roles;
and (3) the growth of increasingly secular social
sciences.
The new attitudes toward knowledge were con
tributed, in part, by the evolutionists, and partly also
by the returning German students.

Truth was no longer

absolute; knowledge was neither final nor complete.

The

word "research" meant many things to many people, but to

43
all it symbolized the tentativeness of present knowledge
and the need to extend its frontiers.

Knowledge was not

the ward of past authority, but was to be gained by frontal
assault, with an offensive posture.

Knowledge was to be

acquired by positive action, with the tools and procedures
of the new science and secular scholarship.

This new

conception of knowledge arose primarily from the Darwinian
revolution.

However, those academicians who had been

trained in Germany also contributed to the new attitudes
toward knowledge, through the connotations of the concept
of Wissenschaft.

Metzger explains:

The very notion of wissenschaft
had overtones of meaning utterly
missing in its English counterpart,
science. The German term signified
a dedicated, sanctified pursuit.
It signified not merely the goal
of rational understanding, but the
goal of self-£ulfiIlment; not merely
the study of the "exact sciences,"
but of everything taught by the
university? not the study of things
for their immediate utilities, but
the morally imperative study of
things for themselves and for their
ultimate meanings.37
The notion of wissenschaft had some impact on the new
American conception of research; the necessity of thorough
ness, disciplined inquiry, and positive dedication in the
pursuit of reliable knowledge.

Associated with these new

attitudes toward knowledge was a high degree of enthusiasm
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for the research function of the professor*

Once the

commitment to the aggressive pursuit of knowledge was
made, there could be no rational limits to research; no
subject nor hypothesis could be taboo,

in short, following

the German argument, the pursuit of knowledge demanded
academic freedom in the form of freedom of inquiry and
expression.
As the horizons of knowledge were extended under
university auspices, specialization of interest and
competence became a practical necessity for the indi
vidual.

As the limits of competence narrowed, expertise

increased, and with it, the professional status of the
scholar-scientist.

As this trend advanced the trustee

and the administrator became less and less capable, in
the eyes of academicians, of judging the professional
competence and stature of an individual professor.

The

teacher-researcher now staked another claim for academic
freedom in the guise of increased faculty authority over
the judgment of the performance of colleagues.

He wanted

to be Insulated from the insecurity of being evaluated
and harassed by irrelevant standards and incompetent
judges.

He hoped, by invoking academic freedom, to

guarantee his liberty to pursue knowledge wherever that
search led.
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Finally, the rise of the university also
coincided with the rapid growth of the secular social
sciences.

This development was not without significance

for the course of academic freedom.

Prior to the Darwinian

controversy and the emergence of the university, the study
of social, economic, and political affairs belonged to
moral philosophy.

With the Darwinian attack on religious

authority and the new outlook on knowledge sponsored b y
the university research function, it became feasible to
study societal institutions in the systematic, secular,
and often empirical, manner of the established sciences.
However, the new social scientist was most vulnerable to
intimidation in his research activities because he could
not easily avoid questioning sacred mores and folklore.
He was trampling on the sacred with his secular science
and outlook.

He, more than his colleagues, needed some

reliable guarantees of free inquiry and expression.

It

is worth noting that among the early leaders in the
founding of the American Association of university
Professors was a disproportionately high representation
of social scientists.
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The American Economic Association

was particularly involved in the promotion of academic
freedom and the AAUP.^®
On the whole, then, the rise of the university,
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with its emphasis on research and graduate training, the
emergency of new, positive attitudes toward intellectualscientific activity, the professionalization and special
ization of academic roles, and the rise of the social
sciences within the university, encouraged the specifi
cation of the idea and the rationale of academic freedom.
Toward an operational Concept of Academic Freedom.
The founding of the AAUP in 1915, as an associ
ation devoted primarily to the promulgation of academic
freedom, signaled an important degree of institutionalization
of the concept.

The next chapter is devoted to an analysis

of this organization as a sponsor of academic freedom.
Aside from the activity of the AAUP there continued to
be discussion of the concept of academic freedom to
clarify its meaning.
In the twentieth century two statements in
particular represent important contributions to the
continuing clarification of the concept,

one is Arthur

Lovejoy's definitive essay written in the 1930's and the
other is by Robert Maclver in the 1950's.

Neither statement

represents an official conception of AAUP or any other
organization.
In examining Lovejoy's and Maclver's discussion
of the subject of academic freedom the following questions

47
will serve as guidelines of analysis:
(1)

What is the nature of academic freedom

(What is one free to do or to have?)

How does its nature

and status compare to other "freedoms11 in society?
(2)

who is entitled to academic freedom and

under what conditions?

Are students specifically included?

is academic freedom only intramural, i.e., does it apply
only within the routine activity of the academy?
(3)
freedom? Why

What is the basis or rationale of academic
is it valued?

Who and what are its bene

ficiaries?
(4)
demic freedom?
extended?

What and who are the main threats to aca
How

may academic freedom be protected or

Who has the responsibility to defend academic

freedom?
The late Arthur 0. Lovejoy, long-time professor
of philosophy at Johns Hopkins university, maintained a
scholarly interest in the subject of academic freedom
throughout his professional career.
of a definitive essay,
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He was the author

"Academic Freedom," in the Encyclo-
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pedia of the Social Sciences.
In this essay, written in 1930, Professor Lovejoy
advances the following definition of academic freedom:
Academic freedom is the freedom
of the teacher or research worker
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in higher institutions of
learning to investigate and
discuss the problems of his
science and to express his
conclusions, whether through
publication or in the in
struction of students, without
interference from political or
ecclesiastical authority, or
from the administrative of
ficials of the institution in
which he is employed, unless
his methods are found by quali
fied bodies of his own profession
to be clearly incompetent or
contrary to professional ethics.4
Academic freedom includes freedom of opinion,
speech, and publication, and is, thus, akin to ordinary
civil liberties "usually accorded to other citizens of
A O

modern liberal states," writes Lovejoy.

The main

difference between academic freedom and the similar
freedoms of other citizens is that "the teacher is in
his economic status a salaried employee," and, Lovejoy
continues,

"the freedom claimed for him implies a denial

of the right of those who provide or administer the funds
from which he is paid, to control the content of his
teaching.1,44
This freedom is attached to the social role of
the scholar in the academy and pertains to both the
teaching and the research function performed in that
setting.

It is to be noted that Lovejoy makes no

reference to academic freedom as pertaining to the role

1
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of student or to the function of learning.

The closest

he comes to this is in specifying freedom of research,
but it is not the freedom to conduct research in the
generic sense (to inquire, investigate, learn).

It is

the freedom of the "research worker," who is presumably
a professional employee of the academy.

There is little

doubt, however, that Lovejoy has the benefit of the
student and the learning process in mind in his state
ment.

Such a conclusion seems warranted when one

examines his justification for academic freedom.
The freedom of the scholar is, in Lovejoy's
view,

"socially necessary," that is, of essential benefit

to the life o f ..civilized society.

He contends that the

function of teaching and research in higher institutions
of learning is among those indispensable functions
"which cannot be performed if the specific manner of
their performance is dictated by those who pay for
them."^5

Furthermore, there are three aspects of the

role of the academic scholar which necessitate academic
freedom.

These are:

(1) technical expertise,

(2)

disinterestedness, and (3) advancement of science and
new ideas.
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As a technical eaqpert the scholar undergoes

extensive and costly training prior to being set apart
"to investigate problems which it is not practicable
for all men to investigate thoroughly and at first hand

for themselves."
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The scholar thus becomes an expert

adviser and informant for society in his area of compe
tence.

The disinterestedness of the scholar is somewhat

analogous to that of the judge.

Such objectivity, neces

sary in the pursuit of knowledge, can prevail only if the
scholar is free from intimidation and subordination.

The

advancement of science and new ideas, the most important
function of the scholar, often entails challenging or
undermining dominant beliefs and generally accepted
"knowledge."

Inquiry, including presentation of findings,

must occur without external restraints.
At another point in the same essay Lovejoy
speaks more specifically to the question of the student's
concern with academic freedom.
he states,

Students are entitled,

"to learn the contemporary situation in each

science, the range and diversity of opinion among specialists in it. . ."
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This condition can occur only to the

extent that teachers are free in the sense of the definition
quoted earlier.

In other words this "right" of the student

to learn is contingent upon the freedom of the scholar to
make available his findings.

This is not to say that the

student possesses academic freedom as Lovejoy has defined
it.
The only other freedom or right which inheres
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in the role of the student derives from the responsibility
of the scholar to present fairly the range of opinion and
interpretation in his field of inquiry.

It is the obli

gation of the teacher (and, conversely, the right of the
student) to encourage and train the student to reach his
own conclusions through critical reflection and investi
gation.

This right of the student might be construed to

be academic freedom of a sort.

Nonetheless, one roust

conclude that Lovejoy did not conceive of academic
freedom, as he defined it, to apply to the student.

On

the one hand, the student's right to learn is a result
of the freedom of teaching.

And, on the other hand, the

right of the student to receive from the teacher a fair
presentation of professional opinion is a result of the
obligation of the teacher to practice academic freedom.
Granted, then, that academic freedom resides in
the role of the scholar in the academy, is it only an'
intramural freedom he enjoys or does it also apply to
the extramural expressions and activities of the scholar?
Lovejoy seems to be somewhat equivocal on this point.

He

states that dismissals pursuant to the exercise of po
litical or personal freedom outside the university in a
way, or for purposes, objectionable to the administrative
authorities of a university are "contrary in spirit" to
academic freedom.

Such punitive action is, he declares,
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" . . . primarily a special case of the abuse of the
economic relation of employer and employee for the
49
denial of ordinary civil liberties."
This statement
notwithstanding, the reader is left not knowing whether,
after all, academic freedom is extramural in application
or perhaps only extramural "in spirit."
Throughout Lovejoy's brief essay academic freedom
is given an instrumental justification.

The freedom of

the scholar presumably is not an intrinsic value.

Its

worth is in its contribution to the quest for knowledge,
which in turn is seen to be of extrinsic value to society.
Academic freedom is, he writes, a prerequisite condition
to "the proper prosecution . . .

of scientific inquiry and

the communication of the results of it to the public and
to students . . .»50

Thus, the students, directly, and

society as a whole, perhaps less directly, are the bene
ficiaries to whom the fruits of academic freedom accrue.
In his definition of academic freedom Lovejoy
was careful-to specify potential sources of threats to
the freedom of the scholar.

Academic freedom is a freedom

from interference from "political or ecclesiastical
authority."

He seems to have in mind, on the one hand,

the system of public higher education, which is often
subject to "political" control, if not interference.
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On the other hand, sectarian colleges are in many cases
vulnerable to "ecclesiastical interference," e.g.,
official or informal norms in matters of religious creed.
In each case it is a form of "external" interference or
restraint.

By implication any manifestation of outside

influence upon the academic affairs of the scholar
represents a menace to free inquiry and free teaching.
Lovejoy also cites as potential threats to
academic freedom the administrative officials of the
institution.

Traditionally in the united States, power

to "hire and fire" has been quite generally in the hands
of administrators.

Academic freedom is intended, in part,

to remind administrative officials that the academic
employer-employee relation is not analogous in all
respects to such a relation in the business world.

The

employee-scholar remains free from doctrinal specification
of his expressions and activities, or any other type of
interference.

As Lovejoy phrases it, "„ . . those who

buy a certain service may not (in the most important
particular) prescribe the nature of the service to be
rendered."51
What are the means by which academic freedom can
be protected and extended?

And, whose responsibility is

it to defend this freedom?

Governing boards, administrative
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officials, and faculty personnel alike are responsible
for the maintenance of conditions of academic freedom.
Governing boards, for their part,

"should decline all

endowments for the inculcation of opinions specified by
the donor."52

Most attempts by external sectarian, po

litical, economic, or other groups to interfere with
academic freedom are channeled through, or brought to
bear upon, the administrative officers of an institution.
Thus, administrators are in a position, as well as obliged,
to resist such arbitrary pressures before they are brought
to bear on the faculty member.

That is, the administration

usually can, and certainly, must, insulate the faculty
from external intimidation and influence.

The faculty,

for its part, should have general control of "admission
of the teaching office."

included in this responsibility

is the naming of faculty personnel and formulation of
policy related to that process.
These measures are essential for the maintenance
of academic freedom.

"But the chief practical requisite

for academic freedom," Lovejoy asserts,

"consists in

guaranteed security of tenure in professional positions
. . ."

53

He goes on to say that such tenure must be

qualified, i.e., so that a tenured professor can be
removed for "grave cause," but for that reason only, as
specified in his definition of academic freedom quoted
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above.

The point is, of course, that if strict rules of

academic tenure are in force, the tenured scholar is the
least vulnerable to any kind of interference.

Tenure,

then, is seen to be the chief instrument for the accomplish
ment of academic freedom.
It may be helpful to summarize professor Lovejoy's
conception of academic freedom.

It is the freedom to

investigate, to discuss, to teach, to publish,

it belongs

to the scholar-employee --- the teacher or researcher -—
working in the environment of the academy.

The extent to

which it applies to the extramural affairs of the scholar
is unclear, but extramural utterances are exercises of
ordinary civil liberties and are in keeping with the
“spirit" of academic freedom.

Students are not specif

ically included in the scope of academic freedom, but
they are nevertheless entitled to be taught by teachers
who are free to teach and who exercise their academic
freedom.

The rationale for academic freedom is extrinsic

in that such freedom is an invaluable prerequisite for
the pursuit and attainment of knowledge in all fields
of scholarly inquiry.

The benefits of academic freedom

accrue to society as a whole and especially to students
taught under such conditions.

Finally, the threats to

academic freedom may come from within the academy (e.g.,
administrative interference) or from beyond its bounds
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from various political, economic, or sectarian forces.
Whatever the source, the governing board, administrative
officers, and faculty share the responsibility to resist
encroachment upon the freedom of the scholar.

The roost

effective single measure in protecting freedom of inquiry,
teaching and publication is the system of academic tenure
whereby the scholar is guaranteed a secure position in
the academy for so long as he is not guilty of proved
incompetence or moral delinquency.
Professor Robert Morrison Maclver, of Columbia
University, in 1955, published a volume devoted entirely
to the subject of academic freedom.
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This work, sponsored

by Columbia university through the American Academic
Freedom Project, was in no small manner stimulated as a
response to the so-called McCarthy period of the fifties,
when the integrity of the university and the freedom of
the scholar came under attack.
book Maclver states:

In the preface to the

"The aggravated assaults on aca

demic freedom and the general disesteem of intellectual
enterprise characteristic of our country at this time
55
furnish the occasion for this work."
Maclver deals comprehensively with several
aspects of the subject of academic freedom, including
elements of the social and cultural context in which that
freedom is operative.

His Introductory essay is on the
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meaning of the concept of academic freedom is of most
relevance here.
Maclver proposes the following definition of
the concept:
The broad meaning of academic
freedom is plain enough.
It is
the freedom of the scholar within
the institution devoted to scholar
ship, the 'academy.'
*

*

*

Academic freedom is . . . a right
claimed by the accredited educator,
as teacher and investigator, to
interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without
being subject to any interference,
molestation, or penalization because
these conclusions are unacceptable
to some constituted authority within
or beyond the institution.
Here is
the core of the doctrine of academic
freedom.
It is the freedom of the_
student within his field of study.
From the above statement there seems to be no
doubt about the scope of the activities of the scholar
embraced by Maclver's concept of academic freedom.

That

freedom applies to the ordinary functional activities of
teaching and investigation (or research) carried on in
the university, including especially the interpretation
and communication of findings or conclusions.
Academic freedom is a species of the general
C Q

"freedom of the mind."

However, whereas the notion of
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the freedom of the mind is quite abstract, the concept
of academic freedom has reference to a specific context.
Academic freedom is conceived by Maclver to be an institutional freedom.
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That is, the freedom of the scholar

applies to his institutional functions, to his work
within the academic environment.

The scholar also, of

course, as an individual citizen is entitled to the
other aspects (not specified by Maclver) of the general
freedom of the mind outside the setting of the academy.
In its strict usage, the concept of academic
freedom, writes Maclver,

"is taken to have reference only

to the teacher and the collectivity of teachers, the
faculty."^®

Thus, it is a freedom attached to those

scholarly and scientific roles of the faculty, and does
not include the role of student.

Maclver apparently

does not mean that students are to be denied intellectual
freedom, nor that there is no shared ground of interest
between student and teacher. But, academic freedom is a
61
professional freedom.
He explains:
"it is the freedom
claimed as a right by the members of a guild.

Just as

the doctor or the lawyer needs a special area of freedom
if he is to carry out his duties and serve aright his
clients, so does the educator."
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Being a professional freedom, that is, a freedom
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that is claimed by virtue of a certain kind of social
role performed by the scholar, academic freedom is not
absolute.

The exercise of academic freedom is limited

to the area of competence of the scholar, to his chosen
field of study.

Academic freedom is then a specialized

claim, or at least is specialized in application.

Maclver

states that the faculty member should not "arrogate to
himself an authority beyond the range of his competence,"
nor should he, therefore,

"regard the rostrum of his

class as a platform from which to broadcast his opinions
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on issues irrelevant to the courses he is teaching."
The chemist, for instance, is not entitled to indulge in
geopolitical pronouncements in his biochemistry class.
Being institutional, academic freedom is es
sentially intramural.

According to Maclver, the

academician is obligated to use discretion in his
extramural affairs,

outside the academy, the scholar-

scientist should make it clear that he speaks as an
individual citizen rather than as an institutional
spokesman.

Furthermore, he should "avoid any public

behavior that would tend to bring discredit on his
institution."
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Because of this latter proviso, it would

seem that the scholar-scientist is less free than other
citizens.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that, for Maclver,
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academic freedom applies exclusively intra muros.
Maciver advances an entirely instrumental rationale
for academic freedom.

The full significance of academic

freedom, he asserts, lies in the fact that it is a
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functional freedom.
Academic freedom is the sine qua
non for the performance of the primary functions of the
university and its faculty.

Those primary functions are

the advancement of knowledge (through research investigation)
and the communication of knowledge
discussion and teaching).

(through publication,

Speaking of the functions as

one, Maciver states
From this function the claim to
academic freedom derives. This
freedom is not to be thought of as
a privilege, not as a concession,
nor as something that any authority
inside or outside the institution
may properly grant or deny, qualify
or regulate, according to its
interest or its discretion.
It is
something instead that is inherently
bound up with the performance of the
university's task, something as
necessary for that performance as
pen and paper, as classrooms and
students, as laboratories and
libraries.66
By the same token the role performance of the scholarscientist functionally requires an environment of academic
freedom.
Those who benefit by the maintenance of academic
freedom in higher education are those who, directly or
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indirectly, benefit from the publicly accessible knowledge
gained through open scholarly and scientific inquiry.
Maciver indicates the inclusiveness of the range of
beneficiaries in this statement:

"The service of the

educator is not a service to his students alone or to
his institution or to his profession.

It is a service

to his country, a service to civilization, a service to
mankind."67

consequently, at least in abstract sense,

all men have an objective interest in the security of
conditions of academic freedom.
In spite of the fact that all men may reap the
advantages of academic freedom, in actual practice that
freedom is often abrogated, violated, or otherwise
threatened.

From what sources do these threats emanate?

How may they be allayed?

And whose responsibility is it

to defend and to extend academic freedom?

Much of

Maciver's attention throughout the volume is focused
on these questions.

Here and there, in the introductory

essay under review, he specifies some major perils to
academic freedom without addressing himself to the topic
in any systematic fashion.
Threats to academic freedom may originate from
outside the academy or from within.

Extramural threats

may, of course, be quite varied in source and intent.
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There are, first of all, various ideological groups and
special interests “agitating to make them /i.e., the uni
versities/ agencies for the propagation of particular
68
causes,"
groups which do not appreciate the proper
functions of the university,

other threats of inter

ference or intimidation may emanate from alumni, donors,
politicians, the press, or simply "an excited portion
of the public."
Likewise, very serious perils to academic freedom
may arise from within the structure of the academy.

Obvi

ously, conditions of appointment or promotion which, by
design or practice, give preference, irrespective of
professional qualifications, to those whose views are
more congenial to administrative authorities in contro
versial issues, represent hazards to the integrity of the
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institution and to academic freedom.
The faculty itself
can commit encroachments upon freedom of inquiry in a
variety of ways.

Failure to defend the academic freedom

of one's colleagues diminishes the practice of that
freedom.

In yielding to authoritarianism "from above,"

the principle of academic freedom is deteriorated further.
And, as indicated earlier, overstepping the bounds of
one's sphere of competence or misusing the rostbum of
the classroom is an infraction of the scope of academic
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freedom.

Personal qualities of bias, dogmatism, and

authoritarianism of the individual scholar are also
menaces to objectivity and free inquiry.
There is, however, another Intramural obstacle
to academic freedom which is less likely to be noticed,
according to Maciver.

This less blatant, less overt,

danger to free inquiry has to do with the proliferation
of subsidiary functions of the university to the point
that the primary function, the pursuit of knowledge, is
submerged.

Maciver explains the inherent danger in such

a process in the following passage:
Take, for example, the idea that
it is the business of the uni
versity to prepare the young for
more effective participation in
the life of the community, to equip
them better to meet the conditions
or the demands of their society, or,
simply, to have a more successful
career. The university does serve
the purposes thus indicated, but in
its own way.
if it made any such
objective its primary function, its
distinctive quality would be blurred
and its distinctive contribution
dissipated. . . . Here indeed is
the rub. If the university sets out
as its objective the preparation of
its students for living — then for
What kind of living??®
If a university, for instance, in a racially
segregated society, accepted such a function, its mission
would be to inculcate the values and norms of segregation,
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with stultifying consequences for scientific inquiry con71
cerning the question of racial inequality.
Even in cases
where the social values and norms to be inculcated do not
necessitate a rejection of scientific evidence, the danger
still exists to a degree in that the university becomes an
agency for indoctrination.

Maciver concludes, "The uni

versity cannot without distortion become an agency designed
for indoctrination, no matter how great or good the cause.
In short, it cannot be the foremost function of the uni
versity to perform any other service for society than
the open pursuit of knowledge.

To do otherwise is not

only a detriment to free inquiry in the academy, but
subverts the integrity of higher education, making it the
mouthpiece for the particular whims of society or special
interests within it.
Because, on the one hand-; everyone benefits
from academic freedom, and on the other hand, freedom is
indispensable to the pursuit of knowledge, which is an
intrinsic, universal value, the responsibility for the
protection and advancement of academic freedom is
incumbent on every individual.

However, given the fact

that threats to free inquiry do occur, responsibility
for its defense has to be rather specifically allocated.
A large measure of this responsibility is properly
located within the structure of the academy.

Governing
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boards, administrative officials, and faculty share in
this obligation.

In the earlier discussion of intramural

threats to freedom several practices were detailed, which,
from the present perspective can be viewed as violations
of responsibility.

Without specifying them again, it may

simply be noted that it is the responsibility of governing
boards and administrative officials to shield the faculty
from extramural clamors and demands, as well as to
administer the operation of the academy in such a manner
that the open pursuit of knowledge is the foremost role
requirement of the faculty and that individual performance
is rewarded or penalized exclusively in terms appropriate
thereto.

The role of the faculty in academic responsibility

concerns mainly the performance of its functions in an
objective fashion, refusing to serve doctrinaire ends
imposed from any source, and protecting the right of
colleagues to free inquiry.
To summarize Maciver1s conception of academic
freedom the following points should be noted.
freedom is institutional,

Academic

it embraces the institutional

activities of the scholar-scientist in the prescribed
performance of his role.

As such it is an intramural

right and does not apply to non-institutional affairs of
the faculty.

Academic freedom is professional.

That

is, it applies to the teacher-researcher in the academy,
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rather than to students.

Being a professional right, it

applies to the academician's area of competence or
specialization and involves responsibility toward one's
professional colleagues.

Academic freedom is functional.

It is an indispensable requirement for the full pursuit
of knowledge, which, of itself, constitutes the raison
d 1etre of the university as an institution and the
scholar-scientist as a role.

Knowledge is an intrinsic

value; freedom in the pursuit of knowledge is a functional
value.

All those who benefit from knowledge are heirs of

the results of academic freedom.

The academy itself is

the vanguard of the defense of academic freedom against
external intimidation and Internal abasement.
IV. DIFFERENTIATION OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM FROM RELATED IDEAS
Now that the concept of academic freedom has been
developed with some degree of specificity, it is possible
to distinguish it from certain ideas with which it has
often been confused.

The major ideas frequently and

mistakenly identified with academic freedom are intellectual
freedom and freedom of expression, subjective freedom, and
academic tenure.
Intellectual Freedom and Freedom of Expression.
Intellectual freedom or freedom of thought is a
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somewhat nebulous idea in spite of its currency in Western
intellectual traditions.

Technically, of course, any

person is free to “think" what he will, to believe any
idea in the privacy of his mind.

However, intellectual

freedom usually implies something more than this, the
freedom to publicly express and maintain dissenting ideas
and values.

An atmosphere of intellectual freedom

presumably includes also the lack of intimidation or
penalty for expressing nonconformist opinions.

In the

united States this sort of "freedom" has been only partly
instrumented in the form of a civil right of free speech.
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
related civil rights of citizens simply assures the
dissenter, within broad limits, that there will be no
legal recriminations against his dissent.

Civil rights

do not protect the individual nonconformist from informal,
extra-legal penalties and harassments, such as economic
boycott, that may arise from the sanctions of conformist
public opinion.
In a sense, intellectual freedom is a very broad
claim that encompasses the narrower concept of academic
freedom.

Whereas academic freedom is reserved for a

particular context, the scholar-scientist, teacherresearcher in the academy, intellectual freedom applies
to all people, disregarding even citizenship status.

To
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the extent that the civil right of free speech overlaps
and protects intellectual freedom it applies to all
citizens in their role as citizens, a protection of the
individual from the government.

Even if academic freedom

is conceived as part and parcel of the inclusive notion
of intellectual freedom, it must be kept distinct because
of its quite different frame of reference or application
and basis of sanction.
Subjective Freedom.
One of the problems of assessing the extent of
academic freedom in particular institutions of higher
learning resides in the fact that a subjective feeling
of freedom may prevail without any "real" or objective
freedom.
point.

A hypothetical illustration will exemplify the
In a college in which the entire faculty and

administration share an ardent commitment to racist
beliefs, subjective freedom in expressing viewpoints on
the "race question" is complete.

If no one challenges

the orthodox consensus, then everyone has the secure
feeling of academic freedom.

The point is that academic

freedom is devoid of meaning in an atmosphere of total
consensus.

Academic freedom, including the right to

dissent, takes on meaning only in a situation of dissensus
and competition of ideas.

Subjective "freedom" in orthodox
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consensus may be a false sense of liberty, but Is certainly
not academic freedom.

One can never say that academic

freedom exists or prevails in a particular situation until
orthodoxy has actually been tested or challenged.
Academic Tenure.
The concept of academic tenure also must be dis
tinguished from academic freedom.
form of "job security."

Tenure is basically a

Although the meaning and conditions

for achieving tenure are far from uniform among insti
tutions, usually a person who has tenure is secure in his
position indefinitely until retirement unless guilty of
such serious academic "felonies" as malfeasance, utter
incompetence, or moral turpitude.

Tenure is usually

granted an Individual after a "period of satisfactory
service," sometimes specified, sometimes not.

The merits

and demerits of the tenure system have long been debated
from the points of view of institutions, scholars, and the
profession.
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in practice the system of academic tenure

often operates as a safeguard of academic freedom.

A

tenured professor may reasonably feel less insecurity
than a non-tenured one in exercising academic freedom.
Tenure acts to reduce inhibitions in expressing dissent.
Thus, there is a close operational relation between
tenure and freedom.

However, it is basically a means-end
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relation, tenure being the instrument of academic freedom.
Further, it must be remembered that academic freedom
applies to the non-tenured as well as to the tenured.
Thus, the two concepts are not identical and should be
kept separate analytically.
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CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OP UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS:
ADVOCATE OP ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The American Association of university Professors
is a voluntary association of college and university facul
ty members concerned with the rights and obligations of the
profession and the interests of higher education in the
united States.

The present chapter provides an analysis

of the structure and functioning of the Association as
pertains to academic freedom.

After reviewing some general
i

i

characteristics of the Association and its membership,
the evolution and implementation of its policies on aca
demic freedom are examined.
I.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE ASSOCIATION

The Membership
Membership gualifications.

Currently, member

ship in the Association is open to "teachers and research
scholars on the faculties of approved colleges and uni
versities.

Active (voting) membership is open to a

person ". . . if he has at least a one-year appointment
to a position of at least half-time teaching and/or
75

76
research, with the rank of instructor or its equivalent
2
or higher . .
in an approved institution.
Department
heads and librarians are also eligible for membership.
However, "if an Active or Junior member becomes a college
or university administrative officer with less than half
a normal teaching or research program, he must be trans3
ferred to Associate membership
.

11

Membership dues vary according to class of
membership and, for Active members, according to salary.
Membership lapses for non-payment of dues after one year.
However,

"once admitted, a member may change his occu

pation or transfer to an institution not on the Association's
approved list without affecting his eligibility for con
tinuance of membership."^

Currently, about 92 per cent

of all members of the AAUP are in the Active category

.

5

Eligibility requirements for Association member
ship have been liberalized over the years,

originally

membership was open only to the academic elite, to the
professors "of recognized scholarship or scientific
productivity" and with at least ten years of faculty
experience

. 6

Sporadically, over the last five decades

the bars to membership have been lowered to the present
requirements.
Membership trends.

From its charter membership
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in 1915 of less than nine hundred the Association rolls
doubled within a few months.

At year's end in 1930, the

Association, which had lowered its elitist membership
standards and allowed graduate students to be Junior
members, numbered over 10,000.

(See Table I.)

Growth

during the Depression years of the thirties was relatively
slow, increasing by only about 55 per cent to 1940.
Growth was again slow during World War Two.
of 1945 membership was still under 18,000.

At the end
From then

until the end of 1950 the gain was rapid, more than
doubling to 40,626.
Overall, the decade 1950 to 1960 was a period
of stagnation in membership growth.

In 1959 the Associ

ation had fewer members (39,000) than in 1950.

The drop

of six thousand from 1954 to 1955 is probably largely
7
explained by a 50 per cent increase in dues.
The decline
of two thousand from 1958 to 1959 is accounted for by a
purge from the rolls of lapsed memberships which had
been carried for two years.

8

From that point to the

present the membership has increased at a rapid pace.
From the end of 1959 to the end of 1965 the membership
practically doubled to about 77,000.

This increase has
„ 9
occurred in spite of a dues increase in 1962.
Figure 4 shows membership trends by three-year
intervals from 1944 through 1965.

The first six years

TABLE I
SIZE OP AAUP MEMBERSHIP, 1915-65*

Year

Number

Year

Number

1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

847
1,931
2,244
2,274
2,378
3,632
4,046
4,568
5,206
5,520
5,828
6,077
6,468
6,896
7,986
10,115
11,588
12,069
11,765
11,500
12,713
13,377
13,930
14,595
15,330
15,872

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

16,329
15,920
16,015
16,910
17,970
21,238
28,016
33,638
37,524
40,626
42,263
43,404
43,525
43,615
37,567
36,415
37,363
41,264
39,020
42,273
49,022
54,387
61,316
6 6 ,645a
76,900a

aSource:

Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 72.

♦Source:

Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 110.
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Figure 4.

AAUP membership trends, from 1944 to 1965.
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1965
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of the period showed rapid growth.

From 1950 to 1953,

one notes the distinct leveling off, followed by a de
crease in the next three years (dues increased fifty per
cent in 1955).

Only slight gains were recorded until the

sharp upswing began in 1959, which continued until 1965
with no indication that it would abate (as of 1965).
Membership trends as measured by number of
institutions with a local AAUP chapter indicate similar
patterns

(see Table II).

chapters

(or "branches" as they were then called), b y

1930 there were 155.

Beginning in 1916 with only 31

The percentage increase in chapters

between 1930 and 1940 was much greater than the rise in
total membership, having doubled to 301 in the ten years.
One hundred new chapters were added b y 1950, and 200 more
b y 1960.

The increase since 1960 has been especially

fast, going from 600 to 936 in the five years ending in
10
1965.
Membership b a s e .

There seem to be available no

accurate statistics for the AAUP membership base.

How

ever, the U. S. office of Education has provided (since
1957) biennial total figures for full-time instructional
staff for residential instruction in degree-credit courses.
These data, for selected years, are presented in Table III.
While this category does not coincide exactly with the

TABLE II
TOTAL NUMBER OP AAUP CHAPTERS,
BY YEAR, 1916-65*

Year

Number

Year

Number

1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

31
41
52
52
56
65
85
98
103
113
119
128
138
141
155
175
218
227
235
248
253
267
272
284
301

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

315
325
324
323
319
329
_335
356
371
402
428
447
451
471
482
474
499
535
573
600
636
700
757
835
936a

a Source:

Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 72.

♦Source:

Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 117.
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i

TABLE III
AAUP MEMBERSHIP COMPARED WITH FULL-TIME FACULTY FOR RESIDENT INSTRUCTION
IN DEGREE-CREDIT COURSES IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
UNITED STATES, 1949-50 TO 1964-65*
Academic
Year

Full-time staff, Instructor
or above
Per cent
Number
increase
3

1949-50
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
1961-62
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66

115,000°
,
°
126,000°
136,000°
154,602
163,656
178,632
204,561
,
°
243,000e
1

2

1

2

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

w —— w
-3.5
13.5
8

.

0

13.2
5.9
9.2
14.5
8

.

1

19. lf

AAUP Membership as of
January 1
Per cent
Number
increase

AAUP Membership per
cent of full-time
staff

*5

37,524
42,263
43,525
37,567
37,363
39,020
49,022
61,316
66,645
74,962

1

2

.

6

3.0
-13.7
-0.5
4.4
25.6
25.1
8.7
. f
2

2

2

32.6
38.1
34.5
27.6
24.2
23.8
27.4
30.0
30.2
30.9

aSource: U, S. Office of Education, Digest of Educational Statistics
(OE-10024-65, Bulletin 1965, No. 4), p.
. ^Source: AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51,
No. 2 (May 1965), p. 110, and Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 72. ^Estimated
by the author from other statistics. ^Estimate by the office of Education.
eEstimated by the author. fPer cent increase from 1963-64.
8

♦Source:

6

Multiple sources cited separately above.
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total eligible membership of the AAUP, it fits as nearly
as any on which data are available.
As shown in Table III, recently the AAUP member
ship has averaged under 30 per cent of this national base.
From a low of 23.8 per cent in 1959-60, the AAUP percentage
has climbed steadily to about 30 per cent in 1964-65.

If

this trend may be projected to 1965-66, the Association
membership is probably about 31 per cent of its potential
as measured from this base.

Therefore, not only is the

AAUP growing at a rapid pace, but also considerably faster
than its base during the last five years.
Figure 5 shows another way of comparing member
ship growth to total faculty trends.

if 1957-58 is used

as the base year, one cap compare percentage increases
from that point through subsequent years for the two
groups.

As shown in Figure 5, the only biennium since

1957-58 in which the percentage of total faculty increase
i

has been larger than that for the AAUP was the first,
i.e., from 1957-58 to 1959-60.

Since 1959 the percentage

increases for the AAUP have been considerably greater
than those for its base, the total faculty.

The increase

over the entire period was 100.6 per cent for the AAUP,
compared to 57.4 per cent for the total faculty.

The

percentages used in Figure 5 were computed from figures
in Table III.
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Membership distribution*
a.

Geographical location.

Table IV offers com

parative data on the distribution of the Active membership
of the AAUP and total faculty by geographical regions {as
defined by the u. S. Census) for 1956-57, the only year
for which these data are available for both populations.
By these data the AAUP is relatively stronger in the states
of the Midwest and the Middle Atlantic, and relatively
weaker in New England, the South, the Far West, and es
pecially the Southwest

(see Table IV).

Using the same regional classification one may
note the regional discrepancies in recent increases in
AAUP membership (see Table V ) .

The regions showing the

greatest percentage increase between 1957 and 1963 were
the Pacific, the Southwest, and the South Atlantic states,
where the Association had been relatively weak in numbers,
and the Middle Atlantic states where it had already been
comparatively strong.

Each of the foregoing sections

experienced gains of about eighty per cent during the six
year period in question.

All other regions had gains of

less than the 64 per cent for the Association as a whole.
b*

Type of institution.

The distribution of

Association members by type of institution seems to be at
variance with the distribution of the profession generally.

TABLE IV
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OP AAUP MEMBERSHIP
COMPARED TO TOTAL COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITIES
FACULTIES:
UNITED STATES, 1956-57*

Numbers

Percentages

Total
Faculty

AAUP
Members"

Total
Faculty

New England

24,731

2611

8.3

Middle Atlantic

57,508

6986

19.3

2

East North Central

58,642

8016

19.6

23.6

West North Central

29,526

3717

9.9

South Atlantic

37,948

3835

12.7

11.3

East South Central

17,011

1581

5.7

4.7

West South Central

24,505

2

8

5.9

Mountain

11,709

1545

3.9

pacific

36,872

3652

12.4

298,452

33953

Regiona

Total

0

1

0

1

0

6

.

.

AAUP
Members
7.7

1

2

0

0

6

.

.

6

9

4.6

1

1

0

.

8

0

0

.

0

aU. S. Census definition
^Includes only Active members in accredited institutions.
♦Source:

AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 113.
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TABLE V
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCREASES
IN AAUP MEMBERSHIP, 1957-63*

Regiona

1957
Membership

*5

1963
Membership

*-1

Per cent
Increase

New England

2611

3880

48.6

Middle Atlantic

6986

12,771

82.8

East North Central

8016

11,663

45.5

West North central

3717

5283

42.1

South Atlantic

3835

6927

80.6

East South Central

1581

2368

49.8

West South Central

2

3589

78.6

Mountain

1545

2442

58.1

pacific

3652

6760

85.1

33,953

55,683

64.0

Total

0

1

0

aU. S. Census definition
^Includes only Active members in accredited institutions.
♦Source:

AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 113.
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According to an analysis performed by the Association
staff for the academic year, 1962-63, private insti
tutions are overrepresented in the AAUP membership, while
public institutions are underrepresented

.

1

1

For the

approximately five hundred institutions studied, about
two thirds of all faculty were at public Institutions,
whereas only 55 per cent of the AAUP membership was
serving at those institutions.

The same analysis looked

at the distribution among colleges, on the one hand, and
universities and technical institutions, on the other.
Here also one notes a discrepancy between the AAUP
distribution and that for the total faculties,

college

faculties tend to be overrepresented slightly on the AAUP
rosters.

About one third of the total faculty was found

at colleges, whereas about 40 per cent of the AAUP member
ship was at such institutions.
Co

Field of specialization.

of AAUP members compared to total
summarized in Table VI.

u.

The distribution

S. faculty is

Compared to the distribution of

total faculty, the "arts and sciences" are overrepresented
on the AAUP rolls, while the professions and miscellaneous
fields are similarly underrepresented,

within the arts and

sciences the humanities are the roost heavily represented
category for both the AAUP and for total faculty.

The

TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OF AAUP MEMBERSHIP BY FIEIDS
OF SPECIALIZATION, 1956 AND 1963, COMPARED TO
DISTRIBUTION DF TOTAL FACULTIES, U. S. COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES, 1963*

Field
Arts and Sciences

Per cent of
1956 AAUP
Membership

Per cent of
1963 AAUP
Membership

Per cent
of total
faculty

70.0

70.1

60.8

Humanities
Social Sciences

3

Natural Sciences
and Mathematics
Professions, etc.

29.6

29.5

23.7

21.4

2

15.3

19.0

19.6

30.0

1

.

0

2

2

.

0

39.2

29.9

Educat ion and
Physical
Education

9.6

9.1

12.4

Business

4.1

3.9

5.0

Engineering

3.7

3.1

6.9

Health Pro
fessions

2.4

4.3

4.7

0

9.5

Others: Agri
culture, Home
Economics, Law,
Library, etc.
Totals
Totals

1

1

0

0

.

.

2

0

1

1

0

0

.

0

0

0

.

0

1

1

0

0

.

0

0

0

.

1

0

.

0

0

0

.

0

0

1

a Includes also geography, history, and psychology.
♦Source:

AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 112.
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most overrepresented category in the AAUP membership as
compared to total faculty, however, is the "social
sciences," which is construed to include also geography,
history, and psychology.
Two other patterns are evident and noteworthy in
Table VI.

First, the distribution of the AAUP membership

was almost unchanged from 1957 to 1963.

Second, slightly

over fifty per cent of the Association's membership comes
from the humanities and the social sciences together.
These categories are considerably overrepresented compared
to the total faculty distribution.

The natural sciences

and mathematics together comprise less than twenty per
cent of the membership and are underrepresented when
compared to the totals.
The report of the AAUP self-study in 1965, in
analyzing these data, presented the following interpre
tation:
Some of the basic nature and charac
teristics of the Association are
indicated clearly in these dis
tributions. While its membership
includes persons from all the subject
matter areas, its basic strength is
in the arts and sciences rather than
in the professions, and in the
humanities and social sciences in
particular.
Its membership is
strongest in areas concerned more
with basic theoretical matters than
with applied learning and technology,
and within the basic areas themselves,

91
the membership is somewhat stronger
in those fields where matters of
value and opinion are relatively
of more concern than matters of
fact and experimental evidence.12
The Structure of the Association
Officers and Council.

There are only three

elective offices of the Association on the national level,
the presidency and two vice presidencies.

13

The in

cumbents of these positions serve for two-year terms.
Two other executive offices, the General secretary and
the Treasurer, are appointive.

The incumbents of these

five positions are ex officiis members of the council, as
are the three latest living (former) presidents of the
Association.

There are thirty other members of the

Council, three from each of ten geographical districts
of the nation, one third elected by the Association
membership each year for staggered three-year terms.
Out of thirty-eight total number of the Council, there
fore, eight serve ex officiis, while the remaining thirty
are elected specifically to Council membership.

The

structural composition of the Council has changed very
little during the Association's history.
The Council is the chief policy-making and ex14
ecutive body of the Association.
The Council is charged
by the constitution with performing certain basic functions
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and is authorized to act £or the Association.
functions are:

(1) Levying dues,

Among its

(2) managing the

property and financial affairs of the Association,
interpreting the constitution,

(3)

(4) appointing and de

termining the salaries of the General Secretary, the
Treasurer, and the members of the professional staff,

(5)

convening the Annual Meeting and special meetings of the
general membership,

( ) authorizing Association com
6

mittees, and (7) assuming responsibility for the
publications of the Association, including records of
its own meetings.
According to current practice the Council meets
twice a year, although special meetings may be called by
the President.

15

Between Council meetings certain re

sponsibilities may be assigned to the Executive Committee,
which consists of the President, the First Vice President,
and at least four other Council members appointed by the
President.

In such cases the Executive Committee is

authorized to act for the Council in conducting the
business of the Association.
Association Headquarters and Staff.

While ulti

mate authority over the affairs of the Association is
vested in the Council, most of the ongoing work is
performed by the Association headquarters and its staff.

93
The central offices, which house the files and staff of
the Association, are located in Washington, D. C.
The size of the professional staff has been ve^y
small until quite recently.

In 1955, there were only

three members of the professional staff, including the
16
General Secretary.
As of January 1966, there were
-

eleven.

17

All these persons have come to their positions

with academic experience.

Their main functions are:

(1)

to service the Council, the committee, and the other units
of the Association,

(2) to publish and distribute the

publications of the Association,

(3) to maintain communi

cation with other associations, government agencies, etc.,
whose actions are related to the interests of the AAUP,
and (4) to supervise the work of the non-professional
staff (currently about thirty employees)

in the per

formance of the day-to-day tasks of the headquarters
office.

By virtue of his "professional" status a member

of the professional staff is expected to make a creative
contribution in serving the needs of the Association, its
units and members.

He frequently exercises judgment,
18
interprets policy, and offers informed advice.
Committee structure.

Much of the Association's

policy deliberation and formulation occurs in its national
committees.

These are standing committees authorized and

i
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appointed by the Council to deal with specific subjects
of policy.

The policy proposals resulting from committee

activity are subject to approval by the Council.

The

AAUP began in 1915 with sixteen committees on various
subjects ranging from academic freedom to faculty improvement.

19

Each committee was designated alphabetically

as Committee "A," "B," "T,'* or "Z," and so on, along with
its subject label or title.

The practice of using alpha

betical designations has become a customary shorthahd
reference to the committees.

20

The most important committee, and the only one
with a record of continuous activity since 1915, is
Committee A, the Committee on Academic Freedom and
Tenure.

21

Because of the relevance of the work of this

committee to the subject of this study. Committee A is
discussed separately later in the chapter.

Of the other

committees active in the recent history of the Association,
the major ones are Committee B

(Professional Ethics),

Committee T (College and university Government), Com
mittee D

(Accreditation), Committee Z (Economic Status

of the Profession), and Committee R(Relations of Higher
Education to Federal and State Government).

Each of

these committees, composed of members scattered over the
nation, meets from time to time, deliberates on appropriate

95
policies, furnishes guidance to staff members, and sug
gests policy resolutions for the Annual Meeting and for
22
the Council.
Academic freedom entails correlative academic
responsibility.

From its founding the Association has

given recognition to the professional duties and standards
binding upon faculty members.

For this reason the AAUP

established Committee B, on Professional Ethics.

The

record of this committee's activity, however, indicates
relatively less vigor in promoting and enforcing standards
of academic responsibility than Committee A has mustered
for academic freedom.

From 1940 to 1957 the committee
23
was idle, if not defunct.
in 1957 the committee was
reactivated and charged with the responsibility of formu
lating codes of professional ethics and a statement of
principles as well as plans for enforcement machinery.
As of January 1966, in spite of several drafts, no state-*
ment on the matter has become Association policy.

The

AAUP anticipates having an explicit policy statement in
the near future

.

2

4

The activity of Committee T on College and Uni
versity Government is an indication of the Association's
long-term concern with the role of the faculty in the
government of colleges and universities.

Since its

r
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establishment in 1916, this committee has performed two
main functions.

It has

(1) studied the extent and taethodfe

of faculty participation in college and university govern
ment, and ( ) devised a set of principles applicable to
2

faculty participation.

In recent years a third function

has been assumed, namely, investigation and mediation of
cases of reported violations of its sanctioned principles.

25

The committee has come to play an increasingly active and
important role in recent years.
The Association also has an obvious Interest in
accreditation, which is the concern of Committee D.

To

be eligible to gain Active membership in the AAUP a person
must serve on the faculty of an "approved" institution,
which is construed at present to mean an institution
accredited b y its regional accrediting association.

Thus,

the quality of the membership of the Association is partly
dependent on the criteria of the accrediting organizations.
Furthermore, as stated in the AAUP self-study report,
. . . one of the chief purposes of
the Association, as laid down in its
Constitution at the beginning, has
been the promotion of the interests
of higher education and research, and
the establishment of accreditation
procedures has proved to be an effective
w ay of improving the quality of our
institutions. The obligation of
keeping watch upon these accrediting
bodies is therefore implicit in the
Association's statement of its
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purposes. Within recent years .
. . /another/ motive for such inter
est has been expressed, viz., the
desire to use the accrediting process
for assisting in the maintenance of
academic freedom and tenure and in
the improvement of faculty-administration
relations in general.26
Therefore, when Committee D was authorized in
1956, the Council prescribed that the Committee be con
cerned " . . .

with the methods and organizations for

accrediting colleges, universities, and professional
schools; with the relation of faculty members to the ac
crediting process; and with the effectuation of the Associ27
ation's objectives through accreditation."
The Association has always had a committee con
cerned with the economic status of the profession, Committee
Z.

The work of this committee has been aided, since 1959,

b y the service of one of the members of the Washington
staff, who is a professional economist.

28

One of the main

functions of this committee is to collect and publish in
the Bulletin annually detailed information on salary levels
at U. S. colleges and universities.

This report has grown

steadily in its acceptability and interest since it was
initiated in 1958-59.

In 1965 some 800 institutions

authorized publication of their salary information for
1964-65.

2Q

committee

z

is also concerned about taxation,

fringe benefits, the financing of higher education, and
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the possibilities of adapting collective bargaining procedures to the academic marketplace.
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The functions of Committee R on Relations of
Higher Education to Federal and State Government receive
thdir impetus from the trends of growing government support
and control of many facets of higher education.

Among the

myriad problems and issues that have concerned this com
mittee are legislation and executive policies which relate
to academic freedom, the economic status of the profession,
academic ethics in regard to use of federal grants and
contracts for research, the international exchange of
scholars and scholarly materials, copyright regulations,
and many more.
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Judicial action, especially in direct

or indirect relation to academic freedom also receives
the attention of Committee R.

Much of the committee's

activity is of a surveillance nature.

However, the com

mittee shows indications of more positive efforts, such
as initiating its own proposals which support the inter
ests of both the Association and higher education
generally, and pressing these in appropriate government
channels.32
There are other committees that have been active
from time to time.

The Council recently established Com

mittee S on Faculty Responsibility for the Academic Freedom
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of Students.33

The first function assigned to it was the

formulation of some guiding principles in the area.

It

promises to he an important committee but it is as yet
too soon to analyze its work.
Annual Meeting.

Throughout the history of the

AAUP there has been a yearly meeting of the Association
membership at which all members are welcome, but only
Active members may vote.3^

The agenda of the Annual

Meeting is almost entirely taken up with Association
business.

The Annual Meeting is authorized by the consti

tution "to express its views on professional matters."
Much of its business is concerned with action on recom
mendations of the Council.

However, usually a number of

resolutions are acted upon at the meeting which are not
derived from previous council action.
Ordinarily less than one per cent of the Associ
ation's Active members attend the meeting, with the result
that it is hardly a representative body.

35

in view of

the possible impulsiveness and non-representative character
of the meeting, the constitution provides two checks upon
its power.

First, at the request of one fifth of the

delegates present (elected representatives of chapters
and other constituent units), a "proportional vote" may
be called, in which the vote of each delegate is weighted
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according to the size of his constitutency.
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This pro

vision tends to make a vote more nearly representative
of the Association (although the provision has been used
very seldom).

A second check is erxplained in the recent

self-study of the Association:
A second check upon the power of
the Annual Meeting is the requirement
that proposals initiated there re
ceive either the concurrence of
the Council, or the concurrence of
a subsequent Annual Meeting.. Most
proposed actions come to the Annual
Meeting upon the initiative or at
least concurrence of the Council;
if the Annual Meeting accepts these
proposals, they are considered to
be the "action of the Association."
If the Meeting rejects the proposals,
they are dead, at least for the time
being.
If the Meeting itself
initiates some action, it becomes
the "action of the Association" only
if the Council subsequently concurs
in it, or if the ensuing Annual
37
Meeting agrees with its predecessor.
Thus, the Association's policy-making machinery
is bicameral.

The Council and the Annual Meeting share

responsibility for formulating and expressing Association
policy.

Each body maintains some provision to check the

action of the other.

Most policy decisions are initiated

by the Council or its authorized committees and, in
receiving the concurrence of the Annual Meeting, become
the "action of the Association."
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Chapters.

A chapter is recognized by the Associ

ation when the college or university at which it is located
includes at least seven Active members of the Association.
Each chapter has its own elected officers and delegates
to meetings of the Association.

According to the report

of the self-study of the AAUP/ the chapter/ as a unit of
the Association, performs three major functions:

(1) pro

motion of acceptance of the AAUP principles and policies'
by the faculty and administration of the institution in
which it exists;

(2) communication of local information

and opinion to the Washington office; and (3) recruitment
of new members.
Most chapters hold regular meetings and assess
modest dues for chapter functions.

Trends in the number

of chapters are given in Table n .

The Association now

has chapters in two thirds of the regionally accredited,
four-year colleges and universities and in about one
fourth of the accredited junior and community colleges.
State and Regional Conferences.
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As stated in

the 1965 report of the Association self-study, the organi
zation of chapters into larger associations on a state or
regional basis was an unplanned development in the history
of the AAUP.4^

The first formally-organized association

of chapters occurred in the 1920's, in the form of the

38
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Iowa State Conference.
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According to the same report,

". . . beginning in the early 1950’s the organization of
such conferences began to assume the characteristics of
a movement; eighteen were established between 1952 and
1959.1,42

By a constitutional amendment in 1957, the

conferences were given formal recognition as units of
■
43
the Association's structure.
states had such conferences.

as

of 1965, some forty

Most of the conferences

are geographically defined by state boundaries, but there
are also metropolitan and interstate conferences which
meet on a regular basis.

44

Most of the state conferences established since
the Second World War seem to have risen out of concern
about laws detrimental to academic freedom

(e.g.,

disclaimer oaths and speaker bans) enacted by state
legislatures allegedly in the quest for national
security.

As stated in the self-study report,
. . . Neither the isolated chapter
nor the national association seemed
adequately equipped to meet and fore
stall such attacks upon higher edu
cation; hence the growing sense of a
need for groupings larger than the
chapter that could effectively
present the academic case to local
legislators and other state officials.45
Thus, state or regional conferences seem to be

uniquely suited for maintaining surveillance of legislative
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development.

Other functions include:

of new chapters and recruitment efforts;

(1) promulgation
(2) intermediary

communication between chapters and the Washington office
on some matters of regional concern; and (3) maintaining
liaison with regional accrediting associations on matters
of policy and procedure.4^
II.

EVOLUTION OF POLICY ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The American Association of university Professors

was born into an atmosphere of apprehensiveness about
academic freedom.

Throughout its history, the Association

has given top priority among its several concerns to the
promotion and defense of academic freedom.

The basic

outlines of its stance toward norms and practices of
freedom have changed little since the founding of the
Association.

The general evolution of its philosophy,

programs, strategy and tactics pertaining to academic
freedom deserves review.
The general circumstances of the academic world
out of which the AAUP was conceived and organized, in
cluding the discontent and restiveness felt by academicians
toward the effects of rapid change and expansion in higher
education, are well described elsewhere.47

Attention

here is restricted to the essential developments and
policies of the Association relevant to academic freedom.

I
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Just as academic freedom antedated the formation
of the AAUP* so also did attempts to codify the concept.
In 1913, three professional societies, the American
Economic Association, the American Sociological Society,
and the American Political Science Association, collabo
rated in a committee effort to produce a set of principles
of academic freedom.

48

After a year's deliberation, the

members concluded that the thorny issues and questions
involved in their endeavor required protracted and
intensive thought and discussion.

This committee turned

out to be the immediate predecessor and parent of the
AAUP's first committee on academic freedom and tenure.

49

The 1915 Statement
In December 1915, the Association's Committee
A offered in its report a statement of principles which
laid the foundation for the Association's policy on
academic freedom for years to come.^0

in this report

academic freedom was linked to the needs of academic
research, adequate instruction, and the development of
expertise for public service.

Above all, academic

freedom was cast as an indispensable attribute to a
university.

Further, academic freedom incorporated

the notion of ultimate faculty responsibility to
"posterity" in the pursuit of knowledge, rather than
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to the trustees who were one's employers.

Academic freedom

was bounded by the need for objectivity and competence;
that is, conclusions should be ". . . gained by a scholar's
method and held in a scholar's spirit."

On the other

hand, the limitations of competence and objectivity did
not apply, according to the statement, to extramural
utterances.

Outside the university, faculty members had

the same rights as any other citizens for expression and
action, limited only by the need for decorum.

These

propositions formed the skeleton of the Association's
philosophy of academic freedom.
Aside from these generalities the report also
contained practical proposals for their implementation,
the purposes of which were (1) to limit the trustees'
prerogative to fire teachers, and (2) to provide security
and dignity to academic positions.

The idea of due

process was embodied in the proposal of trials under
faculty auspices:
Every university or college teacher
(at the rank of associate professor
or above) should be entitled, before
dismissal or demotion, to have the
charges against him stated in writing
in specific terms and to have a fair
trial on those charges before a
special or permanent judicial com
mittee chosen by the faculty senate
or council, or by the faculty at
large.
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At such trial the teacher accused
should have full opportunity to
present evidence, and if the charge
is one of professional incorapetency,
a formal report upon his work
should he first made in writing by
the teachers of his own department
and of cognate departments in the
university, and if the teacher
concerned so desires, b y a committee
of his fellow specialists from other
institutions appointed b y some
cpmpetent authority. 51
These procedures of due process were intended especially
to safeguard freedom of expression of faculty members
against the potential wrath of trustees.
Tenure was to provide similar safeguards and
some measure of dignity to faculty positions,

"In every

institution there should be an unequivocal understanding
as to the term of each appointment," which should be morally,
if not legally, binding.
freedom was the end:

52

As Metzger states, "Academic

due process, tenure, and establish

ment of professional competence were regarded as necessary
,.53
means."
The 1925 Statement
The Association of American Colleges, an organi
zation of college presidents also founded in 1915, had
its own committee on academic freedom and tenure.

This

committee looked upon the AAUP code as the height of
54
presumption as indicated in its 1917 annual report.
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Within a very short while, however, the AAC was to change
completely its view of the AAUP statement*,

Its 1922

committee report was quite laudatory of the AAUP for its
"significant and highly important" work in codifying academic freedom.

55

The AAC proceeded to accept virtually

the entire AAUP rationale and outline of procedures.

The

AAC reversal made possible a jointly endorsed statement
of principles of freedom and tenure for academic insti
tutions in 1925.

This statement, which resulted from

considerable negotiation of detailed differences, became
56
the policy of each organization.
in substance the 1925 AAUP-AAC statement differed
little from the 1915 AAUP code.

It had the disadvantage

of being cast in the form of mandatory regulations,
apparently calling for explicit adoption by colleges and
universities in order to become absorbed into their by
laws.

Such instances of formal college adoption were very

rare,

presidents and trustees were often willing to

abide by the spirit of the code, but balked at the
regulatory machinery.

57

Moreover, the AAUP and the AAC

began to realize in the 1930's that "what was needed was
a statement of policy that invited approval, not a set
of rules that required adoption."

After sustained

cooperation and negotiation between the two associations
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a new statement was published as the policy of each group
in 1940.
The 1940 Statement
The joint AAUP-AAC statement of 1940 continues
CQ

as present policy.

t

This statement went further than

its predecessor in protecting the freedom and security
of faculty members of the lower ranks.

The maximum

length of the probationary period was set at seven years.
If a teacher were retained after this period he was entitled
to permanent tenure.

At least one year's notice of impending

dismissal was to be given all teachers, including those on
probation.

Finally, this important proviso was added;

"During the probationary period a teacher should have
the academic freedom that all other members of the faculty
have."

The statement is presented in its entirety in

Appendix C.
The AAUP Philosophy of Academic Freedom
The Association's philosophy of academic freedom
has exhibited some internal evolution over the decades.
The charter membership of the AAUP, which sponsored the
1915 code, was hardly a representative body of the aca
demic profession.

Aside from the fact that deans and

presidents were explicitly denied membership in those
days, the rolls of the AAUP included only the academic

elite, the luminaries of the profession.

6X

Lesser lights

among the faculty ranks were not represented (see the
discussion of membership qualifications earlier in this
chapter).

The 1915 statement itself seems to have been

born of a somewhat elitist inspiration.

The most striking

and explicit example of this tendency was the stipulation
of associate professor rank to entitle
to due process in dismissal proceedings.

a faculty member
Furthermore,

there was an underlying tone in the statement to the
effect that academic freedom was an earned right by virtue
of the contributions to scholarship and science of these
notables.

The academic nobility was speaking, as it

were, from the standpoint of reputation and accomplishment
and was seeking to enhance its own sense of dignity.

The

guild quality of the profession had been radically threat
ened by the burgeoning size of higher education in the
preceding decades and the elite sought to secure its
professional status in the face of growing numbers of
62
co-workers in the lower ranks.0
The elitist bias gradually was mitigated as the
membership base was broadened.

By the time of the 1940

statement the privileges of academic freedom were not
reserved for the elite only, but were claimed for all
regular faculty ranks.

Furthermore, deans and other
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administrative officers were eligible for active member
ship as long as they retained substantial teaching or
research duties, and thus were not denied membership, ex
officiis.
The rationale of academic freedom presented in
the 1915 code were linked to changes taking place in the
structure of higher education<>

Those who drafted the

statement took cognizance of the new research function
of the university!

"the modern university is becoming

. . a the home of scientific research."63
statement continued,

Freedom, the

"is the breath in the nostrils of

all scientific activity.”64

If freedom was necessary

for the uninhibited pursuit of research interests, it
was equally important for teaching.

In the early period

of the nation's history it had been sufficient simply
". . . to train the growing generation and to diffuse
65
the already accepted knowledge,"
However, with the
expansion and differentiation of knowledge, the peda
gogical function must be modified to take account of
the tentativeness of research conclusions.

According to

the 1915 statement,
. . . if the student has reason to
believe that the instructor is not
true to himself, the virtue of the
instruction as an educative force is
incalculably diminished. There must
be in the mind of the teacher no

Ill
mental reservation. He must give
the student the best of What he
has and what he is.66
The authors of the 1915 code, then, justified
academic freedom as the sine qua non of the new university
functions.

The university functions were in turn justified

as serving the public interest.

In the interest of

posterity the university
. . o should be an Intellectual
esqperiment station, where new ideas
may germinate and where their fruit,
though still distasteful to the
community as a whole, may be allowed
to ripen until finally, perchance,
it may become a part of the accepted
intellectual food of the nation or
of the world.®'
An examination of the 1940 statement reveals no
change in the rationale of academic freedom:
institutions of higher education are
conducted for the common good and not
to further the interest of either the
individual teacher or the institution
as a whole. The common good depends
upon the free search for truth and its
free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to
these purposes and applied to both
teaching and research. Freedom in
research is fundamental to the
advancement of truth. Academic
freedom in its teaching aspect is
fundamental for the protection of
the rights of the teacher in
teaching and of the student to
freedom in learning. Freedom and
economic security, hence tenure, are
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indispensable to the success of
an institution in fulfilling its
obligations to its student and
to society.®®
The Structure and Functioning of Committee A
The committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure
(Committee A) stands at the apex of the Association's
committee framework.

Historically the reputation of the

AAUP has been built upon the work and accomplishments of
Committee A.

Even with the Association's recent broadening

of concerns and activities, the 1965 report of the selfstudy stated that from 40 to 50 per cent of the time and
energies of the professional staff is consumed by the
fiQ
work of this committee.
Of the fourteen members of Committee A, two of
them, the President and the General Secretary of the
Association, are members ex officiis.

The remaining

twelve are appointed by the President for staggered threeyear terms. 70
The most general and fundamental functions of
Committee A are (1) the formulation of principles of
academic freedom and tenure and (2) the effectuation and
implementation of these principles.

Since 1940 Committee

A has given relatively little attention to formulating
principles and relatively more attention to interpreting
and applying these principles.

Every occasion on which
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the committee is called upon to apply the principles of
the 1940 statement entails interpretation.

The committee

also has sought to interpret the 1940 statement by
amplifying its principles.

A case in point is the 1958

"Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal
Proceedings," which was intended to supplement the idea
71
of due process in the 1940 document.
Nevertheless, the
bulk of the committee's activity is concerned with "case
work," arising from specific complaints of alleged vio
lations of the 1940 principles.
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The responsibility for implementation of the
Association's principles of academic freedom and tenure
also rests primarily with Committee A.

The discussion

of procedures which follows refers to the implementation
72
of the 1940 code.
Committee A Procedures
Committee A authorizes the General Secretary to
receive on its behalf complaints of violations of academic
freedom and tenure by college and university authorities.
If the General Secretary believes that the complaint
merits attention by the Association, he is authorized
to make a preliminary inquiry and " . . .

where appropriate,
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communicate with the authorities of the institution
concerned to secure factual information and comments."
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If possible, the General Secretary is then authorized to
seek an adjustment between the parties involved; in other
words, to resolve the complaint.

If, at that point, an

adjustment seems impossible and the General Secretary
decides that the case (the incident is now a "case"
rather than a "complaint") warrants further attention by
the Association, he is authorized to establish an ad hoc
committee to investigate and render a written report on
the incident.
The task of the ad hoc committee is
to ascertain the facts involved in
the incident under investigation and
to determine whether the 1940 'State
ment of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure' as interpreted
by the Association has been violated,
and whether unsatisfactory conditions
of academic freedom and tenure prevail
in the institution.^
The ad hoc investigating committee is authorized
to visit the institution in question to interview the
parties involved and to secure information and views
pertaining to the case,

in such visits the committee is

charged by the Association rules:
. . . the Committee should make clear
that as an investigating body it acts
not in partisanship, but as a professional
body charged with ascertaining the facts
as objectively as possible, on this
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basis, the cooperation of others
may be sought without hesitation
and will usually be forthcoming.
The committee should Investigate
fully the violation alleged to
have occurred, and should inquire
into conditions of academic
freedom and tenure in the insti
tution which form the background
of the particular case, or which
may have given rise to related
incidents, and into relevant
subsequent developments.75
In dismissal cases, "the committee should de
termine whether the decision to dismiss was fairly reached
and is rationally supported in the light of the Association's principles, both procedural and substantive."
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Depending upon the committee's conclusions,
. . . The committee may set forth
recommendations for or against
publication of the report and for
or against Association censure of
the administration concerned; but
the decision of these matters will
rest with Committee A and, as to
censure, with the Council and
Annual Meeting of the Association.
Hence, the recommendation as to
censure will not be published as
part of the report. The report
should be transmitted in confidence
to the General Secretary.77
The committee's report is transmitted to the
members of Committee A for review and editorial sug
gestions.

The report, as amended, is then sent to the

persons involved in the report, including administrative
officers,

. .with the request that they supply corrections

I
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for any errors of fact that may appear In it and make
such comments as they may desire upon the conclusions
reached."
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The report may subsequently be rewritten

and submitted to the members of Committee A.

If Com

mittee A approves the revised report, it is published
in the Bulletin over the names of the ad hoc committee
members as chief authors of the report and the names of
Committee A members as authorizing publication of the
report.
The authority for imposing censure upon the
administrative officers of the institution in question
rests with the Council and the Annual Meeting of the
AAUP.

If censure is voted by these bodies, then the n^me

of the institution is published in subsequent regular
issues of the Bulletin under the list of "Censured
Administrations."

Censure may be removed in the same

manner by which it is imposed.

During the period of

censure the General Secretary is authorized to correspond,
and to invite consultation, with the censured adminis
tration for the purpose of ameliorating the conditions
which resulted in censure.

When the Association

(specifically Committee A) is satisfied that the grounds
for imposing censure have been eliminated, then censure
may be removed by vote of the Council and the Annual
Meeting.

79
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The Use of Sanctions
The ultimate sanction employed hy the Association
in implementing its principles of academic freedom is the
imposition of censure on an institutional administration,
and the publication in the regular issues of the Bulletin
of the names of colleges and universities whose adminis
trative officers are so censured.

While this is perhaps

the weightiest sanction employed, certainly it is not the
only one.
Within the framework of Committee A procedures
outlined above, three other sanctions are evident.

The

first is the announcement to an institution's adminis
tration that the Association has received a complaint of
an alleged infraction and is seeking to establish the
facts of the case and offers its good offices in
resolving the incident.

A second sanction, which comes

into play if the first one fails, is the Association's
initiation of an on-campus investigation of the case.
third sanction is the published report

A

(in the Bulletin)

of the ad hoc investigating committee's findings.

These

three sanctions are listed in the order of their probable
effectiveness, the latter being the most effective of
the three, and yet somewhat less potent than censure
itself.

It would seem that the potency of each sanction
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arises from its position among the procedural stages of
Committee A, which are cumulative in nature.

Thus, the

power of the first sanction is dependent on the realization
by a "guilty" administrative officer that failure to
ameliorate the situation would lead to subsequent and
weightier sanctions.
It appears that the published report of an in
vestigation is a particularly important sanction.

Noting

this, the self-study report of 1965 states:
. . . publication of the facts
always precedes censure, and publi
cation even without censure is a
powerful sanction, particularly in
the academic world, where prestige
counts for so much. There are
probably no administrators who
relish having the facts of a
questionable episode revealed to
the outside world under the
auspices of an AAUP report, even
though censure is not imposed. .
. . the publication of a story of
administrative ineptitude is often
the only sanction necessary to
bring about changes in the rules
and regulations of the institution
concerned and to induce others to
put their own procedures in order.80
Thus, regardless of whether censure is the
eventual result, the lesser sanctions derive their power
from their position on the cumulative chain that leads
(or can lead) to censure,

censure, it may be noted, is

the only sanction by which the Association seeks in any
way to discourage members from seeking appointments at
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given institutions.

According to present practice, the

Association includes the following statement over the
published list of censured administrations:
Members of the Association have
often considered it to be their
duty, in order to indicate their
support of the principles violated,
to refrain from accepting appointment
to an institution so long as it
remains on the censure list. Since
circumstances differ widely from
case to case, the Association does
not consider it advisable to assert
that such an unqualified obligation
exists for its members; it does
urge that, before accepting
appointments, they seek information
on present conditions of academic
freedom and tenure from the Associ
ation's Washington Office and
prospective departmental colleagues.
The Association leaves it to the
discretion of the individual,
possessed of the facts, to make the
proper decision.81
Alternate Means
Aside from the activity of Committee A, the
Association has other somewhat less direct means of pro
moting its principles of academic freedom.

Two of these

are particularly important in the view of the author; the
influence of the AAUP on the accrediting process (the
concern of Committee D) and the promotion of faculty
participation in the governing of colleges and universities
(Committee T ) .
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The importance of the accrediting process is
perhaps self-evident.

The regional accrediting associ

ations have more powerful sanctions at their disposal
than the AAUP, particularly the removal of accredited
status from an institution.

To the extent that the AAUP

is successful in having its principles of academic freedom
and tenure incorporated as standards into the criteria
for accreditation by the regional associations, the
realization of the Association's ideals of freedom will
be enhanced.

The Association is evidently well aware of

these potentialities, as indicated by the activity of
82
Committee D, established in 1956.
Likewise, the promulgation of ideals of faculty
participation is supportive of the practice of principles
of freedom.

As with accreditation, to the extent that

there is representative faculty participation in academic
government, the probability of faculty misunderstanding
and disaffection would be reduced.

Therefore, to the

degree that Committee T is able to effectuate its ideals,
the purposes of Committee A are advanced and its work
lessened.
The difficult question of the effectiveness of
the AAUP policies and procedures relative to academic
freedom is reserved for the discussion of concrete cases
in Chapter Five.

it has been the purpose of this chapter
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to outline the main elements of structure and function
of the AAUP Which are relevant to its promotion of aca
demic freedom,

it is to be noted that the AAUP< through

its policy statements on principles of academic freedom
and tenure, has contributed to the further codification
and specification of the concept of academic freedom.
As noted, however, the AAUP's interest in the concept
of academic freedom is more than merely academic.

The

formation of the AAUP perhaps signalled the end of the
guild era of faculty-administration relationships and of
the informal etiquette that guided their behavior.
With the advent of the AAUP, one notes the
bureaucratization of the norms, roles, and interaction
within academic social systems.

The three academic

freedom codes are formal, explicit statements of norms
both substantive and procedural (including the values
which underly them), which apply to the quasi-bureaucratic
interaction of faculty and administration.

In spite of

the formalization of these norms, however, their main
force is moral, rather than legal.

The efficacy of its

sanctions against violators depends upon the response of
displeasure within the academic community, inasmuch as
the Association cannot cause direct harm to a recalcitrant
administration.

Attention will be redirected to these

matters in Chapter Five,

in chapter Four the author
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attempts to analyze academic organization with reference
to problems of academic freedom.
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CHAPTER IV
ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom is not merely an idea or an
abstract concept.

As indicated in Chapter I, academic

freedom is also a complex of norms, which, as any other
set of norms, is (or can serve as) a basis for the behavior
of people.

In Chapter II it was suggested that the concept

of academic freedom was influenced in its American develop
ment by the kind of historical context within which it
evolved,

if academic freedom were merely an abstraction,

the "historical context" examined in that chapter would
have no relevance.

Moreover, much of the program of the

AAUP in regard to academic freedom, examined in Chapter
III, takes cognizance of the "behavioral" context in
which norms of academic freedom must operate.

The AAUP

does not simply formulate a detailed concept of academic
freedom.

Rather, as noted in Chapter III, the Association

is concerned also with the implementation of its principles
and policies.

All of these considerations point to the

value of analyzing the relationship of norms of academic
freedom to academic organization.
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For the academic
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organization of colleges and universities is the framework
within which these norms have meaning and within which
they influence the behavior of the incumbents of academic
roles.

This chapter, therefore, is concerned with the

bearing of various facets of academic organization on
the practice of academic freedom.
In conventional terms academic organization in
the united States includes the following components:

a

governing board, a hierarchy of administrative officials,
a faculty, a corps of non-academic employees, a body of
students, a roster of alumni, and possibly other elements,
depending on the peculiarities of local situations,

of

these component units, only the first three, trustees,
administration and faculty, normally share permanent,
de jure, authority over the academic affairs (programs,
policies, appointments, etc.) of a college of university.*'
Occasionally other component units and external groups
and forces exert influence on some special aspect of
academic affairs, but these influences are not derived
from the authority structure of the institution and tend
to be exceptional.

For this reason the ensuing discussion

of academic organization is limited to the roles and
interrelations among trustees, administrators and faculty.
There is a further justification for thus
limiting the conception of academic organization employed
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here, Which takes into account the overall concern of
this study with academic freedom*

Of the several structur

al components cited above, only the faculty, administration
and trustees have any de jure authority to determine
policies and to control conditions affecting academic
freedom.^

The limitations employed, therefore, are

consonant with the purpose of the chapter, the examination
of the impact of academic organization on academic freedom.
The first section of this chapter presents some
models of organization which aid in the analysis of aca
demic organization from a sociological perspective.

The

second section explores the hypothesis that academic
freedom is a function of academic organization.

The

discussion of academic organization, in turn, serves as
the background for the analysis of "academic freedom
cases" in Chapter V.
I.

ANALYSIS OF ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION

Colleges and universities in the United States
are examples of large-scale complex organization.

As is

true of complex organization in general, they are charac
terized by both hierarchical and functional differentiation
in their internal structure.

Conventionally, a governing

board of lay trustees is granted by charter ultimate
authbtity over institutional affairs.

Both administrative
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offices and faculty positions are responsible to the
board.

A considerable degree of "managerial" responsi

bility is usually allocated to administrative offices,
however.

Traditionally, administrators have been con

sidered to be "agents11 of the governing board, and until
rather recently were selected by the trustees.4

The

faculty, like the "administration," is characterized
by a substantial degree of functional and hierarchical
differentiation.

The place of the faculty in the au

thority structure has been uncertain, at best,

commonly

the faculty role in institutional governance has been
minimal compared to the roles of administration and
trustees and traditionally has been confined to limited
"academic" decisions such as degree requirements and
curriculum.

This traditional pattern of allocation of

authority has been, to some extent, challenged in recent
decades as a result of increased concern about academic
freedom.
in the analysis of the relation of academic
organization to academic freedom which follows, academic
organization is examined within a sociological framework.
In the first section some models of formal and informal
organization are applied to academic organization,

in

the second section, selected concepts of reference group
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organization are examined as they apply to academic
organization.
Formal and Informal Organization
5
6
7
Following Mayo, Barnard,
and others,
it may
be said that academic organization has both formal and
informal aspects.

The formal organization of a college

or university is founded upon official definitions of
positions or roles within the institution and of the
norms for interaction among the various roles.

This

pattern of organization is essentially prescribed and
therefore is de jure, in nature, rather than d£ facto.
The formal organization, for instance, will include role
prescriptions for the president, the dean(s), the registrar,
the department chairmen, and so on.

Procedural norms for

role interaction will also be a part of the prescribed
structure.

Therefore, the formal organization is de

jure, prescribed, and official.
Mayo, Barnard, and others have asserted that
within any formal organization, there will also be
informal relationships, which are unaccounted for by
any diagram of formal organization.

According to

Barnard's usage, informal organization refers to

.

. . the aggregate of the personal contacts and interactions and the associated groupings of people.

g

. ."
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In other words, in the college or university, as else
where in large-scale organizations, there are unofficial
relationships, which are not prescribed by the formal
structure.

This type of organization may arise from the

interaction among individual personalities as opposed to
interaction among role incumbents.

For example, Department

Chairman A may consult Department Chairman B on a given
matter, not because of B's official role or official
relationship to A, but because of the quality of the
personal relationship between them.

Informal organization,

thus, tends to be de facto, unprescribed, and unofficial.
In distinguishing informal from formal organi
zation there is the temptation to regard the organizational
behavior of the participants as either formal or informal.
In the author's view, such a dichotomous conception is
not warranted.

The formal-informal distinction applies,

not to behavior or interaction but, to the sets of norms,
values, and roles by which behavior is more or less
governed.

That is, "behavior" is all of one piece and

is not divisible according to this analytical scheme.
The formal-informal distinction applies, in other words,
to what may be called the normative level, rather than
the level of action or behavior.
Both Mayo and Barnard seem to have fallen to
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this temptation.

An attempt is made to represent their

conceptions schematically in Figure 6.
conception is also presented there.

The author's

Each diagram in the

figure has two intersecting dimensions, creating four
cells.

Horizontally, the diagram is bisected by the

formal-informal distinction,

on the vertical is the

distinction between the normative and behavioral levels.
Barnard's formal-informal dichotomy applies only to the
behavioral level.

He speaks only of informal (and formal)

groups and associations.

He does not discuss norms,
9
values, and roles in the same terms.
Mayo also makes the formal-informal distinction

on the behavioral level,

unlike Barnard, however, Mayo

talks about a formal structure of norms.3'0

Nevertheless,

the informal-normative cell is empty because Mayo, like
Barnard, does not recognize a normative structure for
informal association.

Both writers tend to discount the

structured quality of informal interaction.

Barnard, for

instance, writess
. . . informal organization is
indefinite and rather structureless,
and has no definite subdivision.
It
may be regarded as a shapeless mass
of quite varied densities . . .■*•*■
The author's conception, also presented in Figure
1, departs from the earlier schemes in two respects.

First,

BARNARD

X
FORMAL
INFORMAL
X

MAYO
BEHAVIORAL

NORMATIVE

X

X
FORMAL
INFORMAL

X

DRYSDALE
NORMATIVE

BEHAVIORAL

FORMAL
(Official)^
INFORMAL
(Unofficial)

Figure 6« Three models of formal and informal organization;
Barnard, Mayo, Drysdale.
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the formal (official)-informal (unofficial) distinction
applies to the normative level, representing a true
dichotomy.

On the one hand there are the official norms,

role definitions, values and goals which comprise the
formal organization.

On the other hand, there are extra-

or un-official roles, norms, values, and goals Which are
the foundation for patterns of informal association.
Second, on the behavorial level, the formal-informal
dichotomy is erased, to take cognizance of the remarks
made above, to indicate the indivisibility of behavior
or interaction in these terms.

To deny that behavior can

be regarded as either "formal" or "informal," which is
i

the meaning of this scheme, does not imply that the
formal-informal dichotomy is irrelevant for understanding
organizational behavior.

A given act may be guided

primarily by either one or the other type of norms.
It is the author's contention, however, that rarely, if
ever, is a giVen act guided exclusively by either formal
or informal norms.

Particular actions are guided by

both formal and informal norms, goals, and values.

The

questions involved here are thorny ones for the sociolo
gist.

How does the observer determine whether, and to

what extent, a given act is guided by informal (or
formal) norms, especially in view of the fact that the
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"influence11 of norms, whether formal or informal, may be
unconscious as well as conscious?

Tracing the normative

bases of actions is a formidable research task.

Con

ceptualizing behavior in this unified manner does not
resolve such difficulties, but does at least take cognizance
of them.
in applying the formal-informal distinction,
there is also the temptation to say that one or the other
is more "real," that while formal organization is pre
scriptive, informal organization is actual or real.

Such

a statement is misleading, however* Both formal and
informal organization are sets of norms, and as such are
prescriptive.

Each is "real" in the sense that each is

capable of serving as the basis for human interaction.
Thus, both behavior and the norms guiding it, whether
formal o r informal, may be regarded as "real."

"Real"

organization can be formal, informal, or an amalgam of
the two.
Reference organization;

"Cosmopolitans" and "Locals"

The concept of "reference group," developed in
recent years by sociologists and social psychologists is
also applicable to the analysis of academic organization.
12
The term has been given a variety of meanings.
Here,
the concept will refer to a group Which serves as a
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source of values and norms for an individual Whether he
is a member of that group or not.

Reference organization

will mean alternative sets of values and norms within the
same social system (e.g., a university).

Reference

organization seldom coincides with official organization
and therefore represents a type of informal organization.
Following Robert Merton, a distinction may be

13

made between '’cosmopolitans" and "locals.”

Applied to

academic organization, "locals" are those among the
faculty and administration whose reference group is the
institution at Which they serve.

Their primary loyalty

is to the values and goals of their college or university.
Their interests are parochial and particularistic.

The

local situation is their "world," the framework within
Which they see their lives unfolding.

They "identify"

with the local framework to the virtual exclusion of
interests beyond the institution and locality.
"Cosmopolitans," on the other hand, are those
whose reference groups are found beyond institution and
locality.

Because there are so many possibilities for

external reference groups, cosmopolitans are less likely
than locals to be homogeneous.

Their primary loyalties

may be to the values and norms of a professional or learned
society, science, education in general, and so on.

While
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in order to operate in the local environment one must at
least minimally heed local norms and values, the cosmo
politan's "world" is beyond the confines of locality.
His perspective is likely to be more universalistic than
particularistic.

Local affairs in so far as they are

unique and remote from "cosmopolitan" concerns are not
likely to compel his attention and interest.

He is "in"

the local situation but not "of" it.
Applied to a hypothetical university, one might
expect the cosmopolitans to be represented heavily among
the faculty and locals similarly overrepresented among
administrative officers.

If for no other reasons than

the requirements of their roles, administrators are
expected to be committed to the local values and norms
and the bulk of their work is concerned with local affairs.
The demands of faculty roles are generally less likely to
invoke local loyalty and involve relatively less attention
to local concerns,

on the contrary, faculty roles are

considered widely to be "liberating" and ecumenical by
nature.
Assuredly, however, locals are to be found among
faculty ranks and cosmopolitans among administrators.
The "local" professor may be an aspirant for an adminis
trative post.

He may anticipate remaining at his school

for the duration of his career.

He may have relatively
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little communication with fellow scholars and researchers
in his field in the "outside" world of professional
activity.

The "cosmopolitan” administrator, on the other

hand, may have retained a strong loyalty to his own
discipline and an active interest in the work done by
"external" colleagues in his field.

He may view his

administrative work as temporary, at least in respect
to his current institution.

His retention of an identity

with any outside reference group will inhibit his becoming
a "local."
Because lopals and cosmopolitans act on the
basis of quite different values and norms, the possi
bility for conflict between them is ever present.

The

two are likely to have different conceptions of the
proper goals of the institution and its programs and the
means of achieving goals, including definitions of roles
of faculty and administrators.

Locals, the "home-guard"

as it were, are more likely to put institutional interests
as they perceive them above considerations of more abstract
values, ideas, and goals,

conversely, cosmopolitans, who

might be labeled "careerists," are more likely to promote
goals and values derived from their "external" reference
groups.
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II.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A
FUNCTION OF ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
In Chapter One it was stated that academic organi
zation is an intervening variable between the AAUP and
the practice of academic freedom.

It is the purpose of

this section to examine this idea in the light of the
preceding discussion of the formal and informal

(es

pecially reference) organization of faculty-administration
relationships.
The Relevance of Formal organization
As with complex organization in general, colleges
and universities usually have explicitly defined structural
units or components differentiated in terms of both function
and hierarchy.

Also, functions and procedures of these

units for action and Interaction are usually specified
in some detail,

inasmuch as these structures and functions

are the bases for much of the action of faculty and adminis
trators, the nature of the formal organization is relevant
to the kinds of policy and practice

(including academic

freedom) characteristic of a college or university.
Central to the hypothesis that formal organi
zation is relevant to the practice of academic freedom is
the additional hypothesis that certain types of academic
structure and function are favorable while others are
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unfavorable, to the practice of academic freedom.

That

is, specific structures and functions may affect the
practice of academic freedom either positively or
negatively.

Hypothetical cases will illustrate the

point in question.
The extreme case of negative influence would
probably be a college or university wherein all policy
making authority rested in the office of president.

Such

a system would be compatible with autocratic management
of an institution.

If such were the case there would be

no structural guarantees of functional autonomy within
the institution.
Looking at institutional governance in terms of
formal organization, functional autonomy for the faculty
seems to be the key to the practice of academic freedom.
By functional autonomy is meant the institutionalized
means whereby faculty roles and units are granted policy
control over specific faculty, or academic, functions.
Those structural features which allow for autonomy will
tend to promote the chances for academic freedom for the
faculty.
Functional autonomy is closely approximated by
what the AAUP terms "faculty participation" in college
and university government.

An examination of the Associ

ation's principles of faculty participation provides an
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illustration of structural and functional means of pro
moting faculty autonomy, and hence, presumably academic
freedom.

Among the principles which the AAUP has pro

moted over the years are the following:
1.

There ought to be a close under
standing between the faculty and
the board of trustees and to
this end agencies other than the
president are required for joint
conference between the two
bodies.

2.

The general faculty should
participate with the trustees
in the nomination of a president,
and the faculty of a school or
division should have a voice in
selecting the dean who presides
over that school.

3.

Administrative officers should
have the advice of representative
faculty committees in matters of
educational policy, and specifically
in matters touching appointments,
promotions, and dismissals, and
in making budgets.

4.

The faculty of the university at
large or its authorized repre
sentatives, and the faculty of
each college in the university,
should have ultimate legislative
power over educational policies
within the jurisdiction of that
faculty, and should control its
own organization and its committee.

5.

The departments of instruction,
however organized, should be con
sultative bodies and should exercise
what is in effect a collective
authority over the teaching and
research under their jurisdiction.1,4
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The first principle cited simply provides for
communication

(through unspecified means) between faculty

and governing board.

Presumably this communication would

be in some sense direct rather than mediated through normal
"administrative" channels,

one function of this communi

cation would be to make the trustees aware of faculty
ideas and opinion on specific institutional issues.
Additionally, direct communication would tend to foster
mutual understanding and appreciation of the functions
performed by each body.
The second principle makes provision for the
faculty to share authority with the board in selecting
administrative officers.

The means and extent of this

authority are not specified.

However, it is clear that

this measure increases the autonomy of the faculty.

More

over, to the extent that the faculty has an important
voice in such selections, the chances for selecting
officers sympathetic to faculty autonomy in general are
enhanced.
The third principle seeks to assure faculty
influence, but not autonomy, in policy formulation
pertaining to faculty personnel and academic budgeting.
It seems to leave primary responsibility for these with
administrative officers.
The fourth principle, however, claims full
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autonomy for each faculty unit

(college, school, etc.)

in legislating educational policy within its juris
diction.

There are no qualifications or limits over this

functional autonomy.

This measure in itself may constitute

a form of academic freedom inasmuch as policy issues
related to academic freedom may be decided by the
faculty or its units.
Finally, the fifth principle provides for faculty
autonomy at the departmental level.

On the one hand, the

department is autonomous from external and higher au
thority in certain types of decisions regarding teaching
and research by its members.

On the other hand, the

terms "consultative bodies" and "collective authority"
Seem to be safeguards against "undemocratic" department
"heads."
It may be noted that all five of the AAUP princi
ples cited above would seem to have the effect of minimizing
the hierarchical character of academic organization and
at the same time emphasizing functional differentiation
as well as autonomy.

Each of the principles

(the first

one perhaps only quite indirectly) aims at increasing the
degree of institutionalized faculty authority in academic
decisions.
Faculty authority and academic freedom,thus,
are closely interrelated.

In a sense academic freedom is
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faculty authority over functions of teaching and research,
broadly defined,

if the faculty has specific forms of

functional autonomy, then its academic freedom can be
denied by no one.

in practice, the problem is that the

faculty does not in fact possess such authority and
therefore its freedom is, at best, uncertain, and, at
worst, non-existent.
Furthermore, it may be noted that the AAUP
principles discussed above represent norms for academic
functions and interaction.

They define the roles of

offices and units within the college or university.
values behind these norms are not explicitly stated.

The
If

faculty authority is not an end in itself, then perhaps
one could say that the chief underlying value or
rationale of these norms is academic freedom.

This

interpretation is substantiated by the AAUP's overarching
concern with academic freedom.

Furthermore, the net

effect of these norms is to promote academic freedom.
The Relevance of Reference Organization
Aside from the importance of the formal or
official organization of the college or university, the
reference organization will have an effect on the practice
of academic freedom.

The composition of the faculty,

administration, and governing board, in terms of the
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values to which they adhere, will affect the probability
of maintaining norms of academic freedom in practice.
The reference organization may also affect the kind of
official organization implemented in the institution.
Employing the reference group categories of
"cosmopolitans" and "locals" discussed earlier, some
hypotheses may be set forth to illustrate the potential
importance of reference organization for academic freedom.
1.

"localism" increases with age, rank, and

length of service at a particular college or university.
This hypothesis simply relates localism to individual
characteristics.

The three independent variables cited

are, of course, related.

As one's length of service at

an institution increases so does his age and usually his
rank.

The most significant variable is probably "length

of service."

Locals are probably less likely to be

mobile, i.e., to leave the institution for another
appointment.

If this is true, it helps to explain the

oligarchic tendencies in faculty government and adminis
trative recruitment.

If locals predominate at the

higher levels of age, rank, and tenure, their chances
for hierarchical advancement are enhanced.
2.

Holding rank constant, localism decreases

as professional reputation outside an institution increases.
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This hypothesis asserts that within each rank locals have
less professional standing and acquaintance outside the
institution at which they serve than do cosmopolitans.
If this proposition is true, it is compatible with the
fact that "cosmopolitans" by definition identify with
external reference groups, foremost among which are the
learned societies, their mefobers and professional
activity.

Also if locals are engaged in cultivating

their "local" careers, their commitment to professional
activity is likely to decline.
3.

Locals are overrepresented among adminis

trators and trustees; cosmopolitans are overrepresented
among faculty.

According to this hypothesis, adminis

trators are more likely to be locals than are the faculty,
whereas faculty are more likely to be cosmopolitans.
As suggested earlier, the reasons for this may lie in
the nature of faculty vork and administrative function.
The requirements of administrative office may reinforce
"localistic" tendencies, whereas most faculty functions
are less likely to do so.

Particularly the research

function of the faculty is likely to support tendencies
toward cosmopolitanism.
4.

Locals are overrepresented among recruits

for administrative offices.

This hypothesis maintains
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that there is selectivity in the recruitment of adminis
trative officers from faculty ranks reinforcing localism
among administrators.

Locals are more likely than

cosmopolitans to be drawn into administrative work.
Perhaps one reason for this is to be found in the first
hypothesis; that is, locals, predominating at the higher
levels of age, rank, and tenure, are considered to be
"eligible" for administrative positions,

one important

qiialification to the fourth hypothesis must be noted.
The probability of cosmopolitans being named to certain
types of administrative posts, such as departmental
chairmanships with limited tenure, will be enchanced if
the selection is made by the faculty constituency rather
than by the "higher administration."
5.
cosmopolitans.

Locals are more homogeneous (in values) than
This hypothesis postulates in effect that

locals are more likely to possess "value consensus" than
are cosmopolitans.

Loca3s share an overriding commitment

to the local institution, its heritage, values and goals,
as well as mutual personal loyalties.

Moreover, this

tendency would be reinforced by the fact that locals are
more likely to know one another and interact over a
sustained period of time (derived from the first hypothesis).
On the other hand, cosmopolitans, while sharing primary
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commitments to external groups and values, do not share
identical reference points.

In view of the diversity

of potential reference groups outside the local situation
cosmopolitans may be characterized by relative hetero
geneity of values.

Their mutual acquaintance and

interaction are inhibited by their relatively shorter
periods of service at the institution.

In short, cosmo

politans are less likely than locals to represent a
collectivity (unless, of course, they unite to form an
AAUP chapter).
6.

Locals favor organizational change in the

institution less than do cosmopolitans.

This hypothesis,

concerning orientation to organizational change, rests
on the commitment of locals to their institution.

Because

of their loyalty to institutional traditions and values,
locals are more likely than cosmopolitans to support the
status quo in the face of proposed change.

Whether this

statement is true might well depend on the nature of any
proposed change.

The kinds of change that locals would

most likely oppose would be those that are either based
on cosmopolitan values or those that would be detrimental
to personal loyalties or institutional traditions.
7.

Locals support norms of academic freedom

and other values promoted by the AAUP less than do
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cosmopolitans.

This hypothesis is the most germane to

the topic of this section, the relevance of reference
organization to academic freedom.

If it is true that

locals are less likely than cosmopolitans to support
norms of academic freedom, why is this so?

in the view

of the author, locals are more likely than cosmopolitans
to feel their loyalties and interests threatened by
academic freedom.

Academic freedom and the values upon

which it is based are abstractions and, as such, are no
respectors of persons, loyalties or local traditions.
Localism is particularistic; academic freedom is universalistic.

Furthermore, academic freedom is by nature

cosmopolitan in the sense that it is "external" to any
particular local institution.
It may be objected, however, that the seventh
hypothesis is not compatible with the fifth one.

If

cosmopolitans are relatively heterogeneous in the
"external" values to which they adhere, why would they
unite in support of norms of academic freedom?

It may

be the case that cosmopolitans feel more insecure without
institutionalized norms of academic freedom.

For ex

ample, cosmopolitans are more likely than locals to be
outspoken on issues considered by the administration to
be "controversial" and to antagonize the local "establish
ment."

Thus, the cosmopolitans are more likely to need,
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and to perceive the need for, official protection in the
form of norms of academic freedom,

unity in support of

these norms does not necessarily mean that cosmopolitans
will unite in collective action to achieve their goals,
however.
As it is with academic freedom, so it is with
other norms and values supported by the AAUP.

Principles

of academic responsibility, faculty participation in
university government, and so forth are compatible with,
and supportive of, academic freedom.

If this is true,

then an additional, derivative hypothesis should be
trues

cosmopolitans are overrepresented among the AAUP

membership on both the national and the local chapter
levels.

There is little doubt that cosmopolitans

predominate in the AAUP.

However, there are probably

many members who do not wholly subscribe to the values
and norms of the Association.

There are those who take

an active interest in the local chapter and participate
in its activities while paying little heed to national
programs and principles,

as

a consequence, local

chapters may differ widely in their interest in and
support of national values and norms.

Just as locals may

dominate college or university government, they may also
dominate a local AAUP chapter and minimize its force in
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promoting academic freedom and related values.
In the light of the preceding discussion of
formal and reference organization, the concept of academic
freedom may be looked upon as an organizational concept.
As stated at the outset of Chapter one, academic freedom,
from the perspective of academic organization, is a set
of norms which governs the action of the faculty, adminis
trators, and trustees.

The essential norms which comprise

academic freedom are the following:
(1)

A faculty member, in his role as an aca

demic specialist, should be free to criticize and to
challenge accepted theories, beliefs, and practices related
to his field of competence.

This norm applies to the

normal functional activities of teaching, research, and
publication, as well as to other channels of expression.
For the social sciences and the humanities this norm
entails freedom to criticize prevalent beliefs and
practices of one's community and society insofar as
these are the subject of one's competence.
(2)

A faculty member, in his role as a "citizen"

of the institution at which he serves, should be free to
criticize the official policies and practices of his
institution, including the actions of administrative
officers and trustees.
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(3)

A faculty member, in his role as a member

of the academic profession, should be free to defend his
colleagues against perceived threats to, or violations
of, their academic freedom.
These norms are role prerogatives of faculty
members.
role:

15

Each norm is attached to a special faculty

specialist, institutional citizen, and professional

colleague.

To speak of freedom is to speak of authority.

To state that the faculty is free to exercise the abovementioned prerogatives is to say that it has the authority
to do so.

Academic freedom, therefore, entails functional

autonomy for the faculty in the performance of faculty
roles.
Correspondingly, if the norms of academic freedom
are institutionalized as faculty prerogatives or rights,
these norms constitute duties or responsibilities from
the perspective of administrative and trustee roles.
Administrators cannot authoritatively abrogate the norms
of academic freedom,

on the contrary, it may be asserted

that it is the duty of administrators to safeguard aca
demic freedom even from external threats.
Academic freedom, thus, is linked inherently
to faculty authority.

Viewed in this manner, faculty

participation in college and university government is a
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key mechanism for the enhancement of academic freedom.
In general, to the extent that faculty participation
in institutional governance is minimized, to that extent
is academic freedom diminished.

Therefore, when academic

freedom is viewed sociologically, from the perspectives
of both formal and reference organization, faculty
participation is the crux of the problem of academic
freedom.

156
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
•^Thomas Edward Blackwell, College Law; A Guide
for Administrators (Washington, D.C.: American Council
on Education, 1961), pp. 40-42, 48-50; Robert M. Maclver,
Academic Freedom in Otar Time (New York;
Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1955), pp. 67-103.
2This is not to ignore the fact that state
legislatures and government agencies, for instance, can,
a n d sometimes do, exercise legal influence which may
affect the practice of academic freedom. From the
conceptual standpoint, however, such influences are
"external" to academic organization.
3Mac±ver, o p . cit., pp. 71-72; Blackwell, op.
cit:q , p. 41.
^Especially the president, who in turn selected
other officers with the approval of the board.
Cf.
Blackwell, ojo. cit., p. 41.
5Elton M a y o , The Human Problems of an industrial
Civilization (Cambridge; Harvard university Press, 1933).
Also F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Management
and the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1946).
^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1938).
^Richard T. Lapiere, A Theory of Social Control
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) , pp. 290-300; Peter M.
Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: university
of Chicago Press, 1955), Ch. I; George C. Homans,. The
Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), Chs. 14,
15.
8Barnard, o p . cit., p. 115.
9lbid., pp. 81-122.
10Cf. Roethlisberger and Dickson, o£. cit., pp.
525-548.
^Barnard, o p . cit., p. 115.
12cf. especially Robert K. Merton, Social Theory
and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 19577^

157
pp. 225-386? Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social
psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp.
93-314; Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint,
and Reference-Group Behavior," American Journal of
Sociology, LXI, 4 (January 1956), pp. 316-328? Tamotsu
Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives," American
Journal of Sociology, IX (May 1955), pp. 562-659.
l^Merton, op. c i t ., pp. 387-420.
^Amer i c a n Association of university Professors,
Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 165.
lSihe values which underlie these normative
freedoms were discussed in Chapters II and III.

CHAPTER V
ACADEMIC FREEDOM CHALLENGED:
SOME POST-WAR CASES
Each of the last three chapters has dealt with
a single variable.

Chapter IX treated the development

of the concept of academic freedom in the united States
in historical terms.

Chapter III presented an analysis

of the structure and functioning of the AAUP as an
advocate of academic freedom.

Chapter IV provided a

largely hypothetical analysis of academic freedom.

It

is the purpose of this chapter to examine the interplay
of the three variables in concrete situations.
The conceptual relationships among the three
variables were outlined in Chapter I.

It was noted there

that academic freedom is a dependent variable in relation
to the AAUP and to academic organization.

Academic

organization was viewed as an intervening variable
between the other two.

That is, the AAUP in promoting

principles of academic freedom must seek to have its
principles assimilated into the patterns of college and
university structure as official policy,

in Chapter IV

academic freedom was examined from the perspective of
organization as a set of norms which govern the actions
158
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of faculty, administrators, and trustees.

The question

that arises at this point is the focus of the present
chapter:

what happens when these norms are not present,

or break down, in particular situations?

what happens

when an individual faculty member feels victimized by
the fact that these norms are not operative in the
institution at which he serves?

It is possible to

examine the interplay of the three variables in
situations in which the AAUP intervenes.
The situations chosen to illustrate the concrete
interplay of the AAUP, academic freedom, and academic
organization are cases of AAUP censure of administrative
officials of particular colleges and universities for
violations of the Association's principles of academic
freedom.

Only those cases which have occurred since

World War II and which have been resolved by 1965 are
included in this analysis.

These are, in effect, cases

in which the AAUP decided that given institutions had
defective patterns of organization in that adminis
trative and/or trustee actions were not governed by
norms of academic freedom.
Following the general descriptive information
on the cases presented in the section below, the cases
are analyzed in terms of the issues involved, the
intervention of the AAUP, and the resolution of the cases.
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I.
THE POST-WAR CASES
OP AAUP CENSURE: DESCRIPTION
During the period from January 1945 through
December 1965, the American Association of University
Professors, following the procedures described in Chapter
III, imposed its censure on the administrative officers
3
(and/or trustees) of thirty-seven U. S. colleges and
universities for violations of the Association's 1940
statement of principles of academic freedom and tenure.
By the end of this period twenty-one of the thirty-seven
cases had been "closed," i.e., removed from censure, and
sixteen cases remained "open," i.e., still listed by the
Association on its list of "Censured Administrations."
For the reasons stated in Chapter I, only the
closed cases are analyzed in this chapter.

It may be

shown that the closed cases do not differ materially in
several respects from the open cases.

From the data

presented in the tables in this section, it may be noted
that the closed cases and the open cases show similar
patterns of regional distribution, frequency by type of
institution, and duration of censured status.
Table VII presents the names and locations of
institutions whose censure has been imposed and removed
between 1945 and 1965, as well as specification of
regional location and type of institution.1" Also given

TABLE VII
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED AAUP CASES
1945-65
year Censure
Imposed Removed

Institution, Name
and Location

Region

Univ. of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri

Midwest

Public
State Univ.

1946

1952

6

Southwest

Public
State Univ.

1946

1953

7

Private
Church related

1950

1956

6

West

Public
State Univ.

1956

1958

2

North Dakota State
Univ., Fargo,
North Dakota

Midwest

Public
State Univ.

1956

1964

8

Ohio State Univ.
Columbus, Ohio

Midwest

Public
State Univ.

1956

1959

3

Southwest

Public
State Univ.

1956

1957

1

East

Public
State Univ.

1956

1958

2

Univ. of Texas
Austin, Texas
Evansville College
Evansville, Indiana
Univ. of California
Berkeley, California

Univ. of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma
Rutgers
New Brunswick,
New Jersey

Midwest

Type of
Institution

No- Years
Censured

(continued)
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TABLE VII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED AAUP CASES
1945-65
Institution, Name
and Location

Region

Saint Louis Univ.
St. Louis, Missouri

Midwest

Type of
Institution

Year Censure
Imposed Removed

No. Years
Censured

Private
Church related

1956

1957

1

East

Private
university

1956

1961

5

Catawba College
Salisbury,
North Carolina

South

Private
Church related

1957

1964

7

Univ. of Nevada
Reno, Nevada

West

Public
State Univ.

1957

1959

2

Auburn Uhiv.
Auburn, Alabama

South

Public
State Uhiv.

1958

1964

6

1958

1963

5

1958

1960

2

Temple Univ.
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania

Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Livingston College
Salisbury,
North Carolina

East
South

Private
College
Private
Church related

(continued)
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TABLE VII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED AAUP CASES
1945-65
Region

Univ. of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Midwest

Public
State Univ.

1958

1959

1

South

Public
State Uhiv.

1958

1960

2

New York Univ.
New York, New York

East

Private
university

1959

1961

2

Princeton Theological
Seminary
Princeton, New Jersey

East

Private
Church related

1960

1961

1

Allen Uhiv.
Columbia, South Carolina

South

Private
Church related

1961

1962

1

Arkansas A., M . , and N.
College
Pine Bluff, Arkansas

South

Public
1964
State College

1965

1

Southwestern Louisiana
Institute
Lafayette, Louisiana

Type of
Institution

Year Censure
Imposed Removed

Institution, Name
and Location

Average Duration of Censure
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No. Years
Censured

3.4
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in this table are the years in which censure was imposed
and removed and the total number of years censured.
Table VIII provides the same types of data for the open
cases, except that along with the year censure was
imposed, the number of elapsed years to 1965 is given.
As noted in Tables VII and VIII respectively, the
duration of censure for the closed cases is 3.4 years,
and for the open cases 3.2 years (through 1965).

Only

three of the sixteen open cases had been censured (as of
the end of 1965) longer than five years, whereas six of
the twenty-one closed cases were censured for at least
six years.

Therefore, there is no apparent reason on

the basis of these data to assume that the open cases
are inherently more difficult to resolve than were the
closed cases.
Table IX gives data on the geographical
distribution of the censure cases,

of the thirty-seven

total cases, fourteen, or about forty per cent, occurred
in the South.

The South had more total cases than any

other region.

Considering the regional distribution

of colleges and universities, the South is probably
heavily overrepresented among the censure cases.

The

Midwest and the East were represented by nine and eight
cases respectively, whereas the Southwest had four cases
and the West had only two.

Comparing the open and the

TABLE VIII
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AAUP CASES
1945-1964
Region

institution, Name
and Location
Jefferson Medical College
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
Texas Technological
College
Lubbock, Texas

Type of
Institution

Year censure
Imposed

No. Years
Censured,
to 1965

Private
College

1956

9

Public
State College

1958

7

South

Private
College

1959

6

East

Public
State College

1960

5

East

Southwest

Fisk university
Nashville, Tennessee
Lowell Technological
Institute
Lowell, Massachusetts
Benedict College
Columbia, South Carolina

South

Private
Church related

1961

4

Alabama State College
Montgomery, Alabama

South

Public
State College

1962

3
(continued)
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TABLE VIII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AAUP CASES
1945-1964
Type of
Institution

Year Censure
Imposed

No. Years
Censured,
to 1965

Midwest

Public
State College

1962

3

Alcorn A. and M. College
Port Gibson, Mississippi

South

Public
State College

1963

2

Arkansas State Teachers
College
Conway, Arkansas

South

Public
State College

1963

2

East

Private
Church related

1963

2

Public
State Univ.

1963

2

Public
Stat^ College

1963

2

Institution, Name
and Location

Region

South Dakota State
College
Brookings, South Dakota

Grove City College
Grove City, Pennsylvania
Univ. of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

Midwest

Sam Houston State
College
Huntsville, Texas

southwest

(continued)
166

TABLE VIII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AAUP CASES
1945-1964
Institution, Name
and Location

Univ. of Arkansas
Fayetteville, Arkansas
Mercy College
Detroit, Michigan

Region

Type of
institution

Year Censure
Imposed

No. Years
Censured,
to 1965

South

Public
State Uhiv.

1964

1

Midwest

Private
Church related

1964

1

College of the ozarks
Clarksville, Arkansas

South

Private
Church related

1964

1

Univ. of South Florida
Tampa, Florida

South

1964

1

Public
State Univ.

Average number of years on censure through 1965
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3.2

TABLE IX
DISTRIBUTION OF OPEN AND CLOSED CENSURE
CASES BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION

N o . of
Closed cases

No. of
Open Cases

Total
Cases

East

5

3

8

Midwest

6

3

9

South

6

8

14

Southwest

2

2

4

West

2

0

2

21

16

37

Region

Totals
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closed cases the distributions and totals are similar
with two exceptions.

First, while the West had two

closed cases, it has no open cases.

Second, eight of

the South's fourteen cases are still open.

However,

little significance can be attached to the fact that
roost of the South's cases are still open inasmuch as
most of them are recent in occurrence,

in three of the

eight open cases censure has been in effect for only
one year, in two others for only two years.
in Table X the occurrence of open and closed
cases by type of institutional control is given.
basic categories are public and private.

The

The public

institutions are classified as either state universities
or state colleges.

The latter category includes techni

cal institutes and teachers colleges.

The private insti

tutions are divided into those that are church-related
or controlled and those that are not.
As Indicated in Table X, of the thirty-seven
cases, twenty-two, or about sixty per cent, involve
public colleges and universities.

Fourteen of these are

state universities and the other eight are state colleges
of various types.

Of the fifteen private institutions,

ten are church-related; five are not.

A comparison of

the open to the closed cases reveals a proportionate
distribution between the public and private categories.

TABLE X
DISTRIBUTION OF OPEN AND CLOSED CENSURE CASES
BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION

Type of
Institution

No. of
Closed Cases

NO. of
Open Cases

11

3

14

1

7

8

Total
Cases

Public
State university
State College
Total

10

12

22

Private
Church Related

6

4

10

Non-Church Related

3

2

5

Total
Total Cases

6

9
16

21
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15
37
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Of the closed cases, twelve are public and nine are
private institutions,

of the open cases, ten are public

and six are private institutions.

Among the private

colleges and universities the distribution between
church-related and non-church-related institutions is
exactly proportionate, exhibiting the overall two to one
ratio.

Among the nine closed cases, six are church-

related; three are not.

Among the open cases, four are

church-related; two are not.
Within the public category, however, there is
a considerable disparity between the open and the closed
cases,

of the fourteen state university cases, eleven

are closed; only three are open.

Of the eight state

college cases, only one is closed, whereas seven are
still open.

The discrepancy is increased when it is

noted that two of the three open state university cases
have been censured for only one year as of 1965, whereas
none of the seven open state college cases is that recent.
It is not easy to account for the difference.

However,

it may be noted from a comparison of Tables VII and
VIII that those universities of greatest academic
reputation are overrepresented among the closed as
compared to the open cases.

For instance, among the

closed cases are the university of California, university
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of Michigan, university of Texas, and Ohio State Uhiversity, as well as Rutgers, Missouri, and other lesserranking universities.

The hypothesis may be advanced

that these relatively high-prestige institutions are
characterized by greater institutional autonomy and are
thus lacking some of the external bureaucratic handicaps
of the state colleges in general.

Thus, they may be

more capable of rapid adjustments leading to resolutions
of the cases.

Additionally, they may be more concerned

than the state colleges with their national esteem, which
stands to suffer under censure.
On the whole, then, it may be concluded that the
open cases do not differ substantially from the closed
cases on the criteria examined.

At this point there is

no reason to conclude that the open cases are inherently
more resistant to resolution.

On the contrary, one might

predict that the open cases will fall into similar patterns
as the closed cases and with time submit to resolution
(though

not automatically to be sure).
Finally, looking at the time distribution of

all thirty-seven cases, one finds they are quite evenly
distributed according to the dates on which censure was
imposed (see Tables VII and VIII).

For the period under

study there were only three cases of censure prior to
1956, two in 1946 and one in 1950.

in 1956, eight
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institutions were meted censure by the Association, and
six more were sanctioned in 1958.

Fewer schools were

censured in 1957 and later years.

Any attempted expla

nation must be largely hypothetical.

A few reasons may

be advanced as partial explanations.

First, the Associ

ation from time to time has been concerned about the size
of its censure list.

Some spokesmen have believed that

to carry too long a list of censured administrations
would diminish the effectiveness and meaning of censure.

2

For the first few years of the period under study, the
Association was carrying on its “blacklist” several
cases of censure invoked prior to 1946.
these cases was not resolved until 1959.

The last of
This con

sideration may have inhibited potential AAUP censure
actions at least until the early 1950's.

A second

reason for lack of censure actions until 1956 may
have been organizational lethargy during the mid-fifties.
During this period there was a backlog of cases under
Investigation which were slow to culminate in censure.

3

Also, as noted in Chapter III, this was a period When
dues were increased fifty per cent and membership in
the Association actually declined.

The years roughly

coincided with the "McCarthy era," in which the AAUP
was slow to react to the issues and the tensions of the
period.

Therefore, the sudden rash of censures in 1956
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to 1958 partially reflects the backlog of Committee A
work which had accumulated.

Since 1958 the time dis

tribution of censures has been more evenly spaced.
II.

THE PATTERNS OF CONFLICT:

THE ISSUES

The analysis in this and later sections of the
chapter pertains exclusively to the closed AAUP censure
cases listed in Table VII.

As mentioned earlier these

are cases in which censure was imposed between 1945 and
1964 and removed between 1946 and 1965.

The data relied

upon in this chapter are matters of public record.

Only

the reports and information published in the AAUP Bulletin
during the twenty-year period are employed in this analysis.
No attempt is made in the following discussion
to provide a detailed or systematic analysis of the
twenty-one cases.

The data presented in the published

reports do not seem to be amenable to such a presentation.
Because the cases exhibit diverse characteristics the
reports vary in comprehensiveness and lack any standardized
framework for presenting and interpreting information.
In spite of this consideration the reports offer clear
accounts of the issues involved in each case in terms
of the sequence of events and of the bearing of Associ
ation policy on the circumstances of each case.

Therefore,

the published reports are well-suited for illustrative
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purposes pertaining to the Interplay of academic freedom,
academic organization, and the American Association of
University Professors,
The issues involved in the twenty-one closed
cases seem to be of four types:

academic freedom, aca

demic tenure, academic due process, and academic organi
zation.

Some of the cases involved all four issues; yet

it seems valuable to keep the issues distinct wherever
possible.

The issues themselves are often interrelated

such that violations of tenure usually involve violations
of due process, for instance. Nevertheless, the cases
are examined here in terms of the separate issues
illustrated by them.
Issues of Academic Freedom
Seventeen of the twenty-one cases include
various types of academic freedom issues.

If academic

freedom is conceived as being comprised primarily of
the three norms elaborated in Chapter IV, the seventeen
cases exhibit violations of, or failures to abide by,
each of these norms, including the freedom of the
specialist to express his views, of the institutional
citizen to criticize his administrative officers and
their policies and actions, and of the colleague to
defend his peers.

Additionally, some of the cases

176
represent denial o£ civil liberties apart from academic
freedom.
The post-war period under study encompasses the
years of the so-called McCarthy era, which was charac
terized by public concern for “national security," led
largely by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the late forties
and early fifties.

Part of the attention of the many

security investigations, seeking to reveal "security
risks," especially members, former members, and sympa
thizers with the Communist Party, was focused on
individual professors and institutions of higher learning.
It is interesting to note that eight of the seventeen
cases which specifically entailed academic freedom
issues can be classified as “national security" cases.
in the fall of 1955 the Association's Council
appointed a special committee to report on the develop
ments of national security cases in several institutions.
The committee was explicitly charged ". . . t o review
the effects upon academic freedom and tenure of the
national effort to achieve military security and to
combat Soviet Communism . . .1,4

The committee produced

a report that included consideration of eighteen cases,
eight of which eventually resulted in censure (seven
of these eight cases are now closed).

Two of the cases
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included on-carapus investigations authorized by the
committee, according to the usual procedures of
treating such cases,

in all the other cases which the

committee reviewed, it relied on facts of public
knowledge and the contents of published documents only.
This was a departure from the normal procedures de
scribed in Chapter III.

Apart from the special com

mittee 's report in 1956, there were later and separate
reports of two additional national security cases, one
of which resulted in censure and is now closed, making
5

a total of eight closed national security cases.
It may be noted that 1955-56 was a relatively
late date to exhibit concern about such cases in view
of the fact that, for all practical purposes, the McCarthy
era was over by that time.

The report of the special

committee acknowledges pressure from the AAUP membership
for the Association to take a strong public stand even
at so late a date:

"The insistence that it do so is

widespread among its members . . . "

The report of

the cases is divided into two sections, the first
entitled,

"The Impact of Public Actions Directed

Against Communism," and the second, "The Effects of
the Refusal to Testify."

under the first heading are

included cases at the university of California and the
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University of Oklahoma,

under the second are included

New York university, Rutgers, Temple, Ohio State, and
the university of Michigan.
The university of California case is probably
the most widely known of all the cases and may be used
to illustrate some of the issues of conflict which have
led to censure.

7

One of the key issues in this case

involved the imposition of a so-called "disclaimer oath"
to faculty members and administrators as a condition of
continued employment.

The oath was actually prescribed

in 1949 by the university's Board of Regents ", . . to
forestall legislation to establish security controls
over the University, which seemed imminent by reason of
0
previous investigations and reports."
The oath which
it imposed included a statement disclaiming membership
in the Communist Party as well as in any other " . . .
g
commitment that is in conflict with my obligations."
The president of the University as well as
the faculty senates within the system went on record as
being strongly opposed to the oath requirement.

After

several months of negotiation and heated controversy,
thirty-two faculty members persisted in refusing to sign
the oath.

The Board subsequently dismissed the faculty

members, more than half of whom bad tenure.

Additional
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faculty members resigned in protest of the dismissals.
The conflict then shifted to the state courts when
twenty of the dismissed faculty members brought suit
to compel their reinstatement.
In 1952, the State Supreme Court decided in favor
of the dismissed faculty members on the ground that the
Board did not have the authority to impose such an o a t h . ^
However, in the interim the state legislature had enacted
a statute requiring a similar oath of all state employees,
including, of course, those in higher education.
court test, this oath was upheld as valid.

Upon

Some of the

dismissed faculty members then took the oath and were
reinstated.

However, the university administration refused

to pay the salaries of the dismissed members during their
non-employment on the ground that the Board action had
been illegal.

On each campus of the university an

administrative official was charged with responsibility
for security surveillance in keeping with the insti
tution's policy of not employing members of the Communist
Party.

11
In the eyes of the AAUP and the special com

mittee the Board, in prescribing the disclaimer oath,
was contravening the academic freedom of the faculty in
bowing to external pressures in the form of anticipated
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legislative sanctions.

12

The administrative officials

also later bowed to the same pressures including those
from Board in maintaining surveillance, as it were, on
the political affiliations and activities of the faculty.
For these infractions the University was censured by the
AAUP.

The report especially noted the adverse effects

of the oath and the surrounding controversy on faculty
morale.
The case at the university of Oklahoma revolved
around the consequences of the imposition of an oath
similar to the one at California.

13

A state-sponsored

investigation of an assistant professor of zoology
raised "doubts" in the minds of the Regents as to the
man's political sympathies.

(He testified in a hearing

that at one time, long before assuming his present
position, he had "sympathized" with the Communist
Party.)

He was dismissed by the Board.

AAUP censure

was the result.
In the section of the committee report en
titled "The Effects of the Refusal to Testify," the
cases examined are largely "First and Fifth Amendment"
cases.

At Rutgers two faculty members, one with

tenure, were dismissed because they invoked the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in
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refusing to testify before the House Un-American acti14
vities Committee.
Under similar conditions a tenured
professor of philosophy at Temple university was dismissed.
Likewise, at Ohio State a tenured associate professor of
physics was dismissed the same day on which he invoked
the First and Fifth Amendments in refusing to testify
16
before HUAC.
His refusal to testify was construed by
the Board as “gross insubordination” to the administration.
The AAUP report noted that the dismissal action rested
partially on ". . . deductions from a supposed state of
17
public opinion in relation to his act . . . ”
Ohio
State also had a disclaimer oath and a "speaker ban.”
At New York university two tenured associate
professors were dismissed for similar reasons.

18

one

had been convicted of contempt of Congress for failing
to produce records of the Joint Anti-Facist Refugee
Committee on demand of HUAC.

The other man had invoked

the First and Fifth Amendments in answering questions
posed by the.Senate internal Security subcommittee.
Similarly three faculty members at the University of
Michigan, one with tenure, received punitive action
upon invoking the two amendments.

19

on the same day

they testified before the HUAC they were suspended from
teaching duties pending inquiry initiated by the adminis
tration.

Eventually two of them were dismissed and the
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third was censured by the Board of Regents,

in taking

these measures the Board stated that Its actions were
not based on the refusals to testify by invoking the
amendments, but on the alleged Communist affiliations
of the men.

The dismissals at Rutgers, Temple, Ohio

State, and New York University were based on the
invocation of the amendments and in most of those cases
the trustees acknowledged that they were confident that
the dismissed faculty members had no affiliations, past
or present, with the Communist Party.

20

The other Pifth Amendment case, that of
Dickinson college in Pennsylvania, was examined in a
later report.

21

However, issues in this case were

similar to those cited above.

An assistant professor

of economics (not having tenure) was dismissed for
having invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer
questions upon interrogation by the HUAC.
There is some question, in the author's opinion,
as to whether these Fifth Amendment dismissals actually
constitute academic freedom cases,

invocation of the

First or Fifth Amendments is the constitutionally
guaranteed civil liberty of an individual.

Dismissals

pursuant to exercise of these rights, and solely for
this reason, comprise a form of denial of civil liberties.
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not of academic freedom,

only If freedom of extramural

expression is construed as part and parcel of academic
freedom can such dismissals be cast as violations of
academic freedom.

Freedom of extramural utterance,

however, is the constitutional right of any citizen,
professor or not, and is therefore something distinct
from academic freedom, which by definition pertains to
those in the ‘'academy," and to their academic functions
and roles.

Assuredly, the Fifth Amendment cases outlined

above involved issues of due process, tenure, and organi
zation.

They did not involve, in the opinion of the

author, distinct issues of academic freedom.
The issue of extramural utterance was also the
primary one which culminated in the AAUP censure of
22
Evansville College in 1946.
An assistant professor
of religion and philosophy was dismissed largely for
his extramural political activity in support of Henry
Wallace for President.

His political nonconformity

became the focus of public controversy in the college
and, more especially, in the city of Evansville.

Here

again, a faculty member was deprived of his position
because he exercised his civil liberties,

it does not

seem to represent a clear-cut issue of academic freedom.
Academic freedom in the strict sense seems to
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have been involved more clearly in the Auburn University
case.

An assistant professor of economics was dismissed

for writing a "letter to the editor" of the campus news
paper in which he challenged (in a rather judicious tone)
the segregationist views expressed in a previous editorial
in that paper.

The specific topic of both the editorial

and the faculty member*s letter pertained to a subject
within the competence of a social scientist.

The Board,

however, construed his letter as the basis for summary
dismissal, in that it dealt with the controversial race
issue, especially since tenure was not involved.
AAUP, of course, did not agree.

The

The man was performing

an appropriate function as a faculty member and as an
individual.

Therefore, his academic freedom was clearly

violated by the dismissal.
Academic freedom issues of various types were
also involved in most of the other cases.

However, these

issues were usually secondary to issues of tenure, due
process, and organization, which are examined in the
following sections.
issues of Academic Tenure
The 1940 statement of AAUP principles deals not
only with academic freedom, but also with standards of
tenure and due process.

Sixteen of the twenty-one closed
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censure cases Included infractions of the Association's
standards of tenure.
The 1940 statement (see Appendix C) states that
"Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time
instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period
24
should not exceed seven years . . . "
Service at other
institutions prior to a given appointment should be
included in the seven years,
. . . subject to the proviso that
when, after a term of probationary
service of more than three years
in one or more institutions, a
teacher is called to another
institution it may be agreed in
writing that his new appointment
is for a probationary period of
not more than four years, even
though thereby the person's total
probationary period in the academic
profession is extended beyond the
normal maximum of seven years.*5
Tenure is permanent or continuous until re
tirement age and may be terminated only because of bona
fide financial exigencies or proof of adequate cause
(such as incompetence or moral turpitude).

Some of the

institutions represented among the sixteen tenure cases
had no explicit tenure policies; others had policies
which differed from the AAUP standards.

In some cases

the tenure policies of the particular institution were
abrogated; in others the infractions pertained only to
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the AAUP standards.
It Is to be noted that infractions of tenure
do not occur in isolation from other issues.

As noted

above, most of the academic freedom cases included
infringements of tenure.

Many of the tenure cases

apparently resulted from personal conflicts and dis
harmonies in which the "victims'' were accused of
disloyalty or

insubordination to the administration or

other forms of obstreperousness or uncooperativeness.
These cases are to some extent typified by the case
which led to the censure of Saint Louis university in
26
1956.
A professor of medicine who was also Director
of the Department of Internal Medicine (both positions
tenured by esqolicit agreement of university officials)
was dismissed largely because of friction between him
and certain administrators and trustees, and more
especially between him and the Sisters of Saint Mary,
who staffed a hospital which was used by his department.
The conflict between the latter over the use of the
hospital seems to have been the root issue which led
the trustees to believe that the professor was dis
pensable.

In view of the AAUP, Saint Louis university

was censureable because the professor's tenure was
violated without adequate cause.

(For instance, the
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the university had failed to live up to certain explicit
commitments made to the man upon his appointment and also
had failed to attempt to ameliorate the conflict between
the professor and the Sisters.)

Other cases are variations

on the same theme.
Issues of Academic Due Process
All twenty-one of the closed cases involved one
or more issues of due process as set forth in the 1940
statement.

The notion of due process pertains to the

proper procedures to be followed in instances of dismissal
or non-reappointment.

The basis

AAUP-sanctioned princi

ples of due process are contained in the following
paragraph from the 1940 statement:
Termination for cause of a con
tinuous appointment, or the
dismissal for cause of a teacher
previous to the expiration of a
term appointment, should, if
possible, be considered by both
a faculty committee and the
governing board of the insti
tution. in all cases where the
facts are in dispute, the accused
teacher should be informed before
the hearing in writing of the
charges against him and should
have the opportunity to be heard
in his own defense by all bodies
that pass judgment upon his case.
He should be permitted to have
with him an adviser of his own
choosing who may act as counsel.
There should be a full stenographic
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record of the hearing available
to the parties concerned.
In
the hearing of charges of
incompetence the testimony
should include that of teachers
and other scholars, either from
his own or from other insti
tutions. Teachers on continuous
appointment who are dismissed for
reasons not involving moral
turpitude should receive their
salaries for at least a year
from the date of notification
of dismissal whether or not
they are continued in their
duties at the institution. 7
It is to be observed that due process, like
academic freedom, is the prerogative of the non-tenured
as well as the tenured positions,

while an institution

may choose not to reappoint a non-tenured faculty member
without an explanation or hearing, it may not interrupt
or terminate a non-tenured appointment during the period
of the appointment except in accordance with the above
procedures,

since 1940 the Association has also

elaborated its principles of due process to apply to
notice of reappointment or non-reappointment.

28

While

the essence of due process is a fair hearing, academic
due process may be conceived more broadly to include all
procedural standards applying to appointments and their
termination b y ad hoc administrative action.
Occasionally due process violations occur in
isolation from other issues.

The censure of Livingstone

College in North Carolina Is a case in point.

29

in

applying for a position at Livingstone, which is af
filiated with a Protestant denomination, an applicant
explicitly noted his religious identification as
Unitarian.

He was offered an acceptable contract to

teach at Livingstone the following academic year.

He

signed and returned the contract, received confirmation
of it from Livingstone, and resigned his position at
Blackburn College where he was teaching at the time.
Early in June he received notice that his contract had
been cancelled by the Livingstone Board of Trustees
because he was a Unitarian, a faith that was unac
ceptable at Livingstone.

The revocation of the signed

contract before the period of appointment began was a
violation of due process, rather than of tenure

(to

which he had no claim) or of academic freedom.
Such cases as the one at Livingstone are rare
in comparison to those cases in which issues of due
process are accompanied by issues of academic freedom
and tenure.

The great majority of the closed censure

cases under consideration included all three types of
issues.
Another case in which due process constituted
the primary, though perhaps not the exclusive, issue was
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the dismissal of a professor of history and sociology
at Southwestern Louisiana Institute in 1955.

30

The

professor had served for one year and his contract had
been renewed for 1955-56.

He was not entitled to tenure

although he had taught at several other institutions in
previous years.

For one reason or another (the basis

of the charges was never made quite clear) the adminis
tration decided to revoke his contract for the coming
year toward the end of the summer.

He was not granted

a hearing nor any other feature of due process either
by the administration or the State Board of Education
to whom the institution was responsible.

Aside from the

fact that there may have been some latent issues of
academic freedom, the denial of due process was the
overriding consideration leading to the AAUP censure
of Southwestern in 1958.
In all the other cases (aside from Southwestern
and Livingstone) the infractions of due process were
accompanied by other misdemeanors and felonies.

Some

of the due process violations were relatively minor
(for instance, a hearing may have been granted but
opportunity for counsel may have been denied) while
others were gross in disregard of due process standards.
The details of these other infractions do not seem to
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deserve special attention apart from consideration of
other issues.
Issues of Academic Organization
Principles of academic organization was not
treated explicitly by the 1940 statement.

Nevertheless,

it may be shown that issues of academic freedom, tenure,
and due process, whether considered singly or in con
junction, entail issues of academic organization.
Academic freedom, tenure, and due process consist
of rules which can govern the actions of people.
are amenable to exposition in the form of policy.

They
Prom

the perspective of academic organization these rules are
organizational norms and, thus, aspects of the organization
of a college or university.

Defective policies, or dis

regard of policies, of academic freedom, tenure, or due
process thus constitute instances of faulty organization
or failure to abide by institutional norms.

Thus, even

the case of Livingstone College, which involved a simple
violation of due process, is an instance of defective
organization.

Moreover, by definition, all twenty-one

cases under examination involve organizational issues.
These considerations notwithstanding, there are several
types of substantive issues of organization involved in
the several cases, which are now to be examined.
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The organizational issues are of two fundamental
types:

those that pertain mostly to formal or official

organization, and those that pertain to reference organi
zation.

Of the former type there are several instances

among the censure cases.

The university of Nevada case

in particular is a notable instance of disregard for
faculty authority in the government of a university.

31

This case concerned the dismissal of a tenured professor
of biology who was also chairman of that department on
charges of insubordination and disloyalty to the
president of the university,

in the judgment of the

AAUP, the case exhibited flagrant violations of academic
freedom, tenure, and due process.

In the view of the

author, an examination of the organization of authority
within this university sheds light on the issues of the
case.
The chief antagonist in the Nevada case was
the president of the university, Dr. Stout.
predecessor had believed that " . . .

His

the general

faculty should be responsible for formulating the
educational policy of the University as a whole."

32

Consonant with this view he had initiated certain
changes in the authority structure, as reflected in
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this statement in the university catalog:
. . . the University Faculty has
legislative jurisdiction, in all
matters of government, discipline,
and educational policy not delegated
by it to the separate faculties, and
has the right o f review of all
actions of the several colleges
which relate to the educational
welfare of the University as a
whole.33
This rather extensive authority was vested mostly
in the general university faculty, but a hierarchical
committee system was devised by the faculty to deal with
specialized concerns.

Dr. Stout assumed the office of

president in the fall of 1952, and quite soon began,

"on

his own authority," to revamp the authority system and to
diminish the role of the faculty in policy-making.

He

referred to the faculty committees as a system which
tried "to pool ignorance and come up with knowledge."3^
From that point faculty committees were formed at the
pleasure of the president and other administrators and
used in an advisory capacity in the event that the adminis
trators wanted advice? otherwise, the committee functions
were perfunctory.
The administrative organization of the uni
versity was thus revised b y president Stout to emphasize
a "chain of command" and to eliminate faculty authority
in university government.

According to Dr. Stout, an
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administrator's function is to "administer," while a
faculty member's function is to "teach" and to conduct
research in his field without concerning himself with
administration.

35

In harmony with the approach Dr.

Stout initiated a change in admissions requirements
(lowering the previous standards) without consulting
the general faculty.
Among other effects, Dr. Stout's modifications
in the organization precluded the right of the faculty
to offer constructive criticism of administrative
policy and practice, which is an aspect of academic
freedom.

1 1 1 6

aforementioned professor of biology was

"guilty" of opposing the new organizational policies
and of criticizing practices under the administration of
Dr. Stout.

For these activities the professor was

charged with disloyalty and insubordination.36

He was

granted a hearing of sorts, though not in keeping with
a full measure of due process, in which Dr. Stout confronted
the biology chairman with these wordss.
. . . D r. Richardson, this is
serious, because on this campus
there is not going to be any
departmental friction. There is
going to be no case of any
departmental belittling or
criticizing others,
in other
words, there is not going to be
friction.
In case there is any
individual who feels he has to stir
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It up, then he Is going to leave
the faculty.
In case there are
two people who can't get along,
both of them will go • . . You
were hired to teach biology*
This year you were given the
appointment to serve as department
head. That does not make you a
critic or a supervisor of the
entire program of higher edu
cation . . . H a v e I made myself
clear? . . .37
Dr. Richardson was dismissed, but subsequently
was reinstated after the Supreme Court of the state of
Nevada overturned the action on the ground that there
was no ground for the dismissal.

38

It may be observed that while there were definite
issues of academic freedom, tenure, and due process in
the Nevada case, the organizational issues encompassed
all of them and represented the underlying source of
these other issues.

The changes wrought by President

Stout destroyed not only faculty authority but also
morale and quite naturally evoked criticism and opposition,
in which the biology professor was not the sole partici
pant.

The president's conception of academic organization

left no place for faculty criticism, much less faculty
participation.

Organization, in this case defective

to be sure, was the root cause of denial of academic
freedom and led to violations of tenure and due process.
Whereas the Nevada case Involved grave trans
gressions of faculty authority by the president, the
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University of Texas case exhibited similar and equally
39
serious transgressions by the governing board.
The
Texas case, which occurred during world War II and
resulted in AAUP censure in 1946, is among the most
complex and widely known cases in the annals of aca
demic freedom.
detail.

The case cannot be treated here in

Like the Nevada case this one included vio

lations of academic freedom, tenure, and due process.
Contrary to the advice of Dr. Homer P. Rainey, the
president, the governing board dismissed several faculty
40
members summarily without benefit of due process.
This action was publicly condemned by both the president
and duly constituted bodies of the faculty.

In Noveniber

1944, President Rainey was also dismissed summarily
from office, and also from his tenured professorship
in education because of the discord between him and
the Board.41
protest.

Several more faculty members resigned in

Also, three Board members protested the

president's dismissal by resigning.

Faculty morale

suffered with each new encroachment by the Board.
At the root of the violations of freedom,
tenure, and due process seems to have been the Board's
view of university organization and of the internal
structure of authority.

With regard bo the relationship

of the Regents to the president and faculty, the Board
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members seem to have held this view, as described in
the AAUP report of the case:
. . . they (the majority of the
members of the Board of Regents)
regard this relationship to be
that of a private employer to his
employees, a relationship in which
the Regents are not debarred by
any moral restrictions beyond
their own individual sense of
expediency from imposing their
personal views and prejudices
upon the teaching of the
university and from employing
the power of dismissal to gratify
their private antipathies and
resentments. They have made it
clear that they regard the uni
versity of Texas asa proprietary
institution.42
Later in the same report is this statement con
cerning the external pressures to which the Board yielded
in making the dismissals:
The evidence in the university of
Texas situation indicates that what
is happening in Texas with reference
to the university is a reappearance
of an old phenomenon, namely, an
effort on the part of certain
special Interest groups to control
education,4^
Thus, instead of conceiving of its role as
insulating the university from external pressures and
attacks from special interests, the Board collaborated
with forces inimical to the freedom and integrity of
educational pursuits within the university.

As in the

198
Nevada case, the violations of the A A U P principles seem
to have stemmed from defective academic organization.
The Texas and Nevada cases illustrate, through
their deficiencies, the relevance of patterns of aca
demic organization for issues of academic freedom, tenure,
and due process.

Unfortunately, these were not isolated

cases.

Similar patterns are evident especially in the
44
cases of North Dalcota State University,
Allen university,

45

and Princeton Theological Seminary.
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In

the latter case, for instance, the AAUP reported that
channels for faculty authority, such as a committee
system, were non-existent in the seminary.

Continuing,

the report noted that
. . . the apparently arbitrary
character of some presidential
decision, made without consultation
with the faculty, has . . . resulted
in a feeling of pessimism about the
health of the institution.
The
idea of a "Christian community" has
turned somewhat sour . . . 7
The second type of organizational issue pertains
to reference organization.

The relevance of reference

organization to the issues of academic freedom, tenure,
and due process can be discussed here only briefly

in

view of the lack of data in the case reports. According
to the distinction made in the previous chapter between
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cosmopolitans and locals, the basic trends in the cases
are rather clear.
The overwhelining majority of dismissals in the
twenty-one cases were of cosmopolitans who were "guilty"
in many cases of challenging localistic values, interests,
and practices.

This type of case was often reflected in

charges of disloyalty or insubordination.

The cosmo

politan "victims" marched to a different drum beat, as
it were, and suffered localistically justified reprisals.
President Rainey of Texas, for instance, was dismissed
from office by the Board because of discord in their
relation.

He thought it more important to defend cosmo

politan principles of academic freedom, rather than to
jeopardize the integrity of his faculty by courting
the pleasure of the Board and seeking harmony between
himself and the Regents.

There are many variations on

this theme among the censure cases.

To designate victims

such as President Rainey as cosmopolitans is not meant
to imply that they were "disloyal" to their insti
tutions by virtue of their cosmopolitanism,

as

far as

can be ascertained from the record, roost of the cosmo
politans displayed commendable loyalty and firm
appreciation of their institutions,

very often, it

was simply a case of cosmopolitan versus local conceptions
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of the proper organization and function of the school,
in this light a cosmopolitan could hardly be expected
to approve uncritically each and every action of his
administrators and trustees, who may have been operating
on different values entirely.
in sum, patterns of academic organization
comprise not only the framework within which issues of
academic freedom, tenure, and due process arise, but
also the substantive source of these issues.

This is

particularly true of the structure of authority (in
cluding the role of the faculty) in a formal sense
and the values to which the members of the academy
adhere, which form the basis for reference organization.
III.
PATTERNS OF AAUP
INTERVENTION: CENSURE IMPOSED
The American Association of university Pro
fessors places primary responsibility for the Associ
ation's intervention in the cases under study with
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure.

The

prescribed procedures which guide the actions
sanctioned by Committee A have been reviewed in
Chapter III.

The actual patterns of AAUP intervention

in the twenty-one cases departed little, on the whole,
from these prescriptions and thus require only brief
attention in the present context.
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The patterns of AAUP intervention to the
point of censure may be outlined as follows:
1.

informal conciliation

2.

Appointment of an investigating
committee

3.

on-campus investigation

4.

Preparation and publication
of findings

5.

imposition of censure^8

In all instances among the twenty-one cases the
Association attempted to resolve or reconcile the reported
conflict in order to prevent its becoming a "case" at
all.

Usually, such action took the form of communi

cation between the Washington office with administrative
officials or trustees, informing of a complaint, requesting
clarification of the situation, and (sometimes a separate
step) offering the good offices of the Association in a
conciliatory fashion.

In this preliminary stage the

Association would briefly state the relevance of AAUP
49
principles to the situation.
in some cases, these early
conciliatory offers were rebuffed by college officials to
the effect that "It is none of your business."

In other

cases, conciliatory offers were accepted in part, but
were unsuccessful in the end.
Upon the failure of informal conciliation, the
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AAUP proceeded to the formal stage of appointing and
briefing an investigating committee.

As mentioned

earlier in this chapter this step was not taken in some
of the "national security" cases which were handled by
an ad hoc committee (which relied on published facts
rather than on-campus investigations).

B y this point

the Association/ through the activity of its staff,
had usually gathered many facts and had clarified some
of the issues of the case.

The information gained in

this manner was used to brief the ad hoc investigating
committees appointed by the General Secretary.

As far

as the composition of the investigating committee is
concerned, the ideal sought, but not always achieved,
was
. . . to have represented on the
committee someone with previous
experience, someone from the region,
someone from the discipline of the
complaining teacher, someone with
legal training.50
The on-campus investigations usually required
at least two full days in which the members of the
committee sought to interview most of the parties
involved in the case.

The committees usually planned

as much as possible for the investigation and made
arrangements prior to arrival to facilitate the
investigation.

The investigating committee in all
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instances sought to make clear, as the Washington office
has done in advance, that the committee has an exclusively
fact-finding function and seeks all available information
on all sides of the i s s u e s . ^
Following the campus visit the members of the
investigating committee collaborated in writing a
report for the Association including a summary o f the
facts of the case, an interpretation of the bearing of
AAUP principles to the issues of the case, and recom
mendations for Committee A action.

According to the

prescribed rules these reports were submitted to the
chief parties in the case for correction of any errors
of fact.

With Committee A approval, which often followed

rewriting of the report, it was approved for publication
in an issue of the AAUP Bulletin.
The final step entails the imposition of
censure by the procedures described in Chapter III.
However, imposition of censure does not terminate AAUP
intervention in any of the censure cases.

These later

steps pertain to removal of the case from censured
status.
IV.

PATTERNS OF RESOLUTION:
CENSURE REMOVED

Intervention of the American Association of
University Professors extends until censure is removed
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from an institution.

Each fall the General Secretary

writes to the administration of each institution
currently on the censure list urging resolution of the
case in accordance with the principles of the 1940
statement.

If appropriate, the Association offers to

have a conference between its representatives and the
administrative officers of an institution in the interests
of a settlement,

in order for censure to be removed and

for a case to be closed. Committee A has to be satisfied
that the conditions which led to censure have been
alleviated.
According to the 1965 Association self-survey
report " . . .

it seems that censured administrations may

be required to meet one or more of three sorts of
conditions*"5^
They may be required to give
evidence of reform (by changing
their rules and regulations and
replacing liable personnel); they
may be required to give evidence
of repentance (by admitting to
past mistakes and promising not to
stray again); they may be required
to give evidence of redress (by
making amends to the individual
for injuries suffered at their
hands.*3
Of the three conditions reform has received
the most emphasis as a requirement for censure removal.

54

Reform usually entails organizational changes in harmony
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with Association principles.

These reformative changes

tend to ensure the future security of Association
principles whereas repentance and redress are linked
to the particular case,

until the 1950's redress was

never insisted upon by the Association/ and repentance
from the offending administrations was seldom forthcoming.

55
There is, finally, the question of the effective-

a‘

ness of the AAUP's whole program of advocacy of academic
freedom.

These questions cannot be evaluated fully in

the present context.

As an agency of codification of

principles of academic freedom, tenure, and due process,
the AATJP has been accorded high esteem in the academic
profession.

The principles which have been promulgated

by the Association since 1915 have been assimilated into
the entire profession.

Some thirty-five learned

societies and educational associations have endorsed
the 1940 statement.56

As an agency of implementation

of these principles the record of the AAUP is also
remarkable.

The channels by which it seeks to implement

its standards are moral rather than legal.

The Associ

ation is generally recognized as having minimized the
■ ex parte character of its intervention.

Its fairness
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has been exemplified in its presentation of case reports.
If fault is found on the part of a complainant the
misdemeanor is reported along with the encroachments
of offending administrators.

In spite of the fact that

it has no legal force the Association has been able to
secure the cooperation of errant institutions in
resolving the censure cases expeditiously.

Finally,

the Association's record is enhanced by the fact that
is has been able to effect organizational reform in the
censure cases,

in the view of the author such reform

is crucial to the future of academic freedom, tenure,
and due process.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Prior to the formation of the American Associ
ation of university Professors in 1915, relatively little
scholarly attention had been devoted to the subject of
academic freedom in the United States,

in recent decades,

however, a sizeable literature on the subject has accumu
lated.

Most of this literature is exhortative rather than

scholarly in nature.

Among scholarly works the main

concerns have been either the philosophical rationale
or the historical genesis and development of academic
freedom.

Particularly important historical work in

recent years has been contributed by Hofstadter, Metzger,
Maciver, and others.

Noticeably missing from the growing

academic freedom literature, however, is any systematic
examination of the subject from a sociological per
spective.

The primary purpose of this study has been

to develop a sociological conception of academic freedom
from an analysis of the social context in which it
operates.

The main results of this analysis may now be

summarized.
The social context of academic freedom consists,
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on the one hand, of the internal organization of colleges
and universities, and on the other hand, of forces in
the academic profession at large, foremost among which
is the American Association of university professors
as an advocate of academic freedom.

Prior to the

establishment of the AAUP there had been little collective
advocacy of academic freedom within the profession.

The

earlier history of academic freedom is primarily, though
not exclusively, the story of events and decisions in
particular colleges and universities.

Thus, the work

of the historian is especially well suited for the
analysis of the development of academic freedom prior
to the present century.

Beginning approximately with

the founding of the AAUP, which greatly increased
collective action in the academic profession as a
whole, the sociologist is able to contribute to the
scholarly discussion of the subject of academic freedom.
As a national association, the AAUP is not
only external to the academic organization of the two
thousand colleges and universities of the United states.
It also has no legal authority over the affairs of a
particular institution.

The force of its advocacy of

principles of academic freedom is essentially moral,
resting as it does on the value commitments of the
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profession as a whole as well as those of its constituents.
'The force of the Association's policies is aided by the
fact that its members, as faculty members of particular
institutions, are carriers of its values and supporters
of its norms with reference to local situations.

The

work of local members is advanced through the organ of
the local AAUP "chapter" as the framework for discussion
and collective action.
The force of the AAUP's promotion of academic
freedom is furthered through the endorsement of its
principles by other educational associations and learned
societies.

The Association of American Colleges, an

organization of administrators, has jointly sponsored
the 1925 and the 1940 statements of principles.

More and

more the principles of the AAUP are becoming those of
the profession as a whole.
There are several means by which the Associ
ation seeks to implement its principles of academic
freedom.

Chief among these is the censure of adminis

trative officers and/or trustees of institutions for
serious violations of principles of academic freedom and
tenure.

Its work in this connection is probably the

most widely known aspect of AAUP activity within and
beyond the profession.
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The salutary effects deriving from its censure
activity are widely recognized but difficult to measure.
These benefits stem partly from the judiciousness of
Association procedures in censure cases.

It has sought

to minimize the ex parte character of its investigation
and censure of institutions.

Censure, and the procedures

attendant to it, are not conceived as partisan intervention
in behalf of injured members, but rather intervention
on behalf of ideals which benefit the entire academic
community in fulfilling its primary functions, the
attainment and dissemination of knowledge.

Thus, the

moral force of AAUP censure is not attenuated b y charges
of partisanship.
The other aspect of the social context of aca
demic freedom examined in this study is the internal
structure of colleges and universities, specifically
the roles of faculty, administrators, and trustees.

In

Chapter IV, in which this subject was treated, two types
of academic organization were distinguished:

one, the

formal or official organization of authority in insti
tutional governance, and, the other, the reference
organization based on the value commitments of the
institutional citizenry.
The formal or official organization of a college
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or university prescribes the legitimate structure within
which institutional decisions and policies are made.

The

manner and degree to which faculty authority is allowed
and promoted in the official organization affects not
only the morale but the academic freedom of the faculty.
If institutional authority is concentrated in adminis
trative roles so that the faculty has no functional
autonomy, then the faculty has no secure hold on any
aspect of academic freedom.

Such freedom as it may

enjoy in these circumstances comes to it by default ,
as it were, of administrative prerogatives and at the
pleasure of individual presidents and deans.
From the perspective of academic organization,
academic freedom is comprised of norms which govern the
action of academic citizens.

The most essential normative

components of academic freedom are the following:
(1)

In his role as an academic specialist,

a faculty member is free to criticize and to challenge
accepted theories, beliefs, and practices related to
his field of competence.
(2)

in his role as a citizen of the insti

tution in which he serves, a faculty member is free to
criticize the official policies and practices of his
institution, including the actions of administrative
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officers and trustees.
(3)

in his role as a member of the academic

profession, a faculty member is free to defend his
colleagues against perceived threats to, or violations
of, their academic freedom.
These norms may be considered prerogatives of
faculty members, each norm being attached to a special
faculty role:

specialist, institutional citizen, and

professional colleague.

These norms of freedom constitute

measures of authority vested in the faculty.

In order

to thrive in practice these norms must be lodged in
patterns of academic organization which encourage their
exercise.

Conceived in this manner academic freedom is

part and parcel of the official authority structure of
a college or university.

Genuine and legitimated faculty

participation in institutional governance is essential
to the prospects for academic freedom.
The unofficial patterns of reference organi
zation within colleges and universities also have import
for the maintenance of norms of academic freedom in
practice.

In Chapter IV, academic organization was

analyzed in terms of the reference group composition
of the faculty and administration, especially according
to the distinction between cosmopolitans and locals.
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Whereas locals share a primary identification with the
local institution and its official values and norms,
cosmopolitans subscribe to values derived from a more
universal culture (including the AAUP).

The cleavage

between cosmopolitans and locals is likely to be
reflected in differential conceptions of university
goals and functions.

Cosmopolitans are far more likely

than locals to support norms of academic freedom and
the values upon which these norms are based,

owing to

the demands of administrative roles as they are usually
structured, administrators are more likely to be
localistic than cosmopolitan.

Thus, without official

channels for the exercise of faculty authority, academic
freedom is likely to be diminished because of the adverse
value commitments of some administrative personnel.
Academic freedom, thus, is intimately linked
to its social context, including especially the patterns
of internal academic organization and the activity of
such external forces as the AAUP.

The examination of

AAUP censure cases in Chapter V demonstrated the relevance
of patterns of academic structure to violations of
principles of academic freedom.

As a rule the infractions

occurred in situations in which faculty authority was
trammeled.

Very often the violations were tied to
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administrative denial of the right of the faculty to
criticize, much less to formulate, institutional
policy.

The majority of dismissals apparently were

of cosmopolitans who had not “internalized11 the
localistic values of their colleagues in administrative
positions.

The censure cases were resolved mainly by

reforms in the policy and organization of the offending
institutions relative to principles of academic good
practices as formulated by the AAUP.
How can an observer, a sociologist for instance,
determine whether academic freedom prevails in a given
college or university?

The preceding discussion would

suggest that he would look first to the official
organization of the institution.

Some colleges and

universities have explicit policies which reflect
institutionalized norms of academic freedom.

In the

absence of such explicit policies, the observer would
then examine the authority structure of the institution
to determine the extensiveness of faculty autonomy in
certain kinds of policy-making.

The assumption here

is that a diminution of faculty authority is incompatible
with academic freedom.
In the absence of official channels of faculty
influence, how may the extent of academic freedom be

■
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assessed?

In the author's judgment, if there are no

formal, legitimate channels for faculty participation
in institutional decision-making, the prospects for
academic freedom are precarious at best.

It is not

feasible for an observer to interview faculty members
with the intent of polling their opinions on the extent
of academic freedom.

As mentioned earlier in this

study, faculty members may misperceive the extent of
academic freedom in an objective sense,
quite free to express personal views.
freedom is, however, subjective,

They may feel
This type of

in the absence of heter

ogeneous opinions and values, in a local academic community
characterized by value consensus on matters that would be
controversial elsewhere, subjective feelings of freedom
are misleading.
It is the author's conviction that without
manifest patterns of faculty authority the only manner
in which the presence or absence of academic freedom
can be determined is by examining what happens when the
norms o f academic freedom are practiced by an individual.
For instance, an observer may inquire into what transpires
when a faculty member criticizes administrative policy
(e.g., the lack of faculty participation).

From the

observer's point of view this is a form of testing.

If
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reprisals follow, and assuming no fault on the part of
the faculty member, then academic freedom in the aspect
tested does not exist.

Without such challenges to

administrative authority, an observer cannot determine
whether, or to what extent, academic freedom prevails.
This study has been undertaken in spite of
these methodological obstacles with the conviction that
academic freedom is a worthy subject for sociological
inquiry, and that important subjects should not be
avoided simply because they are difficult to research.
This study, with its announced limitations of scope, is
but a starting point for sociological investigation of
the subject.

Its task has been primarily conceptual.

An attempt has been made to bring to bear on the subject
a conceptual framework from sociology to enhance scholarly
understanding of academic freedom.

A number of hypo

theses pertaining to both academic freedom and academic
organization have been advanced which may lead to more
fruitful research by the sociologist, who is at least
as vulnerable as any other citizen of the academic
community to attacks upon academic freedom.
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APPENDIX A
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE
1915 STATEMENT
I.

General Declaration of Principles

The term "academic freedom" has traditionally
had two applications — to the freedom of the teacher
and to that of the student, Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreihelt.
It need scarpely be pointed out that the freedom which
is the subject of this report is that of the teacher.
Academic freedom in this sense comprises three elements:
freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching
within the university or college? and freedom of extra
mural utterance and action. The first of these is
almost everywhere so safeguarded that the dangers of
its infringement are slight*
It may therefore be
disregarded in this report. The second and third phases
of academic freedom are closely related, and are often
not distinguished. The third, however, has an importance
of its own, since of late it has perhaps more frequently
been the occasion of difficulties and controversies than
has the question of freedom of intra-academic teaching.
All five of the cases which have recently been investigated
by committees of this Association have involved, at least
as one factor, the right of university teachers to express
their opinions freely outside the university or to engage
in political activities in their capacity as citizens.
The general principles which have to do with freedom
of teaching in both these senses seem to the committee
to be in great part, though not wholly, the same,
in
this report, therefore, we shall consider the matter
primarily with reference to freedom of teaching within
the university, and shall assume that what is said
thereon is also applicable to the freedom of speech of
university teachers outside their institutions, subject
to certain qualifications and supplementary considerations
which will be pointed out in the course of the report.
An adequate discussion of academic freedom must
necessarily consider three matters:
(1) the scope and
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basis of the power exercised by those bodies having
ultimate legal authority in academic affairs; (2)
the nature of the academic calling; (3) the function
of the academic institution or university.
1.

Basis of academic authority

American institutions of learning are usually
controlled by boards of trustees as the ultimate reposi
tories of power, upon them finally it devolves to
determine the measure of academic freedom which is to
be realized in the several institutions,
it therefore
becomes necessary to inquire into the nature of the
trust reposed in these boards, and to ascertain to whom
the trustees are to be considered accountable.
The simplest case is that of a proprietary
school or college designed for the propagation of
specific doctrines prescribed by those who have
furnished its endowment.
It is evident that in such
cases the trustees are bound by the deed of gift, and,
whatever be their own views, are obligated to carry
out the terms of the trust.
If a church or religious
denomination establishes a college to be governed by
a board of trustees, with the express understanding
that the college will be used as an instrument of
propaganda in the interests of the religious faith
professed by the church or denomination creating it,
the trustees have a right to demand that everything
be subordinated to that end.
if, again, as has
happened in this country, a wealthy manufacturer
establishes a special school in a University in order
to teach, among other things, the advantages of a
protective tariff, or if, as is also the case, an
institution has been endowed for the purpose of
propagating the doctrines of socialism, the situation
is analogous. All of these are essentially proprietary
institutions, in the moral sense. They do not, at
least as regards one particular subject, accept the
principles of freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of
teaching; and their purpose is not to advance
knowledge by the unrestricted research and unfettered
discussion of impartial investigators, but rather to
subsidize the promotion of the opinions held by the
persons, usually not of the scholar's calling, who
provide the funds for their maintenance. Concerning
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the desirability of the existence of such institutions,
the committee does not desire to express any opinion*
But it is manifestly important that they should not be
permitted to sail under false colors. Genuine boldness
and thoroughness of inquiry, and freedom of speech, are
scarcely reconcilable with the prescribed inculcation
of a particular opinion upon a controverted question.
Such institutions are rare, however, and are
becoming ever more rare, we still have, indeed,
colleges under denominational auspices; but very few
of them impose upon their trustees responsibility for
the spread of specific doctrines. They are more and
more coming to occupy, with respect to the freedom
enjoyed by the members of their teaching bodies,
the position of untrammeled institutions of learning,
and are differentiated only by the natural influence
of their respective historic antecedents and tra
ditions.
Leaving aside, then, the small number of insti
tutions of the proprietary type, what is the nature of
the trust reposed in the governing boards of the ordinary
institutions of learning? Can colleges and universities
that are not strictly bound by their founders to a
propagandist duty ever be included in the class of
institutions that we have just described as being in
a moral sense proprietary? The answer is clear.
If
the former class of institutions constitute a private
or proprietary trust, the latter constitute a public
trust. The trustees are trustees for the public.
In
the case of our state universities this is self-evident.
In the case of most of our privately endowed institutions,
the situation is really not different. They cannot be
permitted to assume the proprietary attitude and privilege,
if they are appealing to the general public for support.
Trustees of such universities or colleges have no moral
right to bind the reason or the conscience of any
professor. All claim to such right is waived by the
appeal to the general public for contributions and
for moral support in the maintenance, not of a propa
ganda, but of a non-partisan institution of learning.
It follows that any university which lays restrictions
upon the intellectual freedom of its professors proclaims
itself a proprietary institution, and should be so
described whenever it makes a general appeal for funds;
and the public should be advised that the institution
has no claim whatever to general support or regard.
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This elementary distinction between a private
and a public trust is not yet so universally accepted
as it should be in our American institutions. While
in many universities and colleges the situation has
come to be entirely satisfactory, there are others in
which the relation of trustees to professors is apparently
still conceived to be analogous to that of a private
employer to his employees; in which, therefore,
trustees are not regarded as debarred by any moral
restrictions, beyond their own sense of expediency,
from imposing their personal opinions upon the
teaching of the institution, or even from employing
the power of dismissal to gratify their private
antipathies or resentments. An eminent university
president thus described the situation not many years
since:
"In the institutions of higher edu
cation the board of trustees is the
body on whose discretion, good
feeling, and experience the securing
of academic freedom now depends.
There are boards which leave nothing
to be desired in these respects; but
there are also numerous bodies that
have everything to learn with regard
to academic freedom. These barbarous
boards exercise an arbitrary power of
dismissal. They exclude from the
teachings of the university unpopular
or dangerous subjects.
In some states
they even treat professors* positions
as common political spoils; and all
too frequently, both in state and
endowed institutions, they fail to
treat the members of the teaching
staff with that high consideration
to which their functions entitle
them."*
It is, then, a prerequisite to a realization of
the proper measure of academic freedom in American
*From "Academic Freedom," an address delivered
before the New York Chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa Society
at Cornell University, May 29, 1907, by Charles William
Eliot, LL.D., President of Harvard university.
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institutions of learning, that all boards of trustees
should understand - as many already do - the full
implications of the distinction between private
proprietorship and a public trust.
2.

The nature of the academic calling

The above-mentioned conception of a university
as an ordinary business venture, and of academic teaching
as a purely private employment, manifests also a radical
failure to apprehend the nature of the social function
discharged by the professional scholar. While we should
be reluctant to believe that any large number of educated
persons suffer from such a misapprehension, it seems
desirable at this time to restate clearly the chief
reasons, lying in the nature of the university teaching
profession, why it is to the public interest that the
professorial office should be one both of dignity and of
independence.
If education is the corner stone of the structure
of society and if progress in scientific knowledge is
essential to civilization, few things can be more
important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar's
profession, with a view to attracting into its ranks
men of the highest ability, of sound learning, and of
strong, and independent character. This is the more
essential because the pecuniary emoluments of the
profession are not, and doubtless never will be,
equal to those open to the more successful members of
other professions.
It is not, in our opinion, desirable
that men should be drawn into this profession by the
magnitude of the economic rewards which it offers; but
it is for this reason the more needful that men of high
gifts and character should be drawn into it by the
assurance of an honorable and secure position, and of
freedom to perform honestly and according to their own
consciences the distinctive and important function which
the nature of the profession lays upon them.
That function is to deal at first hand, after
prolonged and specialized technical training, with the
sources of knowledge; and to impart the results of
their own and of their fellow-specialists' investigations
and reflection, both to students and to the general
public, without fear or favor. The proper discharge
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of this function requires (among other things) that the
university teacher shall be exempt from any pecuniary
motive or inducement to hold, or to express, any
conclusion which is not the genuine and uncolored product
of his own study or that of fellow-speciallsts.
indeed,
the proper fulfillment of the work of the professorate
requires that our universities shall be so free that no
fair-minded person shall find any excuse for even a
suspicion that the utterances of university teachers
are shaped or restricted by the judgment, not of
professional scholars, but of inesqpert and possibly
not wholly disinterested persons outside of their ranks.
The lay public is under no compulsion to accept or to
act upon the opinions of. the scientific experts whom,
through the universities, it employs. But is is highly
needful, in the interest of society at large, that what
purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and
dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be
the conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the
opinions of the lay public, or of the individuals who
endow or manage universities. To the degree that
~ professional scholars, in the formation and promulgation
of their opinions, are, or by the character of their
tenure appear to be, subject to any motive other than
their own scientific conscience and a desire for the
respect of their fellow-experts, to that degree the
university teaching profession is corrupted; its
proper influence upon public opinion is diminished
and vitiated; and society at large fails to get from
its scholars, in an unadulterated form, the peculiar
and necessary service which it is the office of the
professional scholar to furnish.
These considerations make still more clear
the nature of the relationship between university
trustees and members of university faculties. The
Latter are the appointees, but not in any proper sense
the employees, of the former. For, once appointed,
the scholar has professional functions to perform in
which the appointing authorities have neither competency
nor moral right to intervene. The responsibility of
the university teacher is primarily to the public
itself, and to the judgment of his own profession;
and while, with respect to certain external conditions
of his vocation, he accepts a responsibility to the
authorities of the institution in which he serves,
in the essentials of his professional activity his
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duty is to the wider public to which the institution
itself is morally amenable.
So far as the university
teacher's independence of thought and utterance is
concerned - though not in other regards - the
relationship of professor to trustees may be compared
to that between judges of the Federal courts and the
Executive who appoints them.
Uhiversity teachers
should be understood to be, with respect to the
conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more
subject to the control of the trustees, than are
judges subject to the control of the President,
with respect to their decisions; while of course,
for the same reason, trustees are no more to be held
responsible for, or to be presumed to agree with,
the opinions or utterances of professors, than the
President can be assumed to approve of all the legal
reasonings of the courts. A university is a great
and indispensable organ of the higher life of a
civilized community, in the work of which the
trustees hold an essential and highly honorable place,
but in which the faculties hold an independent place,
with quite equal responsibilities - and in relation
to purely scientific and educational questions, the
primary responsibility. Misconception or obscurity
in this matter has undoubtedly been a source of
occasional difficulty in the past, and even in several
instances during the current year, however much, in
the main, a long tradition of kindly and courteous
intercourse between trustees and members of university
faculties has kept the question in the background.
3.
The function of
the academic institution
The importance of academic freedom is most
clearly perceived in the light of the purposes for
which universities exist. There are three in number;
A.

To promote inquiry and
advance the sum of human
knowledge.

B.

To provide general instruction
to the students.

C.

To develop experts for various
branches of the public service.
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Let us consider each of these,
in the earlier
stages of a nation's intellectual development, the chief
concern of the educational institutions is to train the
growing generation and to diffuse the already accepted
knowledge,
it is only slowly that there comes to be
provided in the highest institutions of learning the
opportunity for the gradual wresting from nature of
her intimate secrets. The modern university is becoming
more and more the home of scientific research. There
are three fields of human inquiry in which the race is
only at the beginnings
natural science, social science,
and philosophy and religion, dealing with the relations
of man to outer nature, to his fellow men, and to the
ultimate realities and values.
In natural science all
that we have learned but serves to make us realize
more deeply how much more refrains to be discovered.
In social science in its largest sense, which is
concerned with the relations of men in society and
with the conditions of social order and well-being,
we have learned only an adumbration of the laws which
govern these vastly complex phenomena.
Finally, in the
spiritual life, and in the interpretation of the general
meaning and ends of human existence and its relation to
the universe, we are still far from~a comprehension of
the final truths, and from a universal agreement among
all sincere and earnest men.
In all of these domains
of knowledge, the first condition of progress is
complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and
public its results.
Such freedom is the breath in
the nostrils of all scientific activity.
The second function - which for a long time
was the only function - of the American college or
university is to provide instruction for students.
It is scarcely open to question that freedom of
utterance is as important to the teacher as it is
to the investigator.
No man can be a successful
teacher unless he enjoys the respect of his students,
and their confidence in his intellectual integrity,.
It is clear, however, that this confidence will be
impaired if there is suspicion on the part of the
student that the teacher is not expressing himself
fully or frankly, or that college and university
teachers in general are a repressed and intimidated
class who dare not speak with that candor and courage
which youth always demands in those whom it is to
esteem. The average student is a discerning observer,
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who soon takes the measure of his instructor.
It is
not only the character of the instruction but also
the character of the instructor that counts; and if
the student has reason to believe that the instructor
is not true to himself, the virtue of the instruction
as an educative force is incalculably diminished*
There must be in the mind of the teacher no mental
reservation. He must give the student the best of
what he has and what he is.
The third function of the modern university
is to develop experts for the use of the community.
If there is one thing that distinguishes the more
recent developments of democracy, it is the recognition
by legislators of the inherent complexities of economic,
social, and political life, and the difficulty of
solving problems of technical adjustment without technical
knowledge.
The recognition of this fact has led to a
continually greater demand for the aid of experts in
these subjects, to advise both legislators and
administrators. The training of such experts has,
accordingly, in recent years, become an.,important
part of*the work of the universities; and in almost
every one of our higher institutions of learning the
professors of the economic, social, and political
sciences have been drafted to an increasing extent
into more or less unofficial participation in the
public service.
It is obvious that here again the
scholar must be absolutely free not only to pursue
his investigations but to declare the results of his
researches, no matter where they may lead him or to
what extent they may come into conflict with accepted
opinion. To be of use to the legislator or the
administrator, he must enjoy their complete
confidence in the disinterestedness of his conclusions.
It is clear, then, that the university cannot
perform its threefold function without accepting and
enforcing to the fullest extent the principle of
academic freedom. The responsibility of the university
as a whole is to the community at large, and any
restriction upon the freedom of the instructor is
bound to react injuriously upon the efficiency and
the morale of the institution, and therefore
ultimately upon the interests of the community.
The attempted infringements of academic
freedom at present are probably not only of less
frequency than, but of a difference character from,
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those to be found in former times, in the early period
of university development in America the chief menace
to academic freedom was ecclesiastical, and the disciplines
chiefly affected were philosophy and the natural sciences.
In more recent times the danger zone has been shifted to
the political and social sciences - though we still have
sporadic examples of the former class of cases in some
of our smaller institutions. But it is precisely in
these provinces of knowledge in which academic freedom
is now most likely to be threatened, that the need for
it is at the same time most evident. No person of
intelligence believes that all of our political problems
have been solved, or that the final stage of social
evolution has been reached. Grave issues in the adjust
ment of m e n 's social and economic relations are certain
to call for settlement in the years that are to come;
and for the right settlement of them mankind will need
all the wisdom, all the good will, all the soberness
of mind, and all the knowledge drawn from experience,
that it can command.
Towards this settlement the
university has potentially its own very great
contribution to make; for if the adjustment reached
is to be a wise one, it must take due account of
economic science, and be guided by that breadth of
historic vision which it should be one of the functions
of a university to cultivate.
But if the universities
are to render any such service towards the right solution
of the social problems of the future, it is the first
essential that the scholars who carry on the work of
universities shall not be in a position of dependence
upon the favor of any social class or group,, that the
disinterestedness, and impartiality of their inquiries
and their conclusions shall be, so far as is humanly
possible, beyond the reach of suspicion.
The special dangers to freedom of teaching in
the domain of the social sciences are evidently two.
The one which is the more likely to affect the privately
endowed colleges and universities is the danger of
restrictions upon the expression of opinions which
point towards extensive social innovations, or call
in question the moral legitimacy or social expediency
of economic conditions or commercial practices in
which large vested interests are involved.
In the
political, social, and economic field almost every
question, no matter how large and general it at first
appears, is more or less affected with private or
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class interests; and, as the governing body of a uni
versity is naturally made up of men Who through their
standing and ability are personally interested in
great private enterprises, the points of possible
conflict are numberless. When to this is added the
consideration that benefactors, as well as most of
the parents who send their children to privately
endowed institutions, themselves belong to the more
prosperous and therefore usually to the more con
servative classes, it is apparent that, so long as
effectual safeguards for academic freedom are not
established, there is a real danger that pressure
from vested interests may, sometimes deliberately
and sometimes unconsciously, sometimes openly and
sometimes subtly and in obsure ways, be brought to
bear upon academic authorities.
On the other hand, in our state universities
the danger may be the reverse, where the university
is dependent for funds upon legislative favor, it has
sometimes happened that the conduct of the institution
has been affected by political considerations; and
where there is a definite governmental policy or a
strong public feeling on economic, social, or
political questions, the menace to academic freedom
may consist in the repression of opinions that in
the particular political situation are deemed ultra
conservative rather than ultra-radical. The essential
point, however, is not so much that the opinion is of
one or another shade, as that it differs from the views
entertained by the authorities. The question resolves
itself into one of departure from accepted standards;
whether the departure is in the one direction or the
other is immaterial.
This brings us to the most serious difficulty
of this problem; namely, the dangers connected with
the existence in a democracy of an overwhelming
and concentrated public opinion.
The tendency of
modern democracy is for men to think alike, to feel
alike, and to speak alike. Any departure from the
conventional standards is apt to be regarded with
suspicion. Public opinion is at once the chief
safeguard of a democracy, and the chief menace to
the real liberty of the individual.
It almost seems
as if the danger of despotism cannot be wholly averted
under any form of government.
In a political autocracy
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there is no effective public opinion, and all are subject
to the tyranny of the ruler; in a democracy there is
political freedom, but there is likely to be a tyranny
of public opinion.
An inviolable refuge from such tyranny should
be found in the university.
It should be an intellectual
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and
where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community
as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, per
chance, it may become a part of the accepted intellectual
food of the nation or of the world. Not less is it a
distinctive duty of the university to be the conservator
of all genuine elements of value in the past thought
and life of mankind which are not in the fashion of the
moment. Though it need not be the "home of beaten
causes," the university, is, indeed, likely always to
exercise a certain form of conservative influence. For
by its nature it is committed to the principle that
knowledge should precede action, to the caution (by no
means synonymous with intellectual timidity) which is an
essential part of the scientific method, to a sense of the
complexity of social problems, to the practice of taking
long views into the future, and to a reasonable regard
for the teachings of experience, one of its most
characteristic functions in a democratic society is to
help make public opinion more self-critical and more
circumspect, to check the more hasty and unconsidered
impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to
the habit of looking before and after. It is precisely
this function of the university which is most injured
by any restriction upon academic freedom; and it is
precisely those who most value this aspect of the
university's work who should most earnestly protest
against any such restriction. For the public may
respect, and be influenced by, the counsels of prudence
and of moderation which are given by men of science,
if it believes those counsels to be the disinterested
expression of the scientific temper and of unbiased
inquiry.
It is little likely to respect or heed them
if it has reason to believe that they are the expression
of the interests, or the timidities, of the limited
portion of the community which is in a position to
endow institutions of learning, or is most likely to
be represented upon their boards of trustees. And a
plausible reason for this belief is given the public
so long as our universities are not organized in such
a way as to make impossible any exercise of pressure
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upon professorial opinions and utterances by governing
boards of laymen.
Since there are no rights without corresponding
duties, the considerations heretofore set down with
respect to the freedom of the academic teacher entail
certain correlative obligations. The claim to freedom
of teaching is made in the interest of the Integrity and
of the progress of scientific inquiry; it is, therefore,
only those who carry on their work in the temper of the
scientific inquirer who may justly assert this claim.
The liberty of the scholar within the university to set
forth his conclusions, be they what they may, is con
ditioned b y their being conclusions gained by a scholar's
method and held in a scholar's spirit; that is to say,
they must be the fruits of competent and patient and
sincere inquiry, and they should be set forth with
dignity, courtesy and temperateness of language.
The
university teacher, in giving instruction upon contro
versial matters, while he is under no obligation to
hide his own opinion under a mountain of equivocal
verbiage, should, if he is fit for his position, be
a person of a fair and judicial mind; he should, in
dealing with such subjects, set forth justly, without
suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of
other investigators; he should cause his students
to become familiar with the best published expressions
o f the great historic types of doctrine upon the
questions at issue; and he should above all, remember
that his business is not to provide his students with
ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for
themselves, and to provide them access to those materials
which they need if they are to think intelligently.
It is, however, for reasons which have already
been made evident, inadmissible that the power of
determining when departures from the requirements
o f the scientific spirit and method have occurred,
should be vested in bodies not composed of members
o f the academic profession.
Such bodies necessarily
lack full competency to judge of those requirements;
their intervention can never be exempt from suspicion
that it is dictated by other motives than zeal for
the integrity of science; and it is, in any case,
unsuitable to the dignity of a great profession that
the initial responsibility for the maintenance of its
professional standards should not be in the hands of
its own members.
It follows that university teachers
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must be prepared to assume this responsibility for
themselves. They have hitherto seldom had the oppor
tunity, or perhaps the disposition, to do so. The
obligation will doubtless, therefore, seem to many an
unwelcome and burdensome one; and for its proper
discharge members of the profession will perhaps need
to acquire, in a greater measure than they at present
possess it, the capacity for impersonal judgment in
such cases, and for judicial severity when the
occasion requires it. But the responsibility cannot,
in this committee's opinion, be rightfully evaded.
If
this profession should prove itself unwilling to
purge its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy,
or to prevent the freedom which it claims in the
name of science from being used as a shelter for
inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical
and intemperate partisanship, it is certain that the
task will be performed by others - b y others who
lack certain essential qualifications for performing
it, and whose action is sure to breed suspicions and
recurrent controversies deeply injurious to the internal
order and the public standing of universities. Your
committee has, therefore, in the appended "Practical
Proposals" attempted to suggest means by which judicial
action by representatives of the profession with respect
to the matters here referred to, may be secured.
There is one case in which the academic
teacher is under an obligation to observe certain
special restraints - namely, the instruction of
immature students. In many of our American colleges,
and especially in the first two years of the course,
the student's character is not yet fully formed, his
mind is still relatively immature.
In these circum
stances it may reasonably be expected that the
instructor will present scientific truth with discretion,
that he will introduce the student to new conceptions
gradually, with some consideration for the student's
preconceptions and traditions, and with due regard
to character-building.
The teacher ought also to
be especially on his guard against taking unfair
advantage of the student's immaturity by indoctrinating
him with the teacher's own opinions before the
student has had an opportunity fairly to examine
other opinions upon the matters in question, and
before he has sufficient knowledge and ripeness
of judgment to be entitled to form any definitive
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opinion of his own.
It is not the least service which
a college or university may render to those under its
instruction, to habituate them to looking not only
patiently but methodically on both sides, before
adopting any conclusion upon controverted issues. By
these suggestions, however, it need scarcely be said
that the committee does not intend to imply that it
is not the duty of an academic instructor to give to
any students old enough to be in college a genuine
intellectual awakening and to arouse in them a keen
desire to reach personally verified conclusions upon
all questions of general concernment to mankind, or
of special significance for their own time. There
is much truth in some remarks recently made in this
connection by a college president:
"Certain professors have been
refused reelection lately,
apparently because they set their
students to thinking in ways
objectionable to the trustees.
It would be well if more
teachers were dismissed because
they fail to stimulate thinking
of any kind, we can afford to
forgive a college professor
what we regard as the occasional
error of his doctrine, especially
as we may be wrong, provided he
is a contagious center of
intellectual enthusiasm.
It is
better for students to think
about heresies than not to think
at all; better for them to climb
new trails, and stumble over
error if need be, than to ride
forever in upholstered ease in
the overcrowded highway.
It is
a primary duty of a teacher to
make a student take an honest
account of his stock of ideas,
throw out the dead matter, place
revised price marks on what is
left, and try to fill his empty
shelves with new goods."*

♦President William T. Foster in The Nation,
November 11, 1915.
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It is, however, possible and necessary that
such intellectual awakening be brought about with
patience, considerateness and pedagogical wisdom.
There is one further consideration with
regard to the classroom utterances of college and
university teachers to which the committee thinks
it important to call the attention of members of
the profession, and of administrative authorities.
Such utterances ought always to be considered
privileged communications. Discussions in the
classroom ought not to be supposed to be utterances
for the public at large. They are often designed
to provoke opposition or arouse debate,
it has,
unfortunately, sometimes happened in this country
that sensational newspapers have quoted and garbled
such remarks. As a matter of common law, it is
clear that the utterances of an academic instructor
ajre privileged, and may not be published, in whole
or part, without his authorization. But our practice,
unfortunately, still differs from that of foreign
countries, and no effective check has in this country
been put upon such unauthorized and often misleading
publication.
It is much to be desired that test
cases should be made of any infractions of the
rule.*
in their extra-mural utterances, it is
obvious that academic teachers are under a peculiar
obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or exaggerated
statements, and to refrain from intemperate or
sensational modes of expression. But, subject to
these restraints, it is not, in this committee’s
i

*The leading case is Abernethy vs. Hutchinson,
3, Tj. J., Ch. 209. in this case where damages were
awarded the court held as follows; "That persons
who are admitted as pupils or otherwise to hear
these lectures, although they are orally delivered
and the parties might go to the extent, if they
were able to do so, of putting down the whole by
means of shorthand, yet they can do that only for
the purpose of their own information and could not
publish, for profit, that which they had not
obtained the right of selling."
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opinion, desirable that scholars should be debarred
from giving expression to their judgments upon
controversial questions, or that their freedom of
speech, outside the university, should be limited
to questions falling within their own specialities.
It is clearly not proper that they should be
prohibited from lending their active support to
organized movements which they believe to be in
the public interest. And, speaking broadly, it may
be said in the words of a non-academic body already
once quoted in a publication of this Association,
that "it is neither possible nor desirable to deprive
a college professor of the political rights vouchsafed
to every citizen."*
It is, however, a question deserving of
consideration by members of this Association, and by
university officials, how far academic teachers, at
least those dealing with political, economic and
social subjects, should be prominent in the management
of our great party organizations, or should be candidates
for state or national offices of a distinctly political
character.
It is manifestly desirable that such
teachers have minds untrammeled by party loyalties,
unexcited by party enthusiasms, and unbiased by
personal political ambitions; and that universities
should remain uninvolved in party antagonisms, on
the other hand, it is equally manifest that the
material available for the service of the State
would be restricted in a highly undesirable way, if
it were understood that no member of the academic
profession should ever be called upon to assume the
responsibilities of public office. This question
may, in the committee's opinion, suitably be made a
topic for special discussion at some future meeting
of this Association, in order that a practical
policy, which shall do justice to the two partially
conflicting considerations that bear upon the matter,
may be agreed upon.
It is, it will be seen, in no sense the
contention of this committee that academic freedom
implies that individual teachers should be exempt
from all restraints as to the matter or manner of
*Report of the Wisconsin State Board of
Public Affairs, December 1914.
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their utterances, either within or without the uni
versity.
Such restraints as are necessary should in
the main, your committee holds, be self-imposed, or
enforced by the public opinion of the profession.
But there may, undoubtedly, arise occasional cases
in which the aberrations of individuals may require
to be checked by definite disciplinary action. What
this report chiefly maintains is that such action can
not with safety be taken by bodies not composed of
members of the academic profession. Lay governing
boards are competent to judge concerning charges of
habitual neglect of assigned duties, on the part of
individual teachers, and concerning charges of grave
moral delinquency. But in matters of opinion, and of
the utterance of opinion, such boards cannot intervene
without destroying, to the extent of their intervention,
the essential nature of a university - without con
verting it from a place dedicated to openness of mind,
in which the conclusions expressed are the tested con
clusions of trained scholars, into a place barred
against the access of new light, and precommitted
to the opinions or prejudices of men who have not
been set apart or expressly trained for the scholar's
duties,
it is, in short, not the absolute freedom
of utterance of the individual scholar, but the
absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion
and of teaching, of the academic profession, that is
asserted by this declaration of principles.
It is
conceivable that our profession may prove unworthy
of its high calling, and unfit to exercise the
responsibilities that belong to it. But it will
scarcely be said as yet to have given evidence of
such unfitness. And the existence of this Associ
ation, as it seems to your committee, must be
construed as a pledge, not only that the profession
will earnestly guard those liberties without which
it can not rightly render its distinctive and
indispensable service to society, but also that it
will with equal earnestness seek to maintain such
standards of professional character, and of scientific
integrity and competency, as shall make it a fit
instrument for that service.
II.

Practical Proposals

As the foregoing declaration implies, the ends
to be accomplished are chiefly three:
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First: To safeguard freedom of inquiry and
of teaching against both covert and overt attacks, by
providing suitable judicial bodies, composed of members
of the academic profession, which may be called into
action before university teachers are dismissed or
disciplined, and may determine in what cases the question
of academic freedom is actually involved.
Second; By the same means, to protect college
executives and governing boards against unjust charges
of infringement of academic freedom, or of arbitrary
and dictatorial conduct - charges which, when they gain
wide currency and belief, are highly detrimental to
the good repute and the influence of universities.
Third: To render the profession more attractive
to men of high ability and strong personality by
insuring the dignity, the independence, and the
reasonable security of tenure, of the professional
office.
The measures which it is believed to be
necessary for our universities to adopt to realize
these ends - measures which have already been adopted
in part by some institutions - are four:
Action by Faculty Committees on Reap
pointments. official action- relating to reappointments
and refusals of reappointment should be taken only
with the advice and consent of some board or committee
representative of the faculty. Your committee does
not desire to make at this time any suggestion as to
the manner of selection of such boards.
B.
Definition of Tenure of office, in every
institution there should be an unequivocal understanding
as to the term of each appointment; and the tenure of
professorships and associate professorships, and of all
positions above the grade of instructor after ten years
of service, should be permanent (subject to the provisions
hereinafter given for removal upon charges). In those
state universities which are legally incapable of making
contracts for more than a limited period, the governing
boards should announce their policy with respect to the
presumption of reappointment in the several classes of
position, and such announcements, though not legally
enforceable, should be regarded as morally binding.
No university teacher of any rank should, except in
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cases o£ grave moral delinquency/ receive notice of
dismissal or of refusal of reappointment, later than
three months before the close of any academic year,
and in the case of teachers above the grade of
instructor, one year's notice should be given,,
C. Formulation of Grounds for Dismissal, in
every institution the grounds which will be regarded as
justifying the dismissal of members of the faculty should
be formulated with reasonable definiteness; and in the
case of institutions which impose upon their faculties
doctrinal standards of a sectarian or partisan character,
these standards should be clearly defined and the body
or individual having authority to interpret them, in
case of controversy, should be designated. Your com
mittee does not think it best at this time to attempt
to enumerate the legitimate grounds for dismissal,
believing it to be preferable that individual insti
tutions should take the initiative in this.
D. Judicial Hearings Before Dismissal. Every
university or college teacher should be entitled, before
dismissal* or demotion, to have the charges against him
stated in writing in specific terms and to have a fair
trial on those charges before a special or permanent
judicial committee chosen by the faculty senate or
council, or by the faculty at large. At such trial
the teacher accused should have full opportunity to
present evidence, and, if the charge is one of
professional incompetency, a formal report upon his
work should be first made in writing by the teachers
of his own department and of cognate departments in the
university, and, if the teacher concerned so desire,
by a committee of his fellow specialists from other
institutions, appointed by some competent authority.
The above declaration of principles and
practical proposals are respectfully submitted by your
committee to the approval of the Association, with the
suggestion that, if approved, they be recommended to the
*This does not refer to refusals of reap
pointment at the expiration of the terms of office of
teachers below the rank of associate professor. All
such questions of reappointment should, as above provided
be acted upon by a faculty committee.
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consideration of the faculties, administrative officers,
and governing hoards of the American universities and
colleges.

APPENDIX B
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OP UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
PRINCIPLES OP ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE
1925 STATEMENT
Academic Freedom
(a) A university or college may not place any
restraint upon the teacher’s freedom in investigation,
unless restriction upon the amount of time devoted to it
becomes necessary in order to prevent undue interference
with teaching duties.
(b) A university or college may not impose
any limitation upon the teacher's freedom in the
exposition of his own subject in the classroom or in
addresses and publications outside the college, except
in so far as the necessity of adapting instruction to
the needs of immature students, or, in the case of
institutions of a denominational or partisan character,
specific stipulations in advance, fully understood and
accepted by both parties, limit the scope and character
of instruction.
(c) No teacher may claim as his right the
privilege of discussing in his classroom controversial
topics outside his own field of study. The teacher is
morally bound not to take advantage of his position by
introducing into the classroom provocative discussions
of irrelevant subjects not within the field of his
study.
(d) A university or college should recognize
that the teacher in speaking and writing outside of the
institution upon subjects beyond the scope of his own
field of study is entitled to precisely the same freedom
and is subject to the same responsibility as attach to
all other citizens.
If the extramural utterances of a
teacher should be such as to raise grave doubts concerning
his fitness for his position, the question should in all
cases be submitted to an appropriate committee of the
252
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faculty of which he is a member.
It should be clearly
understood that an institution assumes no responsibility
for views expressed by members of its staff; and teachers
should, when necessary, take pains to make it clear that
they are expressing only their personal opinions.
Academic Tenure
(a) The precise terms and expectations of
every appointment should be stated in writing and be in
the possession of both college and teacher.
(b) Termination of a temporary or short-term
appointment should always be possible at the expiration
of the term by the mere act of giving timely notice of
the desire to terminate. The decision to terminate
should always be taken, however, in conference with the
department concerned, and might well be subject to
approval by a faculty or council committee or by the
faculty or council,
it is desirable that the question
of appointments for the ensuing year be taken up as
early as possible. Notice of the decision to terminate
should be given in ample time to allow the teacher an
opportunity to secure a new position. The extreme
limit for such notice should not be less than three
months before the expiration of the academic year. The
teacher who proposes to withdraw should also give
notice in ample time to enable the institution to
make a new appointment.
(c) It is desirable that termination of a
permanent or long-term appointment for cause should
regularly require action by both a faculty committee
and the governing board of the college. Exceptions
to this rule may be necessary in cases of gross
immorality or treason, when the facts are admitted.
In such cases summary dismissal would naturally ensue,
in cases where other offenses are charged, and in all
cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused
teacher should always have the opportunity to face
his accusers and to be heard in his own defense by
all bodies that pass judgment upon the case, in the
trial of charges of professional incompetence the
testimony of scholars in the same field, either
from his own or from other institutions, should
always be taken. Dismissal for reasons other than
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immorality or treason should not ordinarily take effect
in less than a year from the time the decision is
reachedo
(d)
Termination of permanent or long-term
appointments because of financial exigencies should be
sought only as a last resort, after every effort has
been made to meet the need in other ways and to find
for the teacher other employment in the institution.
Situations which make drastic entrenchment of this sort
necessary should preclude expansions of the staff at
other points at the same time, except in extraordinary
circumstances.

APPENDIX C
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE
1940 STATEMENT
The purpose of this statement is to promote
public understanding and support of academic freedom
and tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them
in colleges and universities.
Institutions of higher
education are conducted for the common good and not to
further the interest of either the individual teacher'?
or the institution as a whole. The common good depends
upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes
and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in
research is fundamental to the advancement of truth.
Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental
for the protection of the rights of the teacher in
teaching and of the student to freedom in learning.
It carries with it duties correlative with rights.
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifi
cally:
(1) Freedom of teaching and research and of
extramural activities, and (2) A sufficient degree of
economic security to make the profession attractive to
men and women of ability. Freedom and economic
security, hence tenure, are indispensable to the
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations
to its students and to society.
Academic Freedom
(a)
The teacher is entitled to full freedom
in research and in the publication of the results,

The word "teacher" as used in this document is
understood to include the investigator who is attached
to an academic institution without teaching duties.
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subject to the adequate performance of his other aca
demic duties; but research for pecuniary return should
be based upon an understanding with the authorities of
the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in
the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should
be careful not to introduce into his teaching contro
versial matter which has no relation to his subject.
Limitations of academic freedom because of religious
or other aims of the institution should be clearly
stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a
citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an
officer of an educational institution. When he speaks
or writes as a citizen, he should be free from insti
tutional censorship or discipline, but his special
position in the community imposes special obligations.
As a man of learning and an educational officer, he
should remember that the public may judge his profession
and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should
at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of
others, and should make every effort to indicate that
he is not an institutional spokesman.
Academic Tenure
(a) After the expiration of a probationary
period teachers or investigators should have permanent
or continuous tenure, and their services should be
terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case
of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circum
stances because of financial exigencies.
In the interpretation of this principle it
is understood that the following represents acceptable
academic practice;
(1) The precise terms and conditions of
every appointment should be stated in writing and be
in the possession of both institution and teacher
before the appointment is consummated.'
(2) Beginning with appointment to the rank
of full-time instructor or a higher rank, the probationary
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period should not exceed seven years, including within
this period full-time service in all institutions of
higher education; but subject to the proviso that when,
after a term of probationary service of more than three
years in one or more institutions, a teacher is called
to another institution it may be agreed in writing that
his new appointment is for a probationary period of not
more than four years, even though thereby the person's
total probationary period in the academic profession is
extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years.
Notice should be given at least one year prior to the
expiration of the probationary period if the teacher is
not to be continued in service after the expiration of
that period.
(3) During the probationary period a teacher
should have the academic freedom that all other members
of the faculty have.
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous ap
pointment, or the dismissal for cause of a teacher
previous to the expiration of a term appointment,
should, if possible, be considered by both a faculty
committee and the governing board of the institution.
In all cases where the facts are in dispute, the
accused teacher should be informed before the hearing
in writing of the charges against him and should have
the opportunity to be heard in his own defense by all
bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He should be
permitted to have with him an adviser of his own
choosing who may act as counsel. There should be a
full stenographic record of the hearing available to
the parties concerned,
in the hearing of charges
of incompetence the testimony should include that
of teachers and other scholars, either from his own
or from other institutions. Teachers on continuous
appointment who are dismissed for reasons not
involving moral turpitude should receive their
salaries for at least a year from the date of noti
fication of dismissal whether or not they are
continued in their duties at the institution.
(5) Termination of a continuous appointment
because of financial exigency should be demonstrably
bona fide.
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